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Literature Review: Inter-Identity Amnesia and Memory Retrieval 
The aim of this literature review is to explore the current state of research of amnesia 
in DID. At present, DID research has assessed the extent of inter-identity amnesia for 
procedural, semantic, episodic and semantic autobiographical memory. Findings have 
indicated that despite the subjective reports of amnesia supported by results gained using 
measures of explicit memory retrieval, more objective tests tend to indicate a pattern of inter-
identity transfer. As of yet, little research has explored episodic autobiographical memory in 
DID. As DID is a disorder characterised by separated identities that claim to have access to 





Phenomenology and Prevalence 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is regarded as the most chronic and severe of the 
dissociative disorders. The DSM-5 defines DID as a disruption of identity characterised by 
two or more distinct personality states. The disruption involves marked discontinuity of sense 
of self and sense of agency. Amnesia for everyday and/or traumatic events, as well as 
important personal information, is frequently reported (American Psychiatric Association 
[APA], 2013, p. 155).  
 In addition to the diagnostic symptoms, derealisation and depersonalisation are 
customary with a DID diagnosis (Dell, 2002). Derealisation is defined as one experiencing an 
alteration in their perception of the world around them, for example, feeling objects are 
distorted or unreal (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996). 
Depersonalisation is defined as experiencing alterations in the perception of oneself such that 
a person may feel separated from their thoughts and actions, sometimes reporting they feel as 
though they do not belong to them (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Lynn, Lilienfeld, 
Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, & van der Kloet, 2012; Waller et al., 1996). Somatisation, 
characterised by the experiencing of physical manifestations in response to psychological 
turmoil, is also widely reported in DID (Pribor, Yutzy, Dean, & Wetzel, 1993; Walker, 
Gelfand, Gelfand, Koss, & Katon, 1995). Reported somatic experiences include physical 
pain, analgesia and inability to speak (Nijenhuis, 2001; Nijenhuis et al., 1999). The literature 
shows a high comorbidity between DID and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
depression, personality disorders, anxiety disorders, substance abuse disorders and eating 
disorders (Boon & Draijer, 1993a; Dorahy et al., 2014; Ellason, Ross, & Fuchs, 1996; Kluft, 
1983; Vermetten, Schmahl, Lindner, Loewenstein, & Bremner, 2006). 
The reported prevalence rate of DID varies across the scientific literature, with 




(Johnson, Cohen, Kasen, & Brook, 2006; Loewenstein, 1994; Şar, Tutkun, Alyanak, Bakim, 
& Baral, 2000). The prevalence is higher in clinical populations, with between 1% and 12% 
receiving a diagnosis of DID (Boon & Draijer, 1993a; Foote, Smolin, Kaplan, Legatt, & 
Lipschitz, 2006; Horen, Leichner, & Lawson, 1995; Kluft, 1999; Latz, Kramer, & Hughes, 
1995; Ross, Anderson, Fleisher, & Norton, 1991; Şar, 2011; Saxe et al., 1993). 
Documentation of DID is available in many countries including Turkey, Japan, New Zealand, 
Australia, the USA, Canada, Argentina, the UK, Norway and the Netherlands (Dorahy et al., 
2014; Kluft, 1999; Rhoades & Şar, 2005). Systematic studies in inpatient and outpatient 
groups show that DID is often undiagnosed in clinical settings, suggesting that misdiagnosis 
and failure to detect the disorder may be ongoing issues in clinical practice (Foote et al., 
2006). Concerns about false positive diagnosis and a historical preference for clinicians to 
diagnose other disorders are theorised to have resulted in under-diagnosis being an issue 
(Kluft, 1985a; Kluft, 1985b). Clinicians often expect a multitude of obvious dissociative 
symptoms, such as observable switching, to be present in DID. When the symptoms are less 
marked the patient may be viewed merely as displaying “out-of-character behaviours” or as 
having a different psychiatric disorder entirely (Kluft, 1999). Cultural influences and 
unreliable diagnostic instruments can cause poor clinical judgement (Friedl, Draijer, & de 
Jonge, 2000) and as a result, the true DID prevalence in clinical populations may be 
underestimated. Conversely, research has indicated that over-diagnosis may also be a 
problem in DID in the form of imitated cases of patients who, partly unconsciously 
motivated, simulate a DID profile due to contagion or iatrogenesis. Dynamics may include 
the avoidance of responsibility for negative behaviour, and the compensation for an 
overwhelming feeling of not being seen (Draijer & Boon, 1999). Higher rates of DID appear 
to persist in low socioeconomic status communities (Putnam & Loewenstein, 1993), a trend 




2014). DID appears to present more in females than in males (Kluft, 1991; Putnam, 
Hornstein, & Peterson, 1996), likely due to higher rates of abuse and differences in coping 
with trauma between genders, as opposed to biological differences. In addition, females may 
be more likely to present to clinical settings (Reiger et al., 1988). 
Etiology 
The etiology of DID is contentious (Gillig, 2009; Dell, 1988), however, research 
supports an association between the disorder and reported traumatic events experienced in 
childhood, especially those of a relational nature (e.g., abuse) by someone who is relied on 
for care (Dalenberg et al., 2012; Dorahy, 2001; Dorahy et al., 2014; Loewenstein, 2018; 
Loewenstein, Frewen, & Lewis-Fernández, 2017; Nijenhuis, van der Hart, & Steele, 2010). 
The posttraumatic model of DID states that different identities develop as a coping 
mechanism response to abuse perpetrated by an attachment figure (Kluft, 1999). In these 
situations, children experience the contradictory feelings of being afraid of their abuser and 
ashamed of the events occurring, but also needing to seek comfort and safety from them 
(Dorahy et al., 2014; Price, 1993). Sequestering the powerful feelings and thoughts into 
different identities allows for this conflict to be reduced (Dorahy, 2001) when there is no 
possibility for the child to be protected by a secure adult (Ludwig, 1983; Price, 1993). DID 
development allows for the partial preservation of sense of self in the face of trauma 
(Loewenstein, 1994) while maintaining the attachment relationship between the adult and 
child. Rather than needing to continuously confront their traumatic experiences, they switch 
between identities who are aware of the abuse experiences and hold the feelings, memories, 
defences, and behaviours, and those that do not. The so-called Emotional Parts of the 
personality (EP) that contain memories of the abuse is thought to start to be used to deal with 
other life stressors (van der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele, 2006). The Apparently Normal Parts 




considered to work to avoid trauma representations so they can complete day-to-day tasks 
without constant conscious intrusions about their abuse (Dalenberg et al., 2012; Nijenhuis et 
al., 2010; van der Hart et al., 2006). The Four-Factor Theory outlined by Kluft further 
conceptualises the pathways required to develop DID using a posttraumatic framework 
(Kluft, 1984a). (1) The child is required to have a biological predisposition to dissociation; 
(2) must experience traumatic experiences which result in a need for a mental defence 
strategy outside of those usually used by children; (3) must be living in a home and cultural 
environment that influences them to use this detrimental type of defence strategy; and (4) 
must have a lack of social support or ability to self soothe when experiencing these traumatic 
events (Kluft, 1984a; Rosik & Kilbourne-Young, 1999). 
While the association between reported trauma and DID is well supported (see 
Dalenberg et al., 2012; Dorahy et al., 2014), a separate theory of DID etiology implicates 
social influences as having the main role in development of the disorder (Giesbrecht, Lynn, 
Lilienfeld, & Merckelbach, 2008; Piper & Merskey, 2004a; Piper & Merskey, 2004b; 
Spanos, 1994). Proponents of the sociocognitive model purport that there is a lack of 
evidence demonstrating a causal relationship between traumatic events in childhood and DID 
development, stating that the research is overly reliant on self-report data (Boysen & 
VanBergen, 2014; Lynn, Condon, & Colletti, 2013). This theory posits that false or 
exaggerated memories of trauma and dissociative identities are created by people who are 
highly suggestible and prone to fantasy, have poor cognitive processing and attentional 
capabilities, have an aberrant sleep-wake cycle, as well as those who are more easily 
influenced by the media or their therapists (Lynn et al., 2013; Lynn et al., 2012).  
Amnesia in DID 
Amnesia acts as a significant catalyst for people with DID to seek psychiatric help. 




one’s life as well as core personal information about who they are (Elzinga, Phaf, Ardon, & 
van Dyck, 2003; Waller et al., 1996). Studies suggest that periods of forgetting are described 
in 95-100% of people with DID (Boon & Draijer, 1993a; Boon & Draijer, 1993b; Coons, 
Bowman, & Milstein, 1988; Lewis, Yeager, Swica, Pincus, & Lewis, 1997), a figure that 
supports amnesia as a core DSM-5 diagnostic criterion (APA, 2013). Clinically, reports of 
multiple memory problems are seen in DID, illustrating the extensiveness and complexity of 
reported memory problems in this disorder. These include (1) forgetting of autobiographical 
information; (2) lack of inter-identity transfer of information; and (3) difficulties in 
distinguishing whether memories represent real events that have been experienced or are 
pseudomemories (Putnam, 1994). 
People with DID report not being able to remember details for events even when there 
is evidence they have experienced them, or they can suddenly become conscious that they are 
in a place and be unable to recollect how they arrived there (Elzinga et al., 2003; Waller et 
al., 1996). As a result, people with DID report that they are unable to experience a continuous 
life narrative. By allegedly not having access to the details of their life story, they are unable 
to make a coherent link between their experiences of distress and the reasons for it (Kluft, 
1983). Through compartmentalisation of memories into different identities, if an event occurs 
in one identity, another identity may not be able to recall it (Ellenberger, 1970). Reported 
amnesia can be one-way, where identity A is aware of the memories of identity B while 
identity B claims unawareness of identity A’s memories, or two-way, where there is mutual 
reported amnesia between identities A and B (Bryant, 1995; Ellenberger, 1970). The extent 
and nature of amnesia can differ between identities within one person, with some 
experiencing a one-way amnesic relationship while others experience a two-way amnesic 




with a reduced specificity, instead presenting with an overgeneral retrieval style as a way to 
avoid accessing negative memories (Huntjens, Wessel, Hermans, & van Minnen, 2014).   
Memory Systems and DID 
The process of a memory being created involves the stages of encoding, 
consolidation, storage, and retrieval (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997). 
When a stimulus is first presented, it enters into working memory, that involves storing, 
focusing attention on, and manipulating information for a relatively short period of time 
(Baddeley, 1992). Consolidation is the process by where the thread of the memory becomes 
established and associated with other experiences (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997). Storage 
describes the process during which the memory is maintained so it is able to be retrieved 
when cued (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Tulving, 1974). Most information encountered is not 
encoded and/or stored, and information that is encoded and stored is not always retrievable, 
due to processes including trace decay (Ricker, Vergauwe, & Cowan, 2016) and childhood 
amnesia (Bauer, 2015; Peterson, Hallett, & Compton-Gillingham, 2018). In addition to 
clinical observations of DID patients experiencing deficits in remembering autobiographical 
details, reports of amnesia have expanded to amnesia for procedural, semantic and episodic 
memories. The procedural memory system is used to access information about the actions 
required to complete tasks (e.g., driving a car and riding a bike). The semantic memory 
system is associated with knowledge about the world around us while the episodic memory 
system holds information about personally experienced events (Tulving, 1985). Held within 
episodic memories is information regarding a person’s perspective on temporal and spatial 
details of the event and the order in which these events were experienced (Conway, 2009). 
There is also an ability to clearly remember the events happening through access to the 
details of what occurred at the time of experiencing (e.g., what a person was thinking, what 




corresponding level of consciousness attached to them. A memory retrieved from the 
procedural system is drawn with anoetic (non-knowing) consciousness which involves an 
ability to unconsciously perceive and respond to stimuli (Tulving, 1985). A memory retrieved 
from the semantic memory system is drawn with noetic (knowing) consciousness which 
involves consciously perceiving stimuli so that it is known to be true. A memory retrieved 
from the episodic memory system is drawn with autonoetic consciousness, which involves 
being able to access details of the time and place that the event occurred, as well as a feeling 
that it was the person themselves who experienced it. Implicit memory retrieval refers to 
memories of past experiences influencing a person’s behaviour without any awareness of 
remembering (Dorahy & Huntjens, 2007; Schacter, Chui, & Ochsner, 1993). Explicit 
memory retrieval involves accessing information where the person is aware that they 
experienced that which is being retrieved (Kihlstrom, 1998).  
The extent of memory transfer in DID has been debated, with initial research 
presenting different conclusions about which types of memories are able to transfer across 
amnesic barriers. For identities where two-way amnesia exists, as a result of the subjective 
reports of amnesia, it was initially concluded that no transfer would occur. However, when 
attempts were made to compare memories retrieved implicitly with those retrieved 
explicitly, researchers observed that although explicitly retrieved memories remained 
amnesic, certain implicitly retrieved memories exhibited transfer. Nissen, Ross, 
Willingham, Mackenzie and Schacter (1988) and Eich, Macauley, Loewenstein and Dihle 
(1997) found that when memories were assessed via contextual- and data-driven tasks that 
relied upon implicit retrieval, only the data-driven stimuli exhibited transfer. Such results 
provided support for the idea that context-driven stimuli remain compartmentalised in 
identities, while data-driven, perceptual information was not compartmentalised. Context-




processed (Dorahy, 2001; Eich et al., 1997; Nissen et al., 1988), for example, a photo of 
the church that a person with DID was married in will have a different meaning for 
identities who have knowledge of the marriage compared to those identities who are 
unaware they are married. Moreover, even if both amnesic identities are aware of the 
marriage, they may have experienced different events associated with it, which may have 
resulted in a different emotional context to be applied to their marriage (e.g., one identity 
may have access to happy memories while another may have access to memories of abuse 
at the hands of their partner). On the contrary, data-driven information has essentially the 
same meaning in any context (Nissen et al., 1988), for example, that the sky is blue is a 
fact which will have the same meaning to numerous identities. This distinction was further 
supported by Peters, Uyterlinde, Consemulder and van der Hart (1998) who also found 
evidence of the transfer of data-driven information via implicit retrieval tasks.  
More recent research using larger sample sizes and more sophisticated 
experimental techniques has failed to find evidence of amnesia for both implicitly and 
explicitly retrieved data in DID, with both data-driven and contextually-driven semantic 
memory, as well as procedural memory exhibiting transfer (Allen & Movius, 2000; 
Elzinga et al., 2003; Huntjens et al., 2005; Huntjens, Peters, Woertman, van der Hart, & 
Postma, 2007; Huntjens, Huntjens, Postma, Hanmaker, Woertman, & van der Hart, 2002; 
Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & van der Hart, 2003; Huntjens, Postma, Woertman, 
van der Hart, & Peters, 2005; Kong, Allen, & Glisky, 2008; Peters et al., 1998). 
Researchers have used a variety of different tools to assess memory transfer in people with 
DID and non-clinical controls. Elzinga et al. (2003) found intact memory transfer for both 
data- and context-driven stimuli measured via implicit retrieval tasks. Allen and Movius 
(2000) compared event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine whether physiological 




Although the DID group claimed to have no memory of the words presented in identity A, 
their ERP profile was indistinguishable from control participants simulating the disorder. 
Additionally, Huntjens et al. (2003) assessed the transfer of episodic memory across 
identities with the use of an interference paradigm. DID participants were asked to take 
part in tasks in one identity (Identity A) and were then tested for memory transfer in an 
“amnesic” identity (Identity B). Results indicated evidence of the transfer of episodic 
memory across the amnesic identities, a finding replicated by Kong et al. (2008), paying 
special attention to the mitigation of implicit memory effects.  
The field has also aimed to address whether emotional valence may have a role in 
which information transfers across identities, based on clinical observations and theoretical 
conjecture that painful experiences give rise to distinct identities as a means of coping 
(Peters et al., 1998). For example, as EP’s tend to report the memories of traumatic events 
while ANP’s appear to be amnesic for them, it has been hypothesised that stimuli with 
negative, traumatic connotations may stay compartmentalised in EP’s. Elzinga et al. (2003) 
compared performance for emotional and neutral words to find that implicit memory 
retrieval was intact in identities retrieving both types of stimuli. Huntjens et al. (2005) also 
concluded that memory for newly acquired stimulus valence transferred across DID 
identities subjectively reporting amnesia when measured using tests of implicit retrieval. 
Huntjens and colleagues (2007) objectively tested recall and recognition for emotionally 
valenced material learned in another identity in an amnesic identity. The results indicated 
no evidence of total inter-identity amnesia for emotionally valenced material in DID.  
In sum, despite subjective reports of amnesia, research using objective measures 
has consistently yielded evidence of extensive memory transfer when accessed through 




Huntjens et al., 2007; Huntjens, 2002; Huntjens et al., 2003; Huntjens, Postma et al., 2005; 
Kong et al., 2008). 
Semantic Autobiographical Memory Impairment in DID 
 Research has attempted to address whether stimuli associated with autobiographical 
details also exhibits transfer. The autobiographical memory system is associated with a 
person’s own experiences and includes knowledge about who a person is (i.e., their beliefs 
about their self) and the events that have occurred in their life that confirm these beliefs 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Although a criterion of DID is amnesia for personal 
information (APA, 2013), research has so far failed to find support for these amnesic 
barriers. Huntjens, Verschuere and McNally (2012) used a concealed information task to 
assess for transfer of autobiographical stimuli encoded (mainly) into the semantic memory 
system across amnesic identities. Participants presented no difference in ability to 
recognise autobiographical information of the tested identity compared with other, amnesic 
identities. As a result, autobiographical memories encoded into the semantic memory 
system were concluded to show no amnesia when tested via objective measures. 
Episodic Autobiographical Memory Impairment in DID 
Research has attempted to address the transfer of memories in semantic and episodic form, 
however, episodic autobiographical memory is less understood. In DID, these can be 
memories that some identities find distressing due to their association with abuse and trauma. 
The continuation of compartmentalised identities in DID appears to be maintained by keeping 
these experiences impervious to inter-identity transfer, despite evidence that identities can be 
influenced by emotional stimuli implicitly. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) state that autobiographical memories are created from a 
knowledge base of self-referential information that is accessed in the presence of certain cues. 




previous experiences, who they are as a person and future goals. People tend to remember 
and retrieve information that confirms their beliefs about themselves, others and the world 
around them. A person’s self-concept can determine which details are encoded and then 
retrieved from an event (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This process can be hypothesised 
to explain why expected cues do not lead to the memories of certain events being retrieved, a 
phenomenon widely reported in people with DID. For an ANP, dealing with trauma is not in 
line with maintaining their sense of self as someone who does not experience abuse. When a 
cue associated with trauma is presented, it may be less likely they will report a traumatic 
memory compared to an EP.  
Autobiographical memories include a self-referential characteristic in that they allow people 
to reflect on instances where they have successfully achieved their goals (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Through recollection of these types of events, people are able to alter 
their goals in a way that will ensure future success, increasing their self-esteem and reported 
life satisfaction (Judge, Bono, Erez, & Locke, 2005). In DID, although one identity may have 
a goal of proceeding successfully through daily life, another may exist to deal with stressful 
life events. As the DID criteria are primarily associated with separated identities who claim to 
have distinct life goals, the importance of understanding the extent of impairment in the 
autobiographical memory system is of central importance. 
Aim and Outline of the Thesis 
Although research has been conducted exploring amnesia for episodic, semantic and 
procedural memory in DID, methods investigating episodic autobiographical memory have 
yet to be considered. The main question this thesis considers was whether episodic 
autobiographical memory exhibited transfer across identities that report amnesia, in line with 
the previous research assessing transfer of other memory system stimuli. The autonoetic or 




majority of the studies included in this thesis have involved a group instructed to simulate 
DID in order to address concerns from sociocognitive model proponents that participants 
with DID may be simulating amnesia. Two additional comparison groups of healthy 
participants were also included, one that was “amnesic” for the second identities information 
and one that was “nonamnesic” for this information. 
 Chapter two examines episodic memory transfer for self-referential information 
accessed explicitly. Recall and recognition tests were used to assess memory performance in 
the identity that experienced the information, as well as in an identity that reported amnesia. 
Identities were also assessed for deficits in the stages of self-awareness via Tulving’s 
“remember/know” paradigm, where “remember” responses indicate that memory exists at 
autonoetic consciousness and “know” responses indicate noetic consciousness. In Chapter 
three, episodic autobiographical memory transfer for events manipulated in the laboratory 
was assessed. The recall and forced choice recognition tasks and the remember/know 
paradigm used in Chapter two, were employed to assess for differences in explicit memory 
retrieval and the remember or know quality of the memory. Chapter four used a more implicit 
measure to assess the extent of episodic memory transfer for self-referential information.  The 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) was used to determine whether more 
objective tests would also provide comparable results to those presented in Chapters two and 
three. In Chapter five, the ability for identities to engage in meaning-making of self-defining 
memories was assessed, a process associated with developing an integrated sense of self. In 
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Inter-Identity amnesia for episodic, self-referential memory in Dissociative Identity 
Disorder 
 Amnesia is one of the core diagnostic criteria for Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(DID). In this experiment, a vignette task was used to assess the extent of amnesia for 
episodic, self-referential memories across identities. Nineteen DID participants, 16 DID 
simulators, 21 amnesic, and 20 non-amnesic comparison participants from the general 
population were recruited. They were presented with two vignettes (DID and simulator 
participants received one in each of the identities) and asked to imagine themselves in the 
situations outlined. Tasks assessing free recall and recognition for the stimuli were utilised. 
Subjectively, all DID participants reported amnesia for vignettes encoded in the other 
identity. On measures of explicit retrieval, DID participants indicated inter-identity amnesia 
on tests of recognition and a trend for amnesia on tests of recall. However, both amnesic 
comparisons and simulators instructed to feign amnesia showed comparable performance to 
patients with DID. This hinders unequivocal interpretation of results. In conclusion, the 
results provided mixed corroboration for the thesis of inter-identity amnesia. 
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Inter-Identity amnesia for episodic, self-referential memory in Dissociative Identity 
Disorder 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is regarded as the most extreme of the 
dissociative disorders. It involves a person reporting the existence of at least two separate 
identities that consistently take control of their thoughts and behaviour (American Psychiatric 
Association [APA], 2013). Amnesia for experienced events and personal information is a 
core diagnostic criteria for DID, and can present as two-way (with no transfer of information 
reported across identities) or one-way (with only one identity reporting access the memories 
of the other; Ellenberger, 1970; Bryant, 1995). It is not uncommon for adults with DID to 
present with identities who claim to have full awareness of traumatic experiences from the 
past, and others that report little or no recall of previous traumatic events (Kluft, 2007; Van 
der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele, 2006).  
Not yet understood is the extent to which amnesia exists in DID. Preliminary research 
suggested that only memories retrieved explicitly exhibited inter-identity impairment (Nissen, 
Ross, Willingham, Mackenzie, & Schacter, 1988; Eich, Macauley, Loewenstein, & Dihle, 
1997); however, studies using more objective measures have found both explicitly and 
implicitly retrieved memories in DID to exhibit transfer. It is also evident that although 
amnesia for stimuli with traumatic and non-traumatic connotations is subjectively reported, 
both of these types of memory exhibit transfer when assessed via objective measures (Allen 
& Movius, 2000; Elzinga, Phaf, Ardon, & Van Dyck., 2003; Huntjens et al., 2005; Huntjens, 
Peters, Woertman, Van der Hart, & Postma, 2007; Huntjens, Postma, Hanmaker, Woertman, 
& van der Hart, 2002; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & Van der Hart, 2003; Huntjens, 
Postma, Woertman, Van der Hart, & Peters, 2005; Huntjens, Verschuere, & McNally, 2012; 
Kong, Allen, & Glisky, 2008; Peters, Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & Van der Hart, 1998). 




(Huntjens et al., 2003; Huntjens et al., 2005), research has not yet assessed whether self-
referential material also exhibits a similar memory transfer pattern as non-self-referential 
material. As DID is a disorder associated with disruptions of sense of self this material should 
be a point of focus for DID research. In the current study, we aimed to determine whether the 
reported impairment in memory transfer across amnesic identities was evident for episodic, 
self-referential information. The episodic memory system holds information about 
experienced events. When retrieved these memories are paired with a feeling of being able to 
recollect and re-experience the event, alongside an ability to identify that this is an experience 
that fits in with the story of the self over time (autonoetic consciousness; Tulving, 1972). If a 
memory does not elicit autonoetic consciousness, it is retrieved from the semantic memory 
system, without the rich recollective experience (noetic consciousness; Tulving, 1972). These 
types of consciousness during retrieval can be accessed in the remember/know paradigm, in 
which people are asked to remember an experienced event as having occurred (autonoetic 
consciousness) or simply know that the event has occurred (noetic consciousness). This 
paradigm was previously used in DID research by Huntjens and colleagues (2003). Although 
Huntjens et al. (2003) found no differences for information being retrieved with autonoetic or 
noetic consciousness for amnesic identities, the study did not utilise self-referential stimuli 
which may have resulted in more limited access to autonoetic consciousness. In the current 
study, a free recall and forced choice recognition task were used to assess explicit memory 
retrieval for self-referential stimuli. The forced choice recognition task also included a 
remember/know paradigm to assess whether the memories were accessed via noetic and 
autonoetic consciousness depending on their experienced identity.  
To assess the extent of amnesia, several comparison samples were included. We 
recruited two non-clinical comparison groups, one that showed no amnesia and a second 




group of people instructed to consciously simulate DID for the following reason. The 
association between reported trauma and DID is well supported. Yet, a separate theory 
implicates social influences as the main factor in development of the disorder (Piper & 
Merskey, 2004a; Piper & Merskey, 2004b; Spanos, 1994). Rather than people with DID 
developing identities to avoid the constant reliving of chronic trauma, the sociocognitive 
model states that people with DID are instead highly suggestible, prone to fantasy, and 
influenced to (consciously or unconsciously) role-play multiple identities by their therapists 
and other cultural factors (Lynn, Condon, & Colletti, 2013; Lynn et al., 2014; Spanos, 1994). 
Due to the sociocognitive theory implicating the feigning of symptoms in the development of 
DID, a group of people consciously simulating DID were included in the current study. Thus 
participants in the study were from four samples: 1) DID participants reporting two-way 
amnesia, 2) simulator participants educated on how to mimic DID, 3) non-clinical 
comparison participants given stimuli shown to one identity (i.e., half of the stimuli; amnesic 
group) and 4) non-clinical comparison participants given stimuli shown to both identities 
(i.e., all of the stimuli; nonamnesic group).  
To ensure control of demographic characteristics, the DID participants were matched 
as close as possible in terms of age and gender to simulators and comparison participants 
from the general population. Based on the research presented in Chapter one, the current 
study tested the following four hypotheses: (1) For free recall, DID participants would exhibit 
amnesia (i.e., scores not above distractor performance) of vignettes encoded in a different 
identity, a similar profile to the amnesic non-clinical comparison group. Non-amnesic 
comparison participants will exhibit comparable memory retrieval for both vignettes; (2) For 
forced choice recognition, a similar pattern of results was predicted (3) For remember and 
know responses, DID participants would exhibit relatively higher remember scores for 




encoded in the other identity, comparable to amnesic comparison participants. Non-amnesic 
participants would exhibit comparable remember-know scores across vignettes.  
Method 
Participants 
 DID sample. Nineteen DID participants were recruited from referrals via clinicians or 
from a dedicated hospital-based programme in Australia. The target sample size was 20, a 
number based on pre-existing studies of inter-identity transfer (e.g., Huntjens et al., 2003). 
Clinicians referring to the hospital, or those known to work with DID patients, were sent 
information on the study and invitation letters to pass on to DID patients they felt were stable 
enough to receive the information. Nurses at the hospital also gave the invitation letter to DID 
patients attending hospital programmes. Inclusion criteria were, (1) a pre-existing DID 
diagnosis; (2) a confirmation of the DID diagnosis via the Dissociative Disorders Interview 
Schedule (DDIS) administered by the primary researcher; (3) the capacity to engage two 
identities who report a lack of knowledge for events that occur in the other identity; (4) one 
participating identity having more awareness of distressing events from the past and the other 
participating identity having less awareness of such events1, and (5) the ability to switch 
between these two identities on request. Participants were excluded if they (1) were too 
impaired by their psychiatric state to concentrate on the computer tasks, (2) were unable to 
switch between identities or retain an identity in executive control, or (3) reported no amnesia 
between participating identities. Participants were told that the study would examine memory 
in different identities in a DID sample. Participants self-selected the two identities (labelled A 
                                                          
1 This was to reflect a different emotional make-up in each identity, which has been used in 





and B) that took part in the study and received a $20 shopping voucher for participating. Of 
the 19 DID participants tested, seven were removed for: failing to complete the task (n = 1), 
being unable to switch between identities (n = 3), or experiencing test interference from a 
third identity (n = 3). The final DID sample contained 12 participants2. 
 Comparison samples. Forty-one comparison participants took part in the study (i.e., 
the target number in each group was 20 in order to match the DID sample number). These 
were: members of the general population of Christchurch and Brisbane recruited by snowball 
sampling (n = 26) selected to match the mean age and gender of DID participants, and 
undergraduate psychology students (n = 15) recruited via a participant research pool or 
advertisements placed around a psychology department. The advertisement stated that 
volunteers were sought to participate in a psychological experiment assessing memory 
abilities in different groups of people. Comparison participants reported no memory or 
attentional deficits as asked by the researcher. They were randomly assigned to an ‘amnesic’ 
group or a ‘nonamnesic’ group. Participants in the amnesic group received the memory 
stimuli presented to identity A in the DID group (see procedure), while participants in the 
nonamnesic group received both the memory stimuli given to DID identity A and to identity 
B. Comparison participants were not aware that the study was researching DID. Participants 
received $20 in shopping vouchers for participating in the research. 
Simulator sample. Sixteen DID simulator participants took part in the study. The 
target sample size was 20 to match the patient sample number, but unfortunately timing 
constraints and personnel changes in the research team limited recruitment of this group. 
Participant were professional and amateur actors from a University Theatre and Film 
                                                          
2 Two patients were not administered the DDIS due to an administration error. All 10 





Department, and various theatre companies from around Christchurch, New Zealand. They 
were selected to match the mean age of DID participants. They developed two identities that 
they were instructed should have amnesia between them, and followed the same protocol as 
the DID sample (see procedure). Of the sixteen simulator participants tested, two were 
removed (both were female) for refusing to complete the full test session. Participants 
received $20 in shopping vouchers for taking part, along with an added incentive of $50 for 
the participant who best simulated DID (as rated by the primary researcher using a post-
experiment questionnaire; details provided in materials section). The final simulator sample 
contained 14 participants. 
 Table 1 displays the demographic details for each sample. The groups differed 
significantly for age, F(3, 63) = 3.46, p = .021, ηp2 = .141, with simulators presenting 
significantly younger ages than amnesic comparisons (p = .031). DID participants did not 
differ significantly from simulators (p < .078), amnesic (p = 1.000) or nonamnesic 
comparisons (p = 1.000). Simulators showed a trend to differ from nonamnesic comparisons 
(p = .059), but did not differ from the amnesic comparisons (p = 1.000). There were minimal 
variations in gender, but due to the low count for males across groups, inferential statistics 
were not conducted. Comparative analysis was also not utilised for ethnicity and education 
due to cells with low counts.  
Table 1 
Participant Demographic Data across Groups 
 DID 
(n = 12) 
Simulator 
(n = 14) 
Amnesic 
Comparison 
(n = 21) 
Nonamnesic 
Comparison 
(n = 20) 
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* For the dissociative identity disorder (DID) group, two participants chose two ethnicities.  
For the simulator group, one participant chose two ethnicities. For the amnesic comparison 
group, one participant chose two ethnicities. For the nonamnesic comparison group, one 
participant chose two ethnicities, and one participant did not indicate an ethnicity. § For the 
DID group, two participants reported no qualifications. 
Materials 
All participants completed a vignette memory task and a questionnaire battery. 
Vignettes. Two vignettes were developed for the study. These vignettes expanded on 
previous work that has used stories to create memories in a laboratory context with clinical 
and non-clinical participants (Dorahy et al., 2017). Use of vignettes allows the exact 
memorised experience to be measured across identities. The topics of the two vignettes 
focused on being at home and in a park. For the current study, these two vignettes had neutral 
emotional content. The home story involved participants surfing the internet and telling a 
friend about clothing specials they had found. The park story involved participants walking 




long. Vignettes can be viewed in full in Appendix E-2. Francis and Kucera’s (1982) word 
frequency in the English language list was used to confirm that vignette task words did not 
differ significantly in their frequency, t(14) -1.88, p = .081, (see Table 2).  
Table 2 
Word Frequency Means (with SD) for Vignettes  
Vignette task Word frequency 
Home 1110.53 (1451.69) 
Park 2340.73 (2143.85) 
 
 Questionnaires. All participants completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(DES), the PTSD Symptom Scale - Self-Report (PSS-SR) and a demographic questionnaire. 
DID and simulator participants were also administered the Dissociative Disorders Interview 
Schedule (DDIS). The interviewer completed a Post-Experiment Questionnaire. All 
questionnaires can be found in Appendix D. 
DES (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). The DES is a self-report measure assessing the 
presence of general dissociative experiences and symptoms over 28 items (Carlson & 
Putnam, 1993) (see Appendix D-2). Participants indicate the percentage of time they 
experience each dissociative item when not under the influence of alcohol and drugs using an 
eleven point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 100 (always). A mean is calculated, with scores 
ranging from 0 to 100. The DES was included as a measure of current pathological and non-
pathological dissociative experiences. It is appropriate for assessing dissociative experiences 
across the participant groups used in this experiment (i.e., participants with a dissociative 
diagnosis and non-clinical comparisons).  
The DES has excellent psychometric properties and has been used in clinical 
populations with and without dissociative diagnoses and also non-clinical populations 
(Bernstein Carlson et al., 1993; Brand, Classen, McNary, & Zaveri, 2009; Carlson & Putnam, 




Garcelán et al., 2012; Tsar, Kundakci, Kiziltan, Bakim, & Bozkurt, 2001). Table 3 shows the 
alphas for each sample in the current study. 
 PSS-SR (Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). The PSS-SR (see Appendix D-3) 
was included to assess for the presence of PTSD symptoms. Research suggests that DID is 
often comorbid with PTSD (Boon & Draijer, 1993; Vermetten, Schmahl, Lindner, 
Lowenstein, & Bremner, 2006). The PSS-SR is a diagnostic 17-item self-report measure 
which assesses for the presence and severity of PTSD symptoms in those known to have 
experienced traumatic events on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (five or more times 
per week/very much/almost always) (Foa et al., 1993). The PSS-SR has good psychometric 
properties (Foa et al., 1993). Table 3 shows the alphas for each sample in this study. 
Table 3 
Cronbach’s alphas for DES and PSS-SR by Group 
Group DES PSS-SR  
DID  
(n = 12) 
.87 .88  
 
Simulator  







Amnesic Comparison  








(n = 20) 
.99 .93  
 
Demographic Questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire was constructed of 
questions about participant age, gender, ethnicity and education level (see Appendix D-4). It 
was included to match simulator and comparison controls to the participants with DID, on 
these measures. 
DDIS (Ross et al., 1989). The DDIS is a structured interview used as a diagnostic tool 




independent, structured clinical interview diagnosis of DID, a method previously used in 
Dorahy, Middleton and Irwin (2005) and Dorahy, McCusker, Loewenstein, Colbert and 
Mulholland (2006) (see Appendix D-1). Respondents are asked to answer questions relating 
to whether they have felt they had distinct identities, whether these take control of their 
behaviour, whether they experience an inability to recall important personal information and 
whether these issues are due to substance abuse. The DDIS is a psychometrically sound 
measure assessing the presence of dissociative disorders (Ross et al., 1989). Interrater 
reliability indicates substantial agreement across clinicians, with a reported kappa value of 
0.68 (Ross et al., 1989). 
 Vignette Task Emotion Ratings. Directly after each vignette was administered, 
participants were asked to rate their emotional reaction to the information. They were asked 
to respond on a questionnaire rating the extent to which they felt shame, disgust, anxiety, 
embarrassment, guilt (compiled into an overall negative emotion score) and happiness along 
a 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely) 11 point Likert scale (Appendix D-5). The emotion ratings 
were included to ensure that one vignette was not more salient due to an increase in 
emotional tone. 
Post-experiment Questionnaire. The primary researcher was blind to whether DID 
and simulator participants truly had DID or were feigning it as a simulator. Consequently, a 
post-interview questionnaire was included for the primary researcher to state whether DID 
and simulator participants appeared to present with features of DID. The researcher was 
asked whether the participants appeared to have distinct identities and in what ways their 
appearance differed. The researcher was also asked whether there appeared to be amnesia 
between the identities and whether the person appeared to have DID. This assessment was 




researcher believe they had the disorder). The post-experiment questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix D-7. 
Experimental Measures. 
 Free Recall (FR).  
 FRImmediate. Immediately after hearing each vignette, participants were given two 
minutes to state all the details they could remember. Participants were prompted following 
their retrieval effort with the questions “are those all the details that you can remember?” and 
“does anything else come to mind?” The FRImmediate acted as a memory consolidation task. 
 FRDelayed. Once all vignettes had been administered, participants were asked to state 
the details of the two vignettes. Participants were prompted with, “are those all the details 
you have about that story”. Following their recall of the first vignette, if they did not 
spontaneously recall the other vignettes (e.g., DID participants, simulators, amnesic 
comparisons), the participants were prompted with “did you hear any other stories?” An 
affirmative response brought an invitation to outline that story. A negative response resulted 
in the research administering an additional prompt of: “do you remember anything about 
being in your house?” or “do you remember anything about a park?” If the response was 
negative, the researcher administered an additional prompt of: “do you remember anything 
about being on your computer?” or “do you remember anything about feeding ducks?” These 
prompts were designed to assess if DID and simulator participants could volunteer and 
explicitly retrieve information given to their amnesic identity. The FRDelayed occurred after 
35 (amnesic comparisons) to 60 minutes (DID participants, simulators, nonamnesic 
comparisons) from the presentation of the FRImmediate. Previous research has indicated 
little outcome differences in memory recall due to time delays with this variability 
(Degenszajn, Caramelli, Caixeta, & Nitrini, 2001). The FRDelayed assessed free recall 




one vignette’s details were present in another story and if the DID and simulator participants 
could explicitly retrieve information given to their ‘amnesic’ identity. 
 Forced Choice Recognition. 
 Stimuli Recognition. Participants were presented with 38 sentences individually 
placed in the middle of a computer screen. Half of these (i.e., ten and nine sentences) were 
related to each neutral vignette (19 in total), and 19 were not related to either vignette 
(distractor stimuli) (Appendix E-9). Distractor stimuli were matched to the vignette related 
stimuli based on word category (i.e., noun, verb). Participants indicated whether they 
recognised the sentences as representing details that had happened in the stories by pressing 
the Y key on the keyboard, or if they did not recognise them, by pressing the N key. Order of 
presentation of the stimuli was randomised across each participant. The forced choice 
recognition task was used to assess recognition memory of the vignettes. It was administered 
between 40 minutes (amnesic comparisons) and 65 minutes (DID participants, simulators, 
nonamnesic comparisons) after each participant got exposed to the second and final vignette 
(for DID participants and simulators, this was identity B). 
 Remember/know. If participants indicated that they recognised the sentence as 
representing a detail from the vignettes, they were asked to state whether they ‘remembered’ 
or ‘knew’ that it had happened. A ‘remember’ response was explained to participants as 
being paired with an actual recollection of the event, while a ‘know’ response was explained 
as being paired with only a feeling that the event happened. For example, the memory of 
going to the cinema would be classified as a ‘remember’ response if the person was able to 
remember visual, auditory or tactile details of the event (what the movie was, whether they 
were alone or with others, where they sat in the cinema, what went through their mind at the 
time). The event would be classified as a ‘know’ response if the participant could not recall 




the cinema). Participants pressed the R key on the computer keyboard to indicate 
‘remember’, and the K key to indicate ‘know’. This task was included to assess autonoetic 
and noetic memory retrieval. 
Procedure 
The study was part of a larger experiment on memory transfer in DID requiring 
written informed consent from all participants. Measures unconnected to the present study 
included free recall and forced choice recognition tasks assessing inter-identity transfer of 
episodic, autobiographical memories, and an implicit association test of episodic, self-
referential memory transfer. This study was approved by both the University and Hospital 
Research Ethics Committees. 
 Simulator training phase. First, participants rated their knowledge of DID from very 
knowledgeable to no knowledge (Appendix C-1) and indicated whether they had any visual, 
memory or attentional impairments. Participants were then shown a video describing DID 
which provided information to aid simulator performance. The video was 8.27 minutes long 
and consisted of clips from two documentaries “Multiple Personality Disorder: The Search 
for Deadly Memories” (Moss, Nevins, & Mierendorf, 1993), and the trailer of “When the 
Devil Knocks” (Harper, Palmer, & Slinger, 2010). Both clips presented people with DID, 
information about how and why it can develop, and the course of therapy. A Dissociative 
Identity Disorder Information Sheet was also provided and consisted of three pages of 
information outlining the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria of DID and answers to frequently asked 
questions (e.g., do people actually have multiple personalities, how do the identities develop, 
is it obvious when a person switches personalities, what are the symptoms of DID, is DID a 
major health problem and can dissociative disorders be cured?) (Appendix C-2). The 
information sheet was adapted from one provided by the Sidran Foundation. An 




participants to complete 18 questions about their created identity. Participants were given 
education on how to mimic DID which included practice instructions on how to create and 
switch between identities. They were provided with a checklist of 18 characteristics of their 
simulated identities that needed to be addressed. Participants in this group were told to 
convince the researcher who was conducting the assessment session, and who was blinded to 
their simulator status, that they had a DID diagnosis and experienced amnesia between 
identities. They were given one-to-two weeks to practice to cultivate their dissociative 
identity before testing. 
Experimental Procedure. 
The study was separated into five phases: (1) questionnaire battery completion, (2) 
vignette task presentation and initial free recall, (3) delayed free recall (4) forced choice 
recognition task and (5) post-experiment questionnaire completion. 
 Phase 1. All participants signed a written informed consent form (Appendix B-7).  
After consent, the primary researcher administered the DDIS. Participants then completed 
their demographic information and the DES and PSS-SR using the Qualtrics survey platform. 










Phase 2. Participants completed the vignette task where they listened to one or two vignettes, 
depending on their group allocation. The order of vignette set presentation was 
counterbalanced across participants3.   
 DID and simulator participants listened to one vignette in identity A and then 
switched to their “amnesic” identity (identity B) where they listened to a second 
vignette.  
 Amnesic comparisons listened to only one vignette.  
 Nonamnesic comparisons listened to two vignettes.  
Participants were told to remember as many details as possible and become absorbed in 
the stories. The vignettes were played through headphones and after each sentence, 
participants were asked to repeat aloud what had been said, changing from second to first- 
person perspective (e.g., heard, ‘you are in your house’, repeated, ‘I am in my house’). This 
step was included to increase the self-referential quality of each story (Dorahy et al., 2017). 
After each participant had finished repeating the sentence, the next sentence was presented. 
After each vignette, the immediate free recall task was administered. Participants were then 
required to complete the vignette emotion ratings questionnaire. Once the first vignette had 
been concluded, DID and simulator participants were asked to switch into their second 
                                                          
3 Eight of the final DID sample received the house vignette in identity A, and four received 
the park vignette in identity A. Eight of the final simulator sample received the house vignette 
in identity A, and six received the park vignette in identity A. Eleven amnesic comparisons 
received the house vignette in identity A and ten received the park vignette in identity A. Ten 
nonamnesic comparisons received the house vignette in identity A and ten received the park 




identity and were administered the second vignette. Nonamnesic comparisons were presented 
with the second vignette after receiving the first.  
 Phase 3. After an interval of 35-60 minutes in which other tasks unrelated to the 
present one were presented, the participants were asked to recall all the details they could 
remember from the first vignette they heard (i.e., delayed recall). DID and simulator 
participants were assessed in the same identity that heard the first vignette. They were then 
asked to recall information from any other vignettes they heard. 
 Phase 4. Participants were required to complete a forced choice recognition task, in 
which they had to state whether they recognised sentences presented on a computer screen as 
representing events that had happened in the vignettes. If they responded that sentences did 
represent the vignettes, participants were required to state whether they “remembered” or 
“knew” that these had happened. DID and simulators were tested in Identity A. 
 Phase 5. The primary researcher completed the post-experiment questionnaire for 
DID and simulator participants. 
Data Analysis 
 Recall. Two stimuli from the park vignette were removed from the recall 
analysis due to them being rated as too similar to other items. The number of words 
accurately recalled from each vignette was compared. Identity A vignettes were contrasted 
with identity B vignettes. The proportion of correct stimuli (correct stimuli divided by the 
total number of vignette stimuli) was calculated.  
Recognition. One stimulus from the park vignette was removed from the recognition 
sentences for data analysis due to it being rated as too similar to other stimuli upon closer 
inspection. Recognition hit rates were calculated for each vignette (correct stimuli divided by 
the total number of vignette stimuli). False alarms, sensitivity and response bias for each 




procedures outlined in MacMillan and Creelman (2005) to gain d’ and c. d’ was used to 
convey sensitivity and calculate the proportion of stimuli presented to the participants that 
were coded as being previously seen (hits), while correcting for distractor stimuli that were 
incorrectly coded as being previously seen (false alarms) (d’ = z(H) – z(F)). Response bias (c) 
is conveyed as a participant’s likelihood to respond yes or no to stimuli as having previously 
been seen and is represented using the midpoint between z(F) and z(H) (c = - [z(H) + 
Z(F)]/2). A higher response bias indicates that participants were more conservative (i.e., less 
inclined to recognise items as old). 
 Remember/know. A remember/know rate was calculated for each vignette dividing 
information classified as remembered or known by participants hit stimuli.  
Results 
Questionnaires 
 Dissociative experiences differed significantly across groups, F(3, 63) = 57.95, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .734. DID participants (M = 61.16, SE = 13.02) scored significantly higher than 
simulators (M = 44.16, SE = 21.31; p = .007), amnesic comparisons (M = 11.34, SE = 7.77; p 
< .001) and nonamnesic comparisons (M = 10.89, SE = 8.39; p < .001). Simulators also 
presented a significantly higher score than amnesic (p < .001) and nonamnesic (p < .001) 
comparisons. Comparison participants did not show a significant difference (p = 1.000). 
PTSD symptoms differed significantly across groups, F(3, 63) = 42.94, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.67. DID participants (M = 42.67, SE = 9.19) reported higher scores than simulators (M = 
21.93, SE = 10.06; p < .001), amnesic comparisons (M = 7.19, SE = 7.012; p < .001) and 
nonamnesic comparisons (M = 11.30, SE = 10.48; p < .001). Simulators also presented a 
significantly higher score than amnesic (p < .001) and nonamnesic (p = .009) comparisons. 





Vignette Emotion Ratings 
Vignette emotion ratings are reported in Table 4. A mixed measures ANOVA on 
Vignette (home vignette, park vignette) by Group (DID, simulator, nonamnesic comparison) 
was conducted. As the amnesic comparisons received only one vignette they were not 
included in the analysis. The home and park vignettes did not differ significantly on ratings of 
happiness, F(1, 43) = .02, p = .876, ηp2 = .00, or negative emotion, F(1, 43) = 2.50, p = .121, 
ηp2 = .06. There were also no differences in groups for happiness F(2, 43) = .58, p = .564, ηp2 
= .03; however the groups did differ significantly for negative emotion, F(2, 43) = 19.82, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .48. DID participants rated both vignettes as significantly more negative than both 
simulators (p < .001) and nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001). Simulators did not differ 
significantly from the nonamnesic comparisons (p = .545). There was no significant 
difference in DID participants rating of each vignette t(11) = -.96, p = .356, indicating that 
each vignette was rated as having the same emotional connotations.  
Table 4  








Home Vignette    
Happiness 30.83 (27.79) 30.71 (20.93) 33.50 (30.31) 
Negative Emotion 
 
29.50 (25.41) 5.14 (6.41) 2.80 (8.45) 
Park Vignette    
Happiness 22.50 (19.60) 42.14 (29.14) 32.50 (31.27) 
Negative Emotion 37.83 (28.62) 11.71 (22.65) 2.50 (5.87) 
 
 
Post-Experiment Simulator Performance Questionnaire 
 DID participants and simulators did not differ significantly based on the experimenter 
ratings of the presence of amnesia between identities, F(1, 23) = 1.36, p = .256, ηp2 = .06, 




and changes in appearance based on affect, F(1, 23) = 1.09, p = .308, ηp2 = .05, , body 
posture, F(1, 23) = .64, p = .431, ηp2 = .03, and voice characteristics, F(1, 23) = .97, p = .336, 
ηp2 = .04. There was a trend for groups to differ on ratings of appearance based on behaviour, 
F(1, 23) = 3.31, p = .082, ηp2 = .13 and facial characteristics, F(1, 23) = 3.60, p = .071, ηp2 = 
.14, as well as presentation of feigned symptoms, F(1, 23) = 3.80, p = .064, ηp2 = .14. The 
experimenter ratings suggest that DID participants and simulators were indistinguishable in 
their presentation. 
Recall 
Recall mean scores are reported in Table 5. The mixed measures ANOVA on 
Vignette (first vignette presented in identity A, second vignette presented in identity B) by 
Group (DID, simulator, amnesic comparison, nonamnesic comparison) indicated a significant 
main effect for Vignette, F(1, 63) = 57.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .48, with more recall of stimuli 
from the first vignette. The Group main effect was also significant, F(3, 63) = 34.86, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .62. Gabriel’s post-hoc tests indicated that on tests of recall, DID participants were 
no different to simulators (p = .773), but they did recall significantly less information than 
amnesic (p = .014) and nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001). Simulators and amnesic 
comparisons did not differ in their recall (p = .305), but did recall significantly less stimuli 
than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < .001, respectively). Importantly for hypothesis 
one, the Vignette x Group interaction was significant, reflecting a difference in recall 
between groups across vignettes, F(3, 63) = 29.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .59. In Identity A, DID 
participants presented a trend to recall significantly less words from the vignette encoded in 
identity B compared to that experienced in identity A, t(11) 1.94, p = .078. A similar but 
more pronounced effect was found in the simulators who showed significantly less recall for 




< .001. The nonamnesic comparisons showed an opposite trend of increased (instead of 
decreased) recall for the second vignette, t(19) -1.81, p = .086. 
On Vignette 1, a significant difference was present for Group, F(3, 63) = 9.20, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .31, with Gabriel’s post-hoc tests indicating that the DID participants had 
significantly lower recall of information they had experienced in identity A than simulators (p 
= .045), amnesic comparisons (p < .001) and nonamnesic comparisons (p = .006). The 
simulators did not differ significantly when compared to amnesic comparisons (p = .120) and 
nonamnesic comparisons (p = .997), nor did the comparison groups differ between one 
another (p = .242).  
For Vignette 2, the groups also differed, F(3, 63) = 64.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .75, with 
DID participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons showing less recall for identity B’s 
vignettes compared with the nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < .001; p <.001, 
respectively). The DID participants did not differ significantly on recall compared with 
simulators (p = .606) and amnesic comparisons (p = .503), nor did simulators and amnesic 
comparisons (p = 1.000).  
Table 5  
Vignette-dependent Means (with SD) for Recall 
Diagnostic group Vignette 1 hit proportion 
mean (SD) 























Recognition mean scores are shown in Table 6.  
 Sensitivity. The mixed measures ANOVA on Vignette (first vignette presented in 
identity A, second vignette presented in identity B) by Group (DID, simulator, amnesic 
comparison, nonamnesic comparison) indicated a significant main effect for Test session, 
F(1, 63) = 208.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .77, with greater sensitivity of test session 1 compared to 
test session 2. The Group main effect was also significant, F(3, 63) = 49.17, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.70, with the DID, simulator and amnesic comparison groups being significantly less 
sensitive than the nonamnesic comparison group (p < .001; p < .001; p < .001, respectively). 
The DID participants did not differ from the simulators (p = .177) or amnesic comparisons (p 
= .485), nor did the simulators from the amnesic comparisons (p = .962). Importantly for 
hypothesis two, The Test session x Group interaction was significant, reflecting a difference 
in sensitivity between groups across test sessions, F(3, 63) = 49.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .70. DID 
participants scored higher on sensitivity for identity A material (i.e., test session 1 compared 
to test session 2), encoded by identity A, t(11) = 2.62, p = .024. Simulators, t(13) = 14.53, p < 
.001, and amnesic comparisons, t(20) = 25.27, p < .001, were also more sensitive in identity 
A than identity B. Nonamnesic comparisons did not show a significant change across 
vignettes t(19) = -.87, p = .395. 
For test session 1, groups differed significantly on sensitivity, F(3, 63) = 3.038, p = 
.035, ηp2 = .13, with Gabriel’s post hoc tests indicating that the DID participants scored 
significantly lower than amnesic comparisons (p = .024), although they did not differ 
significantly from simulators (p = .351) or nonamnesic comparisons (p = .120). Simulators 
did not differ from amnesic comparisons (p = .890) or nonamnesic comparisons (p = .999), 
nor did the comparison groups differ (p = .982). For test session 2, the groups differed, F(3, 




sensitivity than simulators (p < .001) and amnesic comparisons, but significantly lower 
sensitivity than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001). Simulators and amnesic comparisons 
demonstrated significantly lower sensitivity than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < 
.001, respectively), while simulators and amnesic comparisons did not differ significantly (p 
= 1.000). This suggests that DID participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons are less 
sensitive in discriminating between previously experienced stimuli and distractors at test 
session 2, although nonamnesic comparisons show no difference in sensitivity between test 
session 1 and test session 2. 
Response bias. The mixed measures ANOVA on Test session by Group (DID, 
simulator, amnesic comparison, nonamnesic comparison) indicated a significant main effect 
for Test session response bias, F(1, 63) = 279.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .82, with greater response 
bias (i.e., participants are more conservative) in test session 2 compared to test session 1. The 
Group main effect was also significant, F(3, 63) = 38.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .65, with DID 
participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons reporting higher response bias than 
nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001, p < .001, p < .001, respectively). The DID participants 
did not differ from the simulators (p = .872) or amnesic comparisons (p = .822), nor did the 
simulators from the amnesic comparisons (p = 1.00). The Test session x Group interaction 
was significant, reflecting a difference in response bias between groups across vignettes, F(3, 
63) = 61.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .745. DID participants showed a higher response bias in test 
session 2 (material encoded by identity B) compared to test session 1 (material encoded by 
identity A), t(11) = -3.09, p = .010. Simulators, t(13) = -14.48, p < .001, and amnesic 
comparisons, t(20) = -27.77, p < .001, also reported more response bias in identity B than 
identity A. Nonamnesic comparisons did not show a significant change t(19) = .77, p = .454.  
 For test session 1, groups differed significantly on response bias, F(3, 63) = 3.145, p = 




response bias than amnesic comparisons (p = .040). They also showed a trend towards 
significantly more response bias than simulators (p = .078) and nonamnesic comparisons (p = 
0.71). Simulators did not differ significantly from amnesic (p = 1.000) or nonamnesic (p = 
1.000) comparisons, nor did the comparison groups differ (p = 1.000). For test session 2, the 
groups differed, F(3, 63) = 101.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .83, with post hoc tests indicating that DID 
participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons scored significantly higher response bias 
than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < .001; p < .001, respectively). Simulators and 
amnesic comparisons were also significantly higher on response bias than DID participants (p 
< .001; p < .001, respectively), while simulators and amnesic comparisons did not differ 
significantly (p = 1.000). This suggests that DID participants, simulators and amnesic 
comparisons were more conservative (i.e., more hesitant to indicate that they recognised 
sentences to represent events from the vignettes) at test session 2, whereas nonamnesics were 
more liberal.  
Remember and Know Responses 
Scores indicating the quality of the recognition are presented in Table 6. The mixed 
measures ANOVA for Test session by Group (DID, simulator, amnesic comparison, 
nonamnesic comparison) for remember responses indicated a significant main effect for Test 
session, F(1, 63) = 179.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .741, indicating that there were more remember 
responses for identity A than identity B vignettes. The Group main effect was also 
significant, F(3, 63) = 25.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .55, with DID participants, simulators and 
amnesic comparisons reporting significantly lower remember scores than nonamnesic 
comparisons (p < .001; p < .001; p < .001, respectively). DID participants did not differ from 
simulators (p = .991) or amnesic comparisons (p = .736), nor did simulators and amnesic 
comparisons differ (p = .986). Importantly for the third hypothesis, the Test session x Group 




sessions, F(3, 63) = 37.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .64. DID participants, t(11) = 5.37, p < .001, 
simulators, t(13) = 10.97, p < .001, and amnesic comparisons, t(20) = 8.79, p < .001, 
characterised test session 1 responses more as remember recognitions compared to test 
session 2 (n.b., amnesic comparisons did not receive a second vignette story).  Nonamnesic 
comparisons characterised test session 2 responses more as remember recognitions compared 
to test session 1, t(19) -3.13, p = .006. 
A one-way ANOVA on Group for test session 1 remember responses, F(3, 63) = 2.29, 
p = .087, ηp2 = .10, indicated a trend of differences between groups. No post hoc tests were 
significant (p > .125). 
A one-way ANOVA on Group for test session 2 remember responses showed a 
significant effect, F(3, 63) = 53.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .72, with DID participants, simulators and 
amnesic comparisons showing significantly lower remember responses than the nonamnesic 
comparisons (p < .001). No other comparisons were significant (p’s >.755). 
For know responses, the main effect for Test session was not significant, F(1, 63) = 
1.17, p = .169, ηp2 = .03. The Group main effect was significant, F(3, 63) = 8.38, p < .001, ηp2 
= .29. DID participants knew significantly more stimuli than simulators (p = .001), amnesic 
comparisons (p < .001) and nonamnesic comparisons (p < .002). Simulators were not 
significantly different to amnesic comparisons (p = 1.00) or nonamnesic comparisons (p = 
1.000), nor were amnesic or nonamnesic comparisons (p = 1.00). The Test session x Group 






Table 6  














    
Hit rate Test 
session 1 
 
.67 (.18) .83 (.18) .86 (.12) .84 (.16) 
Hit rate Test 
session 2 
 










.01 (.03) .02 (.04) .02 (.07) .03 (.05) 
Sensitivity 
Test session 1 
 
2.05 (.59) 2.45 (.62) 2.65 (.47) 2.53 (.60) 
Sensitivity 
Test session 2 
 
1.07 (1.14) -.02 (.19) .00 (.24) 2.70 (.51) 
Response bias 
Test session 1 
 
.51 (.30) .20 (.38) .20 (.29) .22 (.28) 
 
Response bias 
Test session 2 




    
Remember 
Test session 1 
 
.46 (.24) .73 (.29) .73 (.23) .72 (.21) 
Remember 
Test session 2 
 




.22 (.17) .10 (.21) .13 (.16) .12 (.15) 
Know Test 
session 2 







The present study assessed the extent of transfer of episodic self-referential memory 
across amnesic identities in DID. On free recall, DID participants and simulators reported (in 
the case of DID a trend for) less memory of stimuli presented to identity B compared to 
identity A, when tested in identity A. Amnesic comparisons only recalled stimuli that were 
presented to them, while nonamnesic comparisons showed an increase in memory of the most 
recently presented stimuli (i.e., vignette 2/identity B stimuli). On tests of forced choice 
recognition, results were similar, DID participants and simulators reported less memory of 
stimuli presented to identity B, when tested in identity A, while amnesic comparisons showed 
no recognition of vignette 2 stimuli and nonamnesic comparisons showed no differences in 
memory for both sets of stimuli. Finally, the recognition sensitivity rates indicated that DID 
participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons also retrieved less information for the 
vignettes overall than nonamnesic comparisons. On the remember/know paradigm, DID 
participants and simulators indicated a reduction in remember responses for identity B 
material compared to identity A material. Amnesic comparisons also showed a reduction in 
remember responses for material that had not been presented to them. Nonamnesic 
comparisons presented no differences in remember responses for vignette stimuli. For know 
responses, no differences between the identity A and identity B material was found for any of 
the groups. 
DID participants selected identities for participation that subjectively reported 
amnesia for material experienced in a different amnesic identity. The report of subjective 
amnesia was checked during the testing by the experimenter by asking the patients after a 
switch whether indeed they did not remember what was done in the other identity, which 




evidence of inter-identity amnesia. DID participants showed a trend for amnesia on tests of 
recall and recognised more stimuli from the vignette they had experienced in the same 
identity compared to that experienced in the other identity.  
However, recall hit rates showed that there was a comparable pattern between DID 
participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons which hinders an unequivocal 
interpretation of the results. All three groups showed a significant reduction in recall and 
recognition of information presented to the amnesic identity and presented a comparable 
pattern of reduced remember responses for stimuli experienced by another identity, with no 
differences in know responses reported for stimuli experienced by another identity.  
The result of a trend for amnesia for DID on measures of recall supports the findings 
of early research indicating that memory transfer cannot occur via explicit retrieval (Eich et 
al., 1997; Peters et al., 1998). However, it does not support recent research that has utilised 
more advanced and objective experimental procedures (Huntjens et al., 2005; Huntjens et al., 
2007; Huntjens et al., 2002; Huntjens et al., 2003; Huntjens, Postma, et al., 2005; Huntjens et 
al., 2012; Kong et al., 2008). With regards to recognition, the current study found that DID 
participants were less able to recognise information learned in identity B compared to that 
learned in identity A, when assessed in identity A. This also contrasts with previous research 
showing transfer on measures of explicit retrieval (Huntjens et al., 2007; Huntjens et al., 
2003). The findings of a decrease in remember responses for identity B stimuli do not support 
the previous reports of similarities in retrieval of memory with autonoetic or noetic 
consciousness (Huntjens et al., 2007; Huntjens et al., 2003). Importantly, however, previous 
research has used more objective methodology (e.g., interference paradigms; Huntjens et al., 
2003) to ensure the simulation of amnesia is not possible. As the simulators in the present 
study were able to replicate the reduction in memory for identity B stimuli presented by DID 




amnesia is indicative of a true impairment in memory retrieval as their memory profile was 
able to be simulated (Huntjens et al., 2006). Yet, true amnesia also showed the same pattern 
as the simulators, so simulation and the presence of dissociative amnesia are both possible 
explanation for the DID findings in the current study.  
A limitation of the study was that the free recall and recognition tasks occurred earlier 
for amnesic comparisons than the other groups (i.e., due to this group only hearing one 
vignette. As a result, the amnesic comparisons may have found the tasks more manageable. 
Future studies should include comparable time intervals between stimuli presentation and the 
tests, to ensure all groups had the same chance to consolidate their memory. Additionally, 
amnesic comparisons may have found the task easier due to them engaging less cognitive 
resources as a result of them receiving only half of the stimuli. However, as amnesic 
comparisons did not report significantly improved memory performance for their stimuli 
compared to the simulators and nonamnesic comparisons, this limitation does not fully 
explain their memory profile for test session 1.  
It is important to recognise that relatively small sample sizes were included for the 
DID and simulator samples. Future studies should aim to include larger DID samples to 
replicate the current findings in a more powerful design. In addition, despite the subjective 
reports of amnesia in DID, the current study presents the results of a relatively stable DID 
sample due to the requirements of participants to be able to switch on demand. This tends to 
be only possible after extensive psychiatric therapy, and as a result, an assessment of the 
extent of episodic, self-referential memory transfer in people who have been more recently 
diagnosed with DID would be beneficial. As with any study involving switching, there is the 
possibility that a third identity may have influenced memory performance without the 
awareness of the researcher. Although participants were asked whether other identities had 




Future research should also attempt to more closely match education level across DID and 
comparison groups to remove the possibility that differences in education may have 
influenced the results. Although comparisons were selected to match the demographic 
information of the DID sample, the mean DID group education level proved lower in the final 
sample due to some participants being excluded from the analysis. 
The present study assessed transfer for the memory of episodic self-referential 
information. While the DID patient data seemed to support the idea of an amnesic barrier 
between identities, it is difficult to draw a conclusion given that the profile of amnesia was 
possible to be simulated. There is thus a need for future studies entailing more advanced and 
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Amnesia is a core diagnostic criterion for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID). In this 
experiment, behavioural tasks were used to assess the nature of amnesia for episodic, 
autobiographical memories across identities. Nineteen DID participants, 16 DID simulators 
and 41 comparison participants from the general population were recruited. They engaged in 
two sets of tasks (DID and simulator participants completed one in each identity). Free recall 
and recognition for the stimuli were assessed. Subjectively, all DID participants reported 
amnesia for events that occurred in the other identity. On tests using measures of explicit 
retrieval, they presented a memory profile of amnesia similar to simulators instructed to feign 
amnesia and amnesic comparisons. The comparable performance of DID participants to both 
amnesic comparisons and simulators hinders unequivocal interpretation of results. DID 
participants did present poorer memory retrieval overall on tasks of recall than the 
comparison groups. Although the results of explicit memory retrieval inability are consistent 
with the subjective reports of DID impairment in retrieving episodic autobiographical 
memory, the use of a more objective assessment of memory retrieval is required to explore 
the nature and extent of inter-identity amnesia.  
 
Author Note 






Inter-Identity amnesia for episodic, autobiographical memory in dissociative identity 
disorder 
Compartmentalised identities are reported in people with Dissociative Identity 
Disorder (DID), with the extent of inter-identity accessibility of experiences not entirely 
understood. Amnesia is a core diagnostic criteria of DID (American Psychiatric Association 
[APA]). It can present as two-way (with no perceived transfer of information occurring 
across identities) or one-way (with only one identity perceiving access to the memories of the 
other; Bryant, 1995; Ellenberger, 1970). Inter-identity amnesia is often reported between 
identities who differ in their remembering of traumatic experiences. Although one identity 
may report knowledge of traumatic experiences from the past, the other may claim full 
amnesia of these events (Kluft, 2007; Van der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele, 2006). 
Previous research using measures of explicit and implicit memory retrieval have 
found evidence of transfer of information across identities reporting amnesia (Allen & 
Movius, 2000; Elzinga, Phaf, Ardon, & Van Dyck, 2003; Huntjens et al., 2005; Huntjens, 
Peters, Woertman, Van der Hart, & Postma, 2007; Huntjens, Postma, Hanmaker, Woertman, 
& Van der Hart, 2002; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & Van der Hart, 2003; 
Huntjens, Postma, Woertman, Van der Hart, & Peters, 2005; Huntjens, Verschuere, & 
McNally, 2012; Kong, Allen, & Glisky, 2008; Peters, Uyterlinde, Consemulder, & Van der 
Hart, 1998; Silberman, Putnam, Weingartner, Braun, & Post, 1985). These studies have 
examined procedural, semantic, episodic and semantic autobiographical memory, but not 
necessarily episodic autobiographical memory. Research has indicated little support for 
subjectively reported inter-identity amnesia, with inter-identity transfer reported for stimuli 
encoded into different memory systems. There also appears to be little difference in whether 
memories are retrieved with autonoetic or noetic consciousness (Huntjens et al., 2003). 




ability to access details about the event and feel as though it was them that experienced it. 
Noetic consciousness is paired with semantic memories and involves a person simply 
knowing that an event happened to them, but without being able to access recollection of 
actually experiencing the event (Tulving, 1985). Understanding episodic autobiographical 
memory is important for DID as identities often claim different levels of access to memories 
for personal experience, including those of traumatic events (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). As the DSM-5 criteria for the disorder include the presence of separate 
identities that hold distinct life memories of episodic autobiographical events, understanding 
the extent of this reported amnesia may provide insight into whether there is potential for 
identities to recognise experiences they attribute to another aspect of self. 
The current study aimed to determine whether the reported impairment in memory 
transfer across amnesic identities was evident for episodic autobiographical memories (i.e., 
information from actually experienced events). To assess the pervasiveness of amnesia in 
DID, comparison samples were included in this study. Two non-clinical comparison groups 
were recruited, one that had full access to all material and a second group of people who were 
truly amnesic for some of the material assessed. A group of people instructed to consciously 
simulate DID was also included. The inclusion of this group is recommended in research to 
investigate the possibility that socio-cognitive factors (e.g., therapist suggestion) may give 
rise to the disorder (Boysen & VanBergen, 2014; Huntjens et al., 2012). By comparing a 
group diagnosed with DID to a group of simulators, research can assess the cognitive profile 
of both groups, generating further knowledge about the aetiology of DID and disorder 
presentation (Boysen & VanBergen, 2014). In line with this recommendation, participants 
were from four samples: DID participants reporting two-way amnesia, non-clinical 
comparison participants who experienced half of the events (amnesic group) or the full set 




For DID participants, two identities were used who were amnesic for events 
experienced by the other identity. Free recall and forced choice recognition tasks were used 
to assess explicit memory retrieval for events experienced in their own identity compared 
with an amnesic identity. As in Chapter two, a remember/know paradigm was included to 
assess whether, in the presence of transfer, the memories were accessed with noetic or 
autonoetic consciousness (Huntjens et al., 2003). Based on the research presented in Chapters 
one and two, the current study tested the following three hypotheses: (1) For free recall, DID 
participants would exhibit amnesia for behavioural tasks encoded in a different amnesic 
identity, a similar profile to amnesic comparison responding. (2) For forced choice 
recognition, a similar pattern of results was predicted, (3) For remember and know responses, 
DID participants would exhibit a higher level of autonoetic consciousness for memories 
encoded in the same identity compared to those encoded in the other identity, comparable to 
amnesic comparisons. Nonamnesic comparisons would exhibit comparable levels of 
autonoetic and noetic performance across the different material.  
Method 
Participants 
DID sample. A total of 19 DID participants were referred by clinicians and nurses, 
and from a hospital-based programme in Brisbane, Australia. The target sample size was 20, 
a number based on pre-existing studies of inter-identity transfer (for example, Huntjens et al., 
2003). Clinicians working with people with DID or referring to the hospital programme were 
sent information and invitation letters for the study to distribute to those they felt were stable 
enough to receive the information. Nurses at the hospital gave the invitation letter to DID 
patients attending hospital programmes. Conditions for inclusion in the study were (1) a pre-
existing DID diagnosis; (2) a confirmation of DID diagnosis via the Dissociative Disorders 




engage two identities to take part who reported no knowledge of events that occur in the other 
identity; (4) the identities had no awareness of the other’s experiences, and one should be 
aware of distressing autobiographical events in their past, while the other should have no 
awareness of such experiences4; and (5) the ability to switch between the two selected 
identities when the experimenter required. Participants were excluded from the study if they 
(1) were unable to concentrate on the computer tasks, (2) were unable to switch between 
identities on request, (3) were unable to maintain a single identity in executive control, or (4) 
there was no amnesia subjectively indicated between their selected identities. As a result of 
the inclusion and exclusion criteria, five participants were removed for: failing to complete 
the task (n = 1), being unable to switch between identities (n = 3), or experiencing test 
interference from a third identity (n = 1). Fourteen participants were included in the final 
sample. Of the 14 DID participants tested, one was removed from the recall analysis for 
failing to complete the task. Participants were told that the study would examine memory in 
different identities in people with DID. Participants chose the two identities (identified as A 
and B) to take part in the study. They received a $20 shopping voucher for their participation. 
The DID participants were from the same sample as the DID participants who participated in 
Chapter two. 
 Comparison samples. A total of 41 comparison participants were recruited for the 
study. People were invited to take part in a study researching memory in different groups. 
Members of the Christchurch and Brisbane general population were recruited using snowball 
sampling (n = 26). A participant research pool for undergraduate psychology students and 
advertisements placed around a psychology department (n = 15) also invited people to 
                                                          
4 This was to reflect a different emotional make-up in each identity, which has been used in 




participate. Inclusion in the study required participants to have no memory or attentional 
deficits. Participants were randomly assigned to the ‘amnesic’ comparison group or the 
‘nonamnesic’ comparison group. Amnesic comparisons received only the memory stimuli 
presented to identity A in the DID and simulator groups (see procedure), while nonamnesic 
comparisons received the memory stimuli presented to both identities. Comparison 
participants were selected to match the DID participants number, gender, and age in order to 
remove the influence of demographic confounders. Comparison participants were unaware 
the research was investigating DID and received a $20 shopping voucher for participating. 
The comparison participants were from the same sample as those who participated in Chapter 
two. 
Simulator sample. A total of 16 simulator participants were recruited for this study. 
The target sample size was 20 in order to match the DID patient sample. The sample included 
professional and amateur actors from a University Theatre and Film Department, as well as 
theatre companies based in Christchurch, New Zealand. They were selected as closely as 
possible given the limited pool to match the gender and age demographic attributes of DID 
participants to remove the influence of demographic confounders. Simulator participants 
created two amnesic identities. Two simulators were removed from the recall analysis for 
refusal to complete the full test session. Participants received $20 of shopping vouchers for 
their participation and were instructed that the person who best simulated DID would receive 
a $50 payment. 
Table 1 displays the demographic details for each sample. For the sample included in 
the free recall task, the groups presented a significant difference on age, F(3, 64) = 3.81, p = 
.014, ηp2 = .152. Simulators were significantly younger than DID participants (p = .023) and 
amnesic comparisons (p = .036) and showed a trend to be significantly younger than the 




included in the forced choice recognition task, the groups presented a trend to differ 
significantly for age, F(3, 67) = 2.48, p = .069, ηp2 = .10. Simulators showed a trend of 
younger age compared to DID participants (p = .084). No other comparisons reported a trend. 
For both tasks, there were minimal variations in gender, but due to the low count for males 
across groups, inferential statistics were not conducted. Inferential statistics were also not 
utilised for ethnicity and education due to cells with low counts. The simulator participants 
were from the same sample as used in Chapter two. 
Table 1 
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* For the dissociative identity disorder (DID) groups, two participants chose two ethnicities. 
For the free recall simulator group, one participant chose two ethnicities. For the forced 
choice recognition simulator group, two participants chose two ethnicities. For the amnesic 
comparison group, one participant chose two ethnicities. For the nonamnesic comparison 
group, one participant chose two ethnicities, and one participant did not indicate an ethnicity. 
§ For the DID groups, two participants reported attaining no qualifications. 
Material 
All participants completed the behavioural tasks and a questionnaire battery. 
 Behavioural tasks. Two sets of behavioural tasks were created for the study that were 
designed to provide unique episodic autobiographical experiences that could be used to assess 
memory retrieval across the two identity states that subjectively reported amnesia. The first 
set of tasks required participants to take out their mobile phone, place it on silent and put it by 
a pot plant. They were then instructed to find a book which was placed under a stack of white 
papers. They retrieved a pamphlet from inside the book and were instructed to find a loose 
piece of paper which had pictures of a circle, triangle and square printed on it. Under each 
shape were instructions on how to draw them. Participants were then required to draw the 
shapes on a blank piece of paper in the same orientation printed on the original sheet. They 
coloured the circle in blue, the triangle in red and the square in green using coloured pencils. 
Participants were then asked to choose their favourite coloured pen and write their first name 
under the circle and using their second favourite coloured pen, their birthday under the 
square. Participants were then asked to look at their drawn shapes and think of a memory that 
it reminded them of. They were asked to visualise this memory for 15 seconds.  
The second set of tasks involved participants tracing a picture of a dog followed by 
filling up three plastic cups with water to three different levels depicted by lines drawn on the 




Participants then completed an origami task where they followed the instructions of the 
experimenter to create a finger pointer. Participants then used this to point to five photos of 
celebrities and name them. They were asked to put them in order from their most to least 
liked, choose the celebrity they saw as most similar to themselves and provide a reason for 
their decision. The complete instructions for each behavioural task can be found in Appendix 
E-4. 
 Questionnaires. All participants completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale 
(DES), the PTSD Symptom Scale - Self-Report (PSS-SR) and a demographic questionnaire. 
DID and simulator participants completed the Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule 
(DDIS). The interviewer completed a Post-Experiment Questionnaire for DID and simulator 
participants. All questionnaires are presented in Appendix D. The questionnaires used in this 
study were also used in the research presented in Chapter two. 
DES (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). The DES is a self-report questionnaire measuring 
general dissociative experiences and symptoms over 28 items (Carlson & Putnam, 1993) (see 
Appendix D-2). Participants specify the percentage of time they experience a dissociative 
experience when not impaired by alcohol and drugs through the use of an eleven point scale 
ranging from 0 (never) to 100 (always). A mean is calculated, with scores ranging from 0 to 
100. The DES was used in this study as a measure of current pathological and non-
pathological dissociative experiences. It is suitable for gauging dissociative experiences 
across the participant groups used in this study (i.e., participants with a dissociative diagnosis 
as well as non-clinical controls). The DES has excellent psychometric properties and has 
been used in clinical populations with and without dissociative diagnoses and non-clinical 
populations (Bernstein Carlson et al., 1993; Brand et al., 2009; Carlson & Putnam, 1993; 




al., 2012; Tsar, Kundakci, Kiziltan, Bakim, & Bozkurt, 2001). Table 2 shows the alphas for 
each sample in the current study. 
PSS-SR (Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993). The PSS-SR (see Appendix D-3) 
was used to assess the presence of PTSD symptoms as DID is often co-morbid with PTSD 
(Boon & Draijer, 1993; Vermetten, Schmahl, Lindner, Loewenstein, & Bremner, 2006). The 
PSS-SR is a diagnostic 17-item self-report questionnaire which assesses for the presence and 
severity of PTSD symptoms in people who have experienced traumatic events (Foa et al., 
1993). People indicate the regularity of PTSD symptoms over the last two weeks on a scale 
from 0 (not at all) to 3 (five or more times per week/very much/almost always). The PSS-SR 
has good psychometric properties (Foa et al., 1993). The alphas of each sample in the current 
study are shown in Table 2. 
Demographic Questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire consisted of questions 
about participant age, gender, ethnicity and education level (see Appendix D-4). It was 
included to verify that simulators and comparisons were matched as closely as possible to 
DID participants on these characteristics. 
DDIS (Ross et al., 1989). The DDIS is a structured interview used to diagnose 
dissociative disorders. The DID section of the interview was used to make a structured 
clinical interview diagnosis of DID independent of previous diagnoses, a method previously 
used in Dorahy, Middleton and Irwin (2005) and Dorahy, McCusker, Loewenstein, Colbert 
and Mulholland (2006) (see Appendix D-1). Respondents answer questions about whether 
they have experienced having distinct identities, whether these identities take control of their 
behaviour, whether they experience difficulty in recalling important personal information and 
whether these experiences are due to substance abuse. The DDIS is a psychometrically sound 




reliability indicates substantial agreement across clinicians, with a reported kappa value of 
0.68 (Ross et al., 1989). 
 Post-experiment Questionnaire. The principal researcher was blind to whether DID 
participants and simulators had a diagnosis of DID or were feigning the disorder as a 
simulator. A post-interview questionnaire was included for the principal researcher to state 
whether DID participants and simulators appeared to present with symptoms of DID. The 
researcher stated whether participants appeared to have distinct identities and the ways their 
appearance differed. The researcher also stated whether there appeared to be amnesia 
between the identities and whether the person appeared to have DID. The post-experiment 
questionnaire was used to establish if simulators could successfully mimic DID presentation 
(i.e., have the researcher believe they had DID) in addition to presenting the same amnesic 
profile measured via retrieval tasks. The post-experiment questionnaire is presented in 
Appendix D-7. 
Table 2 
Cronbach’s alpha for DES by Group 
Group DES PSS-SR 
 
DID (n = 14) .78 .84 
 






























Free Recall (FR). 
 Once both sets of behavioural tasks had been administered, participants were 
instructed to state the details that could be recalled. The free recall task occurred 
approximately 10 minutes after the presentation of the behavioural tasks. Following their 
recall of one of the sets of tasks, if they did not freely recall the other tasks (e.g., DID 
participants, simulators), they were prompted with, “did you take part in any other tasks?. A 
positive response brought an invitation to detail those tasks. A negative response resulted in 
the researcher presenting an additional prompt of “do you remember anything about a mobile 
phone or tracing task?” If the response was negative, the researcher asked, “do you remember 
anything about drawing shapes or filling cups?” The prompts were included to assess if DID 
participants and simulators could explicitly retrieve information of events experienced in 
their amnesic identity. Amnesic comparisons were also prompted to recall a second set of 
behavioural tasks, despite only being exposed to one set. 
Forced Choice Recognition. 
 Stimuli Recognition. Participants were presented with 40 sentences each individually 
placed in the centre of a computer screen. Half of these (i.e., ten and ten sentences) were 
related to each behavioural task (20 in total), and 20 were not related to either set of 
behavioural tasks (distractor stimuli) (Appendix E-9). Participants specified whether they 
recognised the sentences as representing details of events from the behavioural tasks by 
pressing the Y key on the keyboard, or if they did not recognise them, by pressing the N key. 
The order of sentence presentation was randomised across each participant. The forced 
choice recognition task was used to assess recognition memory of the tasks. It was 
administered 20 minutes after exposure to the second and final set of behavioural tasks. 




Remember/know. If participants recognised a sentence as representing an experience 
from the behavioural tasks, they were asked to establish whether they ‘remembered’ or 
‘knew’ that it had happened. Participants were told to choose a ‘remember’ response when 
the sentence was paired with an actual recollection of the event. A ‘know’ response was to be 
selected when the event was paired with only a feeling that it had happened. For example, the 
memory of going to a restaurant would be classified as a ‘remember’ response if the person 
was able to remember visual, auditory or tactile details of the event (which restaurant they 
went to, where they sat in the restaurant, whether they were alone or with others, what went 
through their mind at the time). The event would be classified as a ‘know’ response if the 
participant could not recall any details about the experience, but felt it had happened (i.e., 
they felt they had been to the restaurant). Participants pressed the R key on the computer 
keyboard to select a ‘remember’ response, and the K key to select a ‘know’ response. This 
task was used to evaluate autonoetic and noetic memory retrieval. 
Procedure 
 The present study was part of a more extensive investigation of memory transfer in 
DID. Measures unconnected to the present study included free recall and forced choice 
recognition tasks assessing inter-identity transfer of episodic self-referential memories 
(Chapter two), and an implicit association test of episodic, self-referential memory transfer 
(Chapter four). In the present study, exposure to stimuli occurred after the exposure to 
material of the other studies. Written informed consent was required from all participants. 
The study was permitted by both the University and Hospital Research Ethics Committees. 
Simulator training phase. To begin, participants rated their knowledge of DID from 
very knowledgeable to having no knowledge (Appendix C-1) and indicated whether they 
experience visual, memory or attentional impairments. Participants were then shown a video 




minutes long and used clips from two documentaries “Multiple Personality Disorder: The 
Search for Deadly Memories” (Moss, Nevins, & Mierendorf, 1993) and the trailer of “When 
the Devil Knocks” (Harper, Palmer, & Slinger, 2010). Both clips presented people with DID, 
information about how and why it develops and the progression of therapy. A Dissociative 
Identity Disorder Information Sheet was also given to participants which contained three 
pages of information outlining the DSM-5 DID diagnostic criteria as well as answers to 
frequently asked questions (e.g., do people actually have multiple personalities, how do the 
identities develop, is it obvious when a person switches personalities, what are the symptoms 
of DID, is DID a major health problem and can dissociative disorders be cured?) (Appendix 
C-2). The information sheet was modified from one supplied by the Sidran Foundation. An 
Identity/Character Description Sheet was also made available, where participants completed 
18 questions about their identity. Participants were taught how to mimic DID, including 
through practice instructions about how to create and switch between identities. They were 
given a checklist of 18 characteristics of their simulated identities that needed to be highly 
detailed. These participants were told to convince the researcher who was conducting the 
assessment session, and who was blinded to their simulator status, that they had a DID 
diagnosis. They were given one-to-two weeks to practice having DID and develop their 
amnesic dissociative identity before the experimental session. 
Experimental Procedure. 
The study was conducted in five phases: (1) questionnaire battery completion, (2) 
behavioural task presentation, (3) free recall task (4) forced choice recognition task and (5) 
post-experiment questionnaire completion. 
Phase 1. All participants signed a written informed consent form (Appendix B-7).  




demographic information and the DES and PSS-SR, which were presented on the Qualtrics 
survey platform. The order of the final three questionnaires was randomised. 
Phase 2. Participants completed the behavioural task where they engaged with one or two 
sets of tasks, depending on their group allocation. The order of the behavioural task set 
presentation was counterbalanced across participants. 5  
 DID and simulator participants engaged with one set in identity A and then switched 
to their amnesic identity (identity B) where they engaged with a second set.  
 Amnesic comparisons engaged with only one set.  
 Nonamnesic comparisons engaged with both sets.  
Participants were told to remember as many details as possible from their experience of 
the first behavioural exercise, with the aim of aiding memory encoding of the tasks. Once it 
had concluded, DID and simulator participants were asked to switch into their second 
identity. They were asked whether they remembered anything that had occurred in Identity A. 
They were then administered the second set of tasks and again asked to remember what they 
                                                          
5 Nine of the final DID sample received the first set of behavioural tasks in identity A, and 
five received the second set of behavioural tasks in identity A. Seven of the final simulator 
sample received the first set of behavioural tasks in identity A, and seven received the second 
set of behavioural tasks in identity A. Ten amnesic comparisons received the first set of 
behavioural tasks in identity A and eleven received the second set of behavioural tasks in 
identity A. Ten nonamnesic comparisons received the first set of behavioural tasks in identity 






had experienced. Nonamnesic comparisons were presented with the second set of tasks 
directly after receiving the first.  
Phase 3. Following a short break, DID participants and simulators were asked to 
switch back to identity A and were asked whether they remembered anything that had 
occurred in Identity B. Participants were then requested to recall all the details they could 
remember from the first set of behavioural tasks they experienced (i.e., the delayed recall test 
to measure explicit memory retrieval after the elapsing of time, which is more consistent with 
episodic memories for life experience). They were then asked to recall information from any 
other behavioural tasks they had experienced. 
Phase 4. Participants were required to complete a forced choice recognition task, in 
which they had to state whether they recognised sentences as representing events that had 
happened during the tasks. If they responded affirmatively, they were required to state 
whether they ‘remembered’ or ‘knew’ that these events had happened. DID participants and 
simulators completed their testing in identity A. 
 Phase 5. The principal researcher completed the post-experiment questionnaire for 
DID participants and simulators. 
Data Analysis 
 Recall. The number of tasks correctly recalled from each behavioural set was 
assessed. Identity A recall was compared with identity B recall. The proportion of hits 
(correct stimuli divided by the total number of task stimuli) was calculated.  
Recognition. Recognition hit rates were calculated for each behavioural task (correct 
stimuli divided by the total task stimuli). False alarms, sensitivity and response bias were also 
calculated for each set of behavioural tasks. Sensitivity and response bias were calculated 
using z-score procedures detailed in MacMillan and Creelman (2005) to gain d’ and c. d’ was 




participants that was coded as being previously seen (hits), while correcting for distractor 
stimuli that were incorrectly coded as being previously seen (false alarms) (d’ = z(H) – z(F)). 
c was used to convey response bias and yields a participant’s likelihood to respond yes or no 
to stimuli as having previously been seen. It is calculated using the midpoint between z(F) 
and z(H) (c = - [z(H) + Z(F)]/2). 
 Remember/know. A remember and know rate was calculated for each behavioural 
task by dividing stimuli categorised as remembered or known by participants hits for that set 
of behavioural tasks. 
Results 
Questionnaires  
Dissociative experiences differed signficantly across groups, F(3, 67) = 54.40, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .709. DID participants (M = 55.48, SE = 10.92) scored significantly higher than 
simulators (M = 42.37, SE = 20.59; p = .032), amnesic comparisons (M = 11.34, SE = 7.77; p 
< .001) and nonamnesic comparisons (M = 10.89, SE = 8.40; p < .001). Simulators also 
presented a significantly higher score than amnesic (p < .001) and nonamnesic (p < .001) 
comparisons. Comparison participants did not show a significant difference (p = 1.000). 
PTSD symptoms were higher in DID participants (M = 41.86, SE = 8.51) than 
simulator (M = 22.25, SE = 9.42; p < .001), amnesic comparisons (M = 7.19, SE = 7.01; p < 
.001) and nonamnesic comparisons (M = 11.30, SE = 10.48; p < .001), F(3, 67) = 48.42, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .68. Simulators also presented higher PTSD symptoms than amnesic (p < .001) 
and nonamnesic comparisons (p = .003). Comparisons did not differ (p = .601). 
All DID participants (n = 14) and simulators (n = 4) who were administered the DDIS 






Post-Experiment Simulator Performance Questionnaire 
DID participants and simulators did not differ significantly based on the experimenter 
ratings of the presence of amnesia between identities, F(1, 26) = 3.05, p = .093, ηp2 = .11, and 
changes in appearance based on affect, F(1, 26) = 1.16, p = .291, ηp2 = .04, behaviour, F(1, 
26) = 3.02, p = .094, ηp2 = .104, body posture, F(1, 26) = .50, p = .487, ηp2 = .02, voice 
characteristics, F(1, 26) = .83, p = .372, ηp2 = .03, or facial characteristics, F(1, 26) = 2.43, p 
= .131, ηp2 = .09, across identities. Participants did differ significantly across groups based on 
the ratings of feigning of symptoms, F(1, 26) = 4.32, p = .048, ηp2 = .14, that is, simulators 
were rated as significantly more likely to be feigning their symptoms of DID (M = 1.67, SE = 
.724) than DID participants (M = 1.15, SE = .56). Participants also differed significantly 
across groups based on ratings of appearance of distinct dissociative identities, F(1, 26) = 
4.39, p = .046, ηp2 = .14. Simulators (M = 1.3, SE = .46) were also rated as being more likely 
to present questionable or no dissociative identities than DID participants (M = 1.00, SE = 
.00). In short, the experimenter ratings suggest that DID participants and simulators were 
indistinguishable on items associated with their presentation of amnesia and appearance of 
their identities, however they did appear to be less dissociated from one another and more 
likely to be feigning their symptoms.  
Recall 
Recall mean scores are reported in Table 3. As ANOVA is considered to be robust 
against violations of assumptions (Blanca, Alarcón, Arnau, Bono, & Bendayan, 2017; 
Nimon, 2012), the data was not altered. The mixed ANOVA on Test session (behavioural 
tasks 1 presented first in identity A, behavioural tasks 2 presented second in identity B) by 
Group (DID, simulator, amnesic comparison, nonamnesic comparison) indicated a significant 
main effect for Test session, F(1, 64) = 72.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .53, with more recall of stimuli 




.001, ηp2 = .79. Gabriel’s post hoc tests indicated that on tests of recall, DID participants were 
no different to simulators (p = 1.000), but they did recall significantly fewer stimuli than 
amnesic (who only got identity A stimuli; p = .006) and nonamnesic comparison groups (p < 
.001). Simulators also recalled significantly less stimuli than amnesic (p = .006) and 
nonamnesic comparison groups (p < .001), and amnesic comparisons recalled significantly 
less stimuli than nonamnesic comparison groups (p < .001). Important for hypothesis one, the 
Session x Group interaction was significant, reflecting a difference in recall between groups 
across sessions, F(3, 64) = 28.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .57. In Identity A, DID participants trended 
towards recalling more words from the events they had experienced in identity A compared 
to the events experienced in identity B, t(12) 2.10, p = .057. The simulators showed 
significantly less recall for identity B’s information, t(13) 6.76, p < .001, as did amnesic 
comparisons, t(20) = 8.24, p < .001. The nonamnesic comparisons showed a significant 
increase in recall for identity B’s information, t(19) = -3.10, p = .006, potentially 
demonstrating a recency recall effect in this group. 
On test session 1 (i.e., identity A for DID and simulators), a significant difference was 
present for group, F(3, 64) = 13.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, with Gabriel’s post hoc tests 
indicating that DID participants had significantly lower recall of information they had 
experienced in identity A than amnesic and nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001). The 
simulators also differed from the comparison groups (p = .007; p = .005), but not from the 
DID participants (p = .490). The comparison groups did not differ (p = 1.000).  
For the behavioural tasks presented in test session 2 (i.e., identity B for DID and 
simulators), the groups also differed, F(3, 64) = 149.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .88, with DID 
participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons showing less recall for identity B’s tasks 
compared with the nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < .001; p < .001, respectively). DID 




than simulators (p = .080). DID participants did not differ significantly on recall compared 
with amnesic comparisons (p = .159), nor did simulators and amnesic comparisons (p = 
.994).  
Table 3 
Behavioural Task-dependent Means (with SD) for Recall 
Diagnostic group Behavioural Tasks 1 hit 
proportion mean (SD) 
Behavioural Tasks 2 hit 








.42 (.22) .00 (.01) 
Amnesic Comparison 
(n=21) 
.67 (.26) .03 (.14) 
Nonamnesic Comparison 
(n=20) 
.68 (.16) .77 (.12) 
 
Recognition 
Recognition memory scores are shown in Table 4. One stimulus from behavioural 
tasks set 1 was removed from the recognition sentences due to it being rated as too similar to 
other stimuli. Two stimuli from behavioural tasks set 2 were removed from data analysis due 
to them being rated as too similar to other stimuli upon closer inspection. These omissions 
were to ensure all stimuli were unique, to most thoroughly assess inter-identity amnesia for 

































.38 (.36) .03 (.05) .10 (15) .95 (.06) 
False alarm 
rate session 1 
 
.04 (.09) .02 (.05) .03 (.06) .02 (.05) 
False alarm 
rate session 2 
 
















.90 (.60) 1.43 (.19) 1.34 (.29) .06 (.15) 
Quality 
Remember/Know 













.24 (.23) .04 (.08) .04 (.13) .07 (.14) 
Know session 
2 





 Sensitivity. The mixed measures ANOVA on Test session (set presented first, set 
presented second) by Group (DID, simulator, amnesic comparison, nonamnesic comparison) 
indicated a significant main effect for Test session sensitivity, F(1, 67) = 388.35, p < .001, ηp2 
= .85, with a generally greater sensitivity of behavioural task 1 compared to behavioural task 
2. The Group main effect was also significant, F(3, 67) = 60.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .73, with the 
DID, simulator and amnesic comparison groups being overall significantly less sensitive than 
the nonamnesic comparison group (p < .001; p < .001; p < .001, respectively). The DID 
participants did not differ from the simulators (p = .167) or amnesic comparisons (p = .783), 
nor did the simulators from the amnesic comparisons (p = .799). Important for hypothesis 
two, the Test session x Group interaction was significant, reflecting a difference in sensitivity 
between groups across Test sessions F(3, 67) = 71.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .76. In identity A, DID 
participants were more sensitive in behavioural task 1 compared to behavioural task 2 
encoded by identity B, t(13) 3.84, p = .002. Simulators, t(15) 27.56, p < .001, and amnesic 
comparisons, t(20) 20.28, p < .001, were also more sensitive in identity A than identity B. 
Nonamnesic comparisons did not show a significant change across behavioural tasks, t(19) -
.88, p = .388. 
 For Test session 1, groups differed significantly on sensitivity, F(3, 67) = 4.73, p = 
.005, ηp2 = .175, with Gabriel’s post hoc tests indicating that the DID participants scored 
significantly lower than simulators (p = .022), amnesic comparisons (p = .009) and 
nonamnesic comparisons (p = .011). Simulators did not differ from amnesic comparisons (p = 
1.000) or nonamnesic comparisons (p = 1.000), nor did the comparison groups differ (p = 
1.000). For Test session 2, the groups differed, F(3, 67) = 31.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .82, with 
DID participants demonstrating significantly higher sensitivity than simulators (p < .001) and 
amnesic comparisons (p < .001), but significantly lower sensitivity than nonamnesic 




lower sensitivity than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < .001, respectively), while 
simulators and amnesic comparisons did not differ significantly (p = .592). These results 
suggest that DID participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons are less sensitive in 
discriminating between previously experienced stimuli and distractors at behavioural task 2, 
while nonamnesic comparisons show no difference in sensitivity between behavioural tasks 1 
and 2. 
 Response bias. The mixed measures ANOVA on Test session (set presented first, set 
presented second) by Group (DID, simulator, amnesic comparison, nonamnesic comparison) 
indicated a significant main effect for Test session, F(1, 67) = 293.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .81, 
with greater response bias (i.e., participants were more conservative so less inclined to 
recognise items) in behavioural task 2 compared to behavioural task 1. The Group main 
effect was also significant, F(3, 67) = 41.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .65, with DID participants, 
simulators and amnesic comparisons reporting higher response bias (i.e., more conservative) 
than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < .001; p < .001, respectively). The DID 
participants did not differ from the simulators (p = .100) or amnesic comparisons (p = .518), 
nor did the simulators from the amnesic comparisons (p = .878). Related to hypothesis two, 
the Test session x Group interaction was significant, reflecting a difference in response bias 
between groups across Test sessions, F(3, 67) = 52.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .70. DID participants 
reported more response bias in behavioural tasks 2 encoded by identity B compared to 
behavioural tasks 1 encoded by identity A, t(13) -3.37, p = .005. Simulators, t(15) -21.03, p < 
.001, and amnesic comparisons, t(20) -20.11, p < .001, also reported more response bias in 
identity B than identity A. Nonamnesic comparisons did not show a significant change across 
behavioural tasks, t(19) .75, p = .461. 
 For Test session 1, groups showed a trend to differ significantly on response bias, F(3, 




than amnesic comparisons (p = .083), while all other comparisons were not significant (p > 
.243). For behavioural task 2, the groups differed, F(3, 67) = 70.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, with 
post hoc tests indicating that DID participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons scored 
significantly higher response bias than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .001; p < .001; p < .001, 
respectively). Simulators and amnesic comparisons were also significantly higher on 
response bias than DID participants (p < .001; p = .001, respectively), while simulators and 
amnesic comparisons did not differ significantly (p = .944). This suggests that DID 
participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons were more conservative (i.e., more hesitant 
to indicate that they recognised sentences to represent events from the behavioural tasks) at 
behavioural task 2, whereas nonamnesics were more liberal. 
Remember and Know Responses 
Scores indicating the quality of the recognition are presented in Table 4. The mixed 
ANOVA for Test session (behavioural tasks presented first, behavioural tasks presented 
second) by Group (DID, simulator, amnesic comparison, nonamnesic comparison) for 
remember responses indicated a significant main effect for Test session, F(1, 67) = 117.76, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .64, indicating that there were more remember responses for Identity A tasks 
than Identity B tasks. The Group main effect was also significant, F(3, 67) = 4.19, p = .009, 
ηp2 = .16, with DID participants and simulators reporting significantly lower remember scores 
than nonamnesic comparisons (p < .018; p < .040, respectively). Amnesic comparisons 
reported a trend of lower remember scores than nonamnesic comparisons (p = 0.78). DID 
participants did not differ from simulators (p = .999) or amnesic comparisons (p = .963), nor 
did simulators and amnesic comparisons (p = .999). Important for the third hypothesis, the 
Test session x Group interaction was significant, reflecting a difference in remembering 
between groups across test sessions, F(3, 67) = 3.662, p = .017, ηp2 = .14. DID participants, 




.001, and nonamnesic comparisons, t(19) 3.32, p = .004, characterised behavioural task 1 
responses more as remember recognitions compared to Behavioural Task 2 (n.b., amnesic 
comparisons did not receive a second set of behavioural tasks).  
A one-way ANOVA on Group for behavioural task 1 remember responses, F(3, 67) = 
3.31, p = .025, ηp2 = .13 indicated that the DID participants had significantly lower rates of 
remembering events they heard in Identity A than simulators (p = .029). A trend presented for 
lower rates of remembering than nonamnesic comparisons (p = .066). They were not 
significantly different to amnesic comparisons (p < .130). Simulators did not differ compared 
with amnesic comparisons (p = .960) and nonamnesic comparisons (p = .997), nor did the 
comparison groups (p = 1.000).  
A one-way ANOVA for Group for behavioural task 2 remember responses also 
showed a significant effect, F(3, 67) = 4.04, p = .011, ηp2 = .15, with simulators reporting 
lower remember responses than nonamnesic comparisons (p = .001). Amnesic comparisons 
reported a trend to report less remember responses than nonamnesic comparisons (p = 0.67). 
No other comparisons were significant. 
For know responses, the main effect for Test session showed a trend for significance, 
F(1, 67) = 3.00, p = .091, ηp2 = .04, with more know recognitions for session 1. The group 
main effect was significant, F(3, 67) = 7.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. DID participants reported 
significantly more know responses across sessions than simulators (p = .001), amnesic 
comparisons (p <.001), and nonamnesic comparisons (p = .003). Simulators were not 
significantly different to amnesic comparisons (p = 1.00) or nonamnesic comparisons (p = 
.999), nor were amnesic and nonamnesic comparisons (p = .995). The Test session x Group 
interaction was not significant, F(3, 67) = 1.17, p = .329, ηp2 = .05, reflecting that the groups 







The present study assessed the extent of transfer of episodic autobiographical memory 
across amnesic identities in DID. Subjectively, DID participants reported amnesia for events 
experienced in their other, amnesic identity. On tests of free recall, DID participants showed 
a trend to report less memory of stimuli presented to identity B, when tested in identity A (p 
= .057). Simulators reported a reduction in recall of identity B material. Amnesic 
comparisons only recalled stimuli that were presented to them, while nonamnesic 
comparisons showed an increase in memory of the most recently presented stimuli (i.e., 
behavioural task 2/identity B stimuli; a recency effect). On tests of forced choice recognition, 
results were similar. DID participants and simulators reported less memory of stimuli 
presented to identity B, when tested in identity A, while amnesic comparisons showed no 
recognition of behavioural task 2 stimuli and nonamnesic comparisons showed no difference 
in memory of both sets of stimuli. DID participants, simulators and amnesic comparisons 
were more conservative in recognising identity B stimuli than identity A stimuli. Nonamnesic 
comparisons showed no difference in response bias between both sets of stimuli. On the 
remember/know paradigm, all groups indicated a reduction in remember responses for 
identity B material (i.e., amnesic comparisons also showed a reduction in remember 
responses for material that had not been presented to them). For all participants, no 
differences in know responses for identity A and B material were found.  
Overall recall hit rates indicated that DID and simulator participants reported 
retrieving fewer memories for the tasks than comparisons. However, whereas for identity A, 
DID participants recognised significantly less stimuli compared to the other groups, in 
identity B they recognised significantly more stimuli than simulators and amnesic 
comparisons, indicating a slightly different pattern of responding between these groups and 




showed a reduction in recognition of information presented to the amnesic identity, they did 
not present as great an impairment as seen in groups feigning or exhibiting true amnesia. 
There was also a reduction in remember responses in DID for stimuli experienced in the 
amnesic identity (Identity B) compared to stimuli experienced in their own identity (Identity 
A). In contrast, Huntjens et al. (2003) showed no differences in the number of remember or 
know responses from identity A and identity B in their assessment of inter-identity transfer of 
episodic (non-autobiographical) memory. It is noteworthy that in the current study, the DID 
sample reported significantly more know responses to stimuli seen in their amnesic identity 
compared to the other groups, indicating their memories are more characterised by noetic 
compared to autonoetic consciousness. This indicates that memories of autobiographical 
stimuli encoded in another amnesic identity may be retrieved more from the semantic 
memory system, associated with noetic consciousness, than the episodic memory system, 
which is associated with autonoetic consciousness). 
The DID participants results were comparable to the amnesic comparison group, who 
did not receive a second behavioural task and directly contrasted the results of the 
nonamnesic (true control) group, who showed no detriment in retrieval for identity B tasks 
(i.e., and even an increase for recall tasks). The simulators, instructed and practised at 
simulating amnesia, along with the amnesic comparison group, produced results consistent 
with amnesia (i.e., no recall or recognition of behavioural tasks experienced by identity B for 
the simulators or not seen at all for the amnesic comparison group). The similar findings of 
the DID patients, amnesic group, and simulators hinder a clear interpretation of the patient 
task results. The findings indicate that DID participants exhibit a retrieval profile similar to 





Huntjens et al. (2003) determined that amnesia was not present in DID for episodic 
memory using measures of interference and intrusions to assess retrieval of word lists of 
vegetables, animals and furniture. Identities were presented with separate and shared word 
lists, with their ability to discriminate between the two being no different from control 
participants who exhibit normal memory processes. The results of the current study contrast 
these previous findings of inter-identity memory transfer. In comparing the present study 
results to previous research assessing the transfer of autobiographical memory across 
identities in DID, the findings are also contrasted. Huntjens et al. (2012) concluded that 
transfer of autobiographical stimuli occurred on a task using more indirect measures of 
retrieval (i.e., concealed information task (Huntjens et al., 2012). Importantly, however, both 
these earlier studies presented tasks that simulators proved unable to feign an amnesia profile 
on and thus can be considered to be objective measures of inter-identity amnesia. Although it 
is possible that episodic autobiographical memory is more impervious to transfer than 
semantic autobiographical memory, more indirect, objective measures of assessment are thus 
needed to further assess this hypothesis for episodic autobiographic memory. 
Simulators also presented poorer memory performance for information presented in 
identity A than the comparison groups on tests of recall; however, it is likely that the 
mechanism behind this presentation is different from the deficit presented by the DID group. 
As DID participants presented similarities in their responding to simulators, this effect may 
explain the trend for DID participants to present poorer memory for identity A information on 
the forced choice recognition task. As DID participants presented with significantly higher 
PTSD symptoms than simulators and comparisons, it is difficult to distinguish whether 
memory impairment is due to DID or PTSD symptomatology. Future studies should include a 
PTSD control group to assess whether distinct DID and PTSD memory profiles can be 




participants who are matched on education level. Due to some DID participants in the sample 
having to be excluded from the study, the education levels of the groups presented in this 
study are not comparable, meaning it is difficult to remove education level as a possible 
confounding variable. 
A limitation of the study was that amnesic comparisons received only one set of 
behavioural tasks, meaning they may have found it easier to remember their information from 
the task due to experiencing less cognitive load. Nevertheless, as amnesic comparisons did 
not report a higher level of memory than nonamnesic comparisons, this may not have had a 
substantial effect on their memory performance for test session 1. An additional limitation 
was that DID participants were significantly older than simulators, with older age being 
implicated as a factor in poorer memory performance (Ward et al., 2015). As DID 
participants did not differ significantly from simulators on measures of memory performance 
(free recall and forced choice recognition), this is not thought to have had a role in 
confounding the results. 
The present study provides relevant information about the extent of memory transfer 
in DID. Results indicate that in line with subjective reports of amnesia, memory transfer for 
explicitly retrieved episodic autobiographical memories is also impaired, with memories less 
able to be accessed when they are experienced in a different identity. Although the DID 
participants and simulators both showed a reduction in recognition of identity B stimuli, DID 
participants were able to recognise considerably more stimuli. Thus, the profile of responding 
in these groups does appear to differ. As the results of this study do not clearly distinguish 
between amnesia and simulation, there is a strong need for more objective measures to be 
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Transfer of episodic self-referential memory across amnesic identities in Dissociative 
Identity Disorder using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test 
 
Abstract 
Individuals with dissociative identity disorder (DID) often report having no access to 
autobiographical experiences encoded by other identities. This research used the 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) to determine whether there was transfer of 
episodic self-referential memory events across amnesic identities. Nineteen DID individuals, 
16 DID simulators, and 41 comparison participants (divided into amnesic and nonamnesic 
groups) engaged with an audio vignette of embarrassing scenarios to produce the experience 
of episodic self-referential events. Results showed transfer of episodic self-referential 
memory using the aIAT across identities that reported no conscious awareness of encoded 
content in DID. These aIAT results in DID patients were similar to the nonamnesic 
comparison group and the simulator group, and differed from the amnesic comparison group. 
These results are in line with previous literature showing transfer of memories, but extends 
this work to episodic self-referential memory. 
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Transfer of episodic self-referential memory across amnesic identities in Dissociative 
Identity Disorder using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test 
 Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is captured by a person experiencing marked 
disruptions in his or her identity and sense of agency characterised by two or more distinct 
personality states (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). It is not uncommon for adults 
with DID to present dissociative identities purporting to hold information about traumatic 
experiences from the past, or that appear normal save for a lack of affect and the experience 
of amnesia for previous, particularly traumatic events (Kluft, 2007). Each identity has a 
unique sense of self, having its own first-person perspective on itself, other identities, other 
people, and the world (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Discussion continues about the etiological factors for DID. Yet, a combination of 
factors, including chronic physical, emotional, or sexual abuse perpetrated by a caregiving 
figure, major attachment disruption, genetic determinants (e.g., hypnotisability), and 
sociocognitive and cultural factors, are argued to facilitate its development (e.g., Dorahy et 
al., 2014; Lynn, Lilienfeld, Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, & Van der Kloet, 2012).  
Two fundamental types of identities can be distinguished based on their function in 
the person’s life: Those that appear avoidant of painful internal experiences (avoidant 
identities) and those that appear fixated on them (trauma identities; Boon, Steele, & Van der 
Hart, 2011). Inter-identity amnesia for traumatic events has been reasoned to allow an 
identity to preserve its sense of self and daily functioning in the face of abuse and neglect 
(Kluft, 2007). Although an avoidant identity may claim to not have memories for past 
traumatic events (Lewis, Yeager, Swica, Pincus, & Lewis, 1997), trauma identities report key 
information regarding these experiences. Inter-identity amnesia has been studied for events 
holding both traumatic and neutral emotional content (stored in the episodic memory system) 




separately from a person’s experience, in the semantic memory system. More recently, these 
studies have not found evidence for objective memory retrieval deficits across identities that 
report amnesia (e.g., Huntjens, Peters, Woertman, Van der Hart, & Postma, 2007; Kong, 
Allen, & Glisky, 2008). This lack of retrieval deficit was found in both explicit and implicit 
retrieval tasks (for an extended discussion see Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & Van 
der Hart, 2003). Yet research regarding episodic autobiographical memory transfer in DID is 
lacking. Although therapists have routinely noted a lack of shared episodic autobiographical 
memories between identities (Bryant, 1995), the extent and nature of this reported amnesia 
has not been well assessed experimentally.  
Autobiographical memories hold a large amount of person-specific information 
associated with knowledge about who a person is and the events that have occurred in their 
life (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). One of the few studies assessing autobiographical 
memory transfer in DID required participants to answer semantic autobiographical memory 
questions (e.g., favourite food) about themselves in avoidant and traumatic identities 
(Huntjens, Verschuere, & McNally, 2012). Although the DID group reported amnesia for the 
answers provided by the other identities and reported a belief that they were unable to access 
memories from amnesic identities, transfer of autobiographical memory was evident using 
the Concealed Information Test.  
The current study took a step toward examining episodic autobiographical 
information by assessing episodic self-referential information across identities in DID 
patients reporting amnesia in a controlled setting. Self-referential encoding processes 
information “as strongly related to one’s own experience” (Northoff et al., 2006, p. 441; e.g., 
I had this experience), and is retrieved more accurately than information not self-referentially 
encoded (Symons & Johnson, 1997). The autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) 




autobiographical or self-referential statements (e.g., I was drunk vs I was sober) is true 
(Verschuere, Prati, & De Houwer, 2009). It does so by examining the ease of pairing the 
statements with the labels true and false. When pairing a statement with true (and pairing its 
counterpart with false) is faster than pairing that statement with false (and pairing its 
counterpart with true), the statement is more likely to be correct than its counterpart. Meta-
analytic research supports its validity, with Cohen’s d 0.82 [0.54; 1.11], in naïve (i.e., non-
faking) participants, implying that RTs allow for assessing which of the two statements 
presented in the aIAT is most likely true (Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van Bockstaele, Ben-
Shakhar, & Crombez, 2017).  
In the current study, we aim to determine whether memory transfer across reported 
amnesic DID identities was evident for episodic self-referential information using the aIAT. 
Two vignettes detailing embarrassing scenarios were used. Four samples were assessed. DID 
participants heard a different vignette in each identity. To address the suggestion that DID 
may be a disorder of simulation and as such, simulator groups should be utilised for 
comparison purposes (Boysen & VanBergen, 2014), we also included a DID simulator 
sample consisting of professional and amateur actors instructed to simulate inter-identity 
amnesia. The same procedure was used for the DID and DID simulator samples. One 
additional nonclinical nonamnesic comparison sample heard both vignettes, and acted as a 
true control group, while another heard only one vignette to act as a true amnesia group. In 
line with previous research showing that inter-identity amnesia in DID may be more a 
perceived deficit than an objective retrieval impairment, it was hypothesised that the vignette 
material of both identities would be as easily paired with the “true” category in the aIAT (i.e., 








DID. Nineteen DID participants were recruited from a hospital programme in 
Australia specialising in trauma and dissociative disorders and from referrals via clinicians. 
Inclusion criteria involved, (a) a DID diagnosis by treating clinician; (b) a confirmation of 
DID diagnosis by the researcher using the DID section of Dissociative Disorders Interview 
Schedule (DDIS; Ross et al., 1989); (c) the capacity to engage two identities to take part who 
reported prior to the commencement of the study no knowledge of events that occur in the 
other identity (i.e., two-way between-identity amnesia); (d) having one participating identity 
who had more awareness of distressing events from the past and the other participating 
identity having less awareness of such events; (e) being able to switch between these two 
identities on request; and (f) chosen identities having the ability to read and write. Exclusion 
criteria involved: (a) Not being able to concentrate on the computer task due to intensity of 
psychiatric symptoms as judged by their treating psychiatrist; (b) being unable to initiate 
switching between identities or maintain an identity in executive control, and (c) not 
reporting amnesia between their chosen identities. All 19 DID participants were female. 
Participants were told the study would research memory in different identities of people with 
DID. Participants self-selected the two identities and received a $20 shopping voucher for 
taking part in the study. Seven DID participants were removed for failing to complete the task 
(n = 1), being unable to switch between identities (n = 3), or experiencing test interference 
from a third identity (n = 3). The final DID sample contained 12 participants. 
Comparisons. Forty-one comparison participants took part in the study. These were 
undergraduate psychology students (n = 15) and members of the general population of New 
Zealand and Australia (n = 26) recruited via group e-mail, notice board flyer, or word of 




randomly assigned to an amnesic group (n = 21) or a nonamnesic group (n = 20). Participants 
in the amnesic group received the memory stimuli given to the first identity (Identity A) in 
the DID group (see Procedure), and participants in the nonamnesic group received the 
memory stimuli given to both DID identities. Comparison participants were not aware the 
study was researching DID and were informed it assessed how old and new memories were 
influenced by a person’s cognitive functioning. They received $20 in shopping vouchers for 
participating in the research, or course credit. 
Simulators. Sixteen DID simulator participants took part in the study. These were 
professional and amateur actors from a university theatre and film department in New 
Zealand, and various theatre companies via word of mouth and snowball sampling. Table 1 
shows the demographics details for each group. 
Stimuli 
Vignettes. Vignettes were adapted for the study based on previous research that used 
stories to elicit emotion in a laboratory context in clinical and nonclinical participants 
(Dorahy et al., 2017). The vignettes were 14 sentences long. Two vignettes contained 
embarrassing emotional content (i.e., a bank teller pointing out mucus on your face while 
others mock; being berated in a supermarket for hitting a child with your trolley). We used 
vignettes with embarrassing content to introduce emotional stimuli while avoiding a task too 
taxing to complete, especially for the DID participants. One embarrassment vignette was 
administered to each identity (i.e., bank or supermarket)6. 
 
 
                                                          







Participant Demographic Data across Groups 
 DID 
(n = 12) 
Simulator 
(n = 16) 
Amnesic 
Control 
(n = 21) 
Nonamnesic 
Control 
(n = 20) 
Age M (SD) 39.17 (11.74) 31.38 (15.16) 39.10 (8.70) 38.35 (7.24) 
 
Sex n (%)     
Male 0 (0%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (4.8%) 1 (5%) 
Female 
 
12 (100%) 14 (87.5%) 20 (95.2%) 19 (95%) 
Ethnicity*     
New Zealand 
European 
0 (0%) 13 (81.3%) 11 (52.4%) 16 (80%) 
Māori 0 (0%) 0 (6.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Australian 
European 
10 (83%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (4.8%) 0 (0%) 
Other 
 
4 (33%) 1 (12.5%) 9 (42.9%) 4 (20%) 
Qualification§     
High school 
certificate 






1 (8.3%) 2 (12.5%) 8 (38.1%) 9 (45%) 
University 
level 
5 (41.7%) 9 (56.3%) 11 (52.4%) 11 (55%) 
 
* For the dissociative identity disorder (DID) group, two participants chose two ethnicities. § 
For the DID group, two participants reported no qualifications. 
 
aIAT. The aIAT measured episodic self-referential memory for the content presented 
in the vignettes: “I had mucus on my face in the bank” (Bank vignette) versus “I hit a child 
with my trolley in the supermarket” (Supermarket vignette). It does so by examining the ease 
of pairing the statements with the labels true and false. When pairing the bank statement with 
true (and the supermarket statement with false), RTs are faster than pairing the bank 




more likely to be true for the participant than the supermarket statement. Examples of the 
stimuli and procedure are presented in Table 2. The task was presented using 
Inquisit Software, which recorded RTs with millisecond accuracy (De Clercq, Crombez, 
Buysse, & Roeyers, 2003). Participants are instructed to accurately categorise the sentences. 
In Block 1, participants are presented only with the true and false sentences. The labels 
TRUE and FALSE are depicted in the left and right (respectively) corners of the screen. 
Participants are instructed to categorise true sentences as TRUE (by pressing the E key) and 
false sentences as FALSE (by pressing the I key). In Block 2, participants are presented only 
with the vignette attributes, and participants classify the sentences as belonging either to the 
bank vignette (I HAD MUCUS ON MY FACE IN THE BANK) or to the supermarket 
vignette (I HIT A CHILD WITH MY TROLLY IN THE SUPERMARKET). Assignment of 
response buttons to vignettes was counterbalanced across participants. Block 3 practices for 
Block 4, and consists of a combined block in which participants have to classify both true 
versus false sentences and sentences from both vignettes (i.e., with labels referring to both 
classifications appearing in the corners of the screen). Participants are instructed to categorise 
the sentences as they did in Blocks 1–2. In Block 5, participants are again only presented with 
vignette sentences, but the order of the vignette attributes is reversed to what it was in Block 
2 (e.g., when bank label was left and, supermarket right in Block 2; Block 5 has bank label 
right, and supermarket left). The latter order is then also used in the last two combined 
blocks, with Block 6 practising for Block 7 (e.g., bank and false; supermarket and true). 
Procedure 
The study was part of a larger experiment on memory transfer in DID approved by the 
relevant IRBs. Participants in the simulator group were instructed how to simulate DID via 
various means. Participants were shown a video outlining DID, which provided information 




documentaries “Multiple Personality Disorder: The Search for Deadly Memories” (Moss, 
Nevins, & Mierendorf, 1993) and the trailer of “When the Devil Knocks” (Harper, Palmer, & 
Slinger, 2010). A DID Information Sheet was also provided for education and consisted of 
three pages of information outlining DID and answering frequently asked questions (e.g., is it 
obvious when a person switches identities, what are the symptoms of DID?). DSM-5 criteria 
for the disorder were also included. The information sheet was adapted from the Sidran 
Foundation by members of the research team (MJD, CB). After watching the video on DID, 
and being administered the DID information sheet, participants were given information on 
character development by a professional acting instructor (Dr Greta Bond). An 
identity/character description sheet was then administered which allowed participants to fill 
out 18 questions about their created identity (e.g., age, height, hair colour, interests, 
personality style). Simulators created an identity that was amnesic for the content shown to 
the other identity. They were also educated in how to mimic DID which included practice 
instructions on how to create and switch between identities. They practised their created 
identity for one-to-two weeks and completing a practice log book for the amount of practice 
they engaged in daily, amassing an average of 153.75 minutes of practice (SD = 93.47). 
Participants were then required to pass a DID knowledge test and record their motivation 
levels for practising and simulating DID on a scale ranging from “not at all” to “completely”. 
Simulators were instructed to simulate amnesia between their identities throughout the study. 
Written and informed consent was gained from all participants and identities before 
participation. All participants were tested individually by the first author. Participants were 
randomly assigned to vignette conditions (bank or supermarket). DID and simulator 
participants were assigned the bank vignettes in one identity and supermarket vignettes in the 
other identity. Presentation order of vignettes and order of DID/simulator identity was 




vignette. Nonamnesic comparisons were assigned both pairs of vignettes, and the 
presentation order was again counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed 
to become as absorbed in the vignette as possible and remember any details they could. 
During the vignette presentation, participants were required to say aloud the sentence they 
had just heard via headphones, changing it from the personal pronoun “you” (e.g., you went 
to the bank) to “I” (e.g., I went to the bank) to heighten its self-referential quality. After each 
vignette had finished, participants rated the level of embarrassment experienced on a scale 
from 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely) and were asked to recall as many details of the story as 
possible in two minutes. After switching to the other identity (Identity B), DID and simulator 
participants were asked if they remembered anything about what had just happened in the 
study to assess for subjective inter-identity amnesia (all responded having no awareness). The 
second vignette was given to this identity (or to participants in the nonamnesic comparison 
group), and they followed the same procedure as Identity A. Comparison participants were 
also asked what they remembered after completing the vignette (amnesic) or after each set of 
the vignettes (nonamnesic). Approximately five minutes after hearing their last vignette, 
participants engaged in the aIAT. They were instructed to categorise the sentences as quickly 
as they could while minimising errors. The DID and simulators completed the aIAT in the 
identity that heard the first vignette (Identity A). The researcher who engaged in data 
collection (RM) was blind to who was in the DID and simulator groups, and simulators were 
instructed to ensure the researcher believed they had a DID diagnosis (i.e., they did not break 
role). After blindly testing each simulator and DID participant, the researcher completed a 
survey assessing whether the participant appeared to authentically have DID. All but three 







Structure of the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) with example stimuli 





1 TRUE FALSE “I am sitting at 
a computer” 
(true); “I am 





2 I HAD MUCUS 
ON MY FACE 
IN THE BANK 





“I went to the 
bank” (bank); 





3-4 I HAD MUCUS 
ON MY FACE 
IN THE BANK 
or TRUE 






“I am sitting by 
a television” 
(false); “I am 
sitting at a 
computer” 
(true); “I went 
to the bank” 





20 (practice) + 
40 (test) 





I HAD MUCUS 
ON MY FACE 
IN THE BANK 
“I went to the 
bank” (bank); 











I HAD MUCUS 
ON MY FACE 
IN THE BANK 
or FALSE 
“I am sitting by 
a television” 
(false); “I am 
sitting at a 
computer” 
(true); “I went 
to the bank” 











The aIAT was scored using Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji’s (2003) improved scoring 
algorithm. Trials with RTs greater than 10 seconds were deleted leading to the exclusion of 
1.4% of data. There were no participants that needed to be excluded for having more than 
10% trials 300 ms. The D score is calculated using the difference between the mean response 
latencies in the incongruent combined Blocks (e.g., bank and true; supermarket and false) 
minus the congruent versus combined Blocks (supermarket and true; bank and false) and 
dividing it by their pooled standard deviation, making it roughly equivalent to Cohen’s d. D 
scores that do not significantly differ from zero suggest that both events were in memory 
during retrieval and considered to be true. A significant positive D score indicated that 
identities were more likely to classify their experienced vignettes as being true compared to 
the events experienced in the other identity (which would support the presence of inter-
identity amnesia). aIAT analyses were conducted by the fourth author (BV), who was blind to 
which sample each participant belonged. 
Results 
 
There were no significant group differences in gender, χ2 (3) = 2.12, p = .55, 
Cramer’s V = .18, age, F(3, 65) = 2.00, p = 0.12, hp
2
= .09, or education level, χ2 (6) = 10.63, 
p = .10, Cramer’s V = .40 (broken down into high school; post-high school, non-university; 
university).  
Comparing the bank vignette ratings, the groups differed significantly, F(3, 55) = 
3.52, p = 0.021, hp
2
= .16, with Gabriel’s post-hoc tests indicating that DID participants (M 
=70.83; SD = 35.02) rated the vignette close to significantly (p = .057) more embarrassing 
than the amnesic comparisons (M = 31.82; SD = 35.73), and significantly more embarrassing 
(p = .022) than the nonamnesic comparisons (M = 32.50; SD = 32.91). The difference 




.20), nor were the other comparisons (p > .95). Comparing the supermarket vignette ratings, 
the groups also differed significantly, F(3, 54) = 3.85, p = 0.014, hp
2
= .18, with Gabriel’s 
post-hoc tests indicating that DID participants (M = 65.00; SD = 31.48, p = .047) but not 
simulators (M = 60.00; SD = 31.41, p = .086), rated the vignette as more embarrassing 
compared to nonamnesic comparisons (M = 33.00; SD = 30.97). All other comparisons were 
not significant (p > .18). 
Table 3 shows the D scores and their significance for each group. Nonamnesic 
comparison participants had aIAT scores that did not differ from zero; in other words, the 
aIAT correctly concludes that they subjectively experienced both embarrassing events to be 
true. Amnesic comparison participants had a significantly positive aIAT score; in other 
words, the aIAT correctly recognised that they had experienced only one of the two events. 
Thus, these results validate the aIAT methodology and allow interpretation of DID 
participants and simulators scores. DID participants had an aIAT score that did not differ 
from zero, meaning the events experienced by Identity A were not considered to be more true 
than events occurring in Identity B. Simulators similarly were found to classify both events 
(i.e., those experienced by Identity A & B) as equally likely to be true. The simulators’ aIAT 
score was slightly positive (which hints at successful faking of amnesia), but the score did not 











Table 3.  
D scores (with SD) for autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) 
Diagnostic group aIAT  
D score 
(SD) 
p-value one sample 
t-test against zero 
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that aIAT score 












Note. The Bayes factor for the one-sample t-test against zero, calculated with JASP 
(https://jasp-stats.org) and the Cauchy prior width set to JASP default r= 0.707, indicates how 
much more likely the data are under the alternative hypothesis (aIAT differs from zero) than 
under the null hypothesis (aIAT is zero). Interpretation of Bayes factor following Lee and 
Wagenmakers (2013). 
 
These findings were confirmed by a significant one-way between-subjects ANOVA 
on Group (DID, simulator, amnesic comparison, nonamnesic comparison), F (3, 65) = 3.79, p 
= 0.014, hp
2
 = .15. An independent t-test showed a large difference in aIAT scores between 
the amnesic comparison group and the nonamnesic comparison group, t(39) = 3.42, p < .01, 
Cohen´s d = 1.08 (95% CI: 0.43; 1.74), confirming the aIAT methodology. The aIAT D score 




2.15, p = .04, Cohen´s d = 0.78 (95% CI: 0.04; 1.51), but did not differ significantly from the 
nonamnesic comparison group, t(30) = 0.72, p = .47, Cohen´s d = 0.28 (95% CI: -0.44; 0.99 
or the simulators, t(26) = 0.70, p = .49, Cohen´s d = -0.26 (95% CI: -1.02; 0.49). These 
results were complemented with Bayesian statistics (see Table 3), providing additional results 
rendering a conclusion of anecdotal evidence for no amnesia in the DID sample and amnesia 
for the simulators.  
Discussion 
This study was unique in examining transfer of episodic self-referential memory 
across different self-reported amnesic identities in DID. Results in the comparison groups 
confirmed the aIAT methodology as the aIAT could discriminate the comparison group who 
were amnesic for one event (i.e., had not experienced one of the embarrassing events) from 
the comparison group who were not amnesic (i.e., had experienced both embarrassing 
events). The aIAT results of the DID participants indicated they had episodic memory of both 
events; in other words, the tested identity did not discriminate between the event experienced 
in the same versus another identity, so that both were considered to be true. The results of the 
DID patients were similar to nonamnesic comparisons and simulators.  
The DID trauma model indicates that traumatic events are experienced by trauma 
identities and kept separate from avoidant identities who have a role in preserving 
functioning in day-to-day tasks by inter-identity amnesia. By compartmentalising these 
events so they are separated from avoidant identities, integration with other identity-specific 
memories cannot occur, further perpetuating the existence of separate identities. Results 
indicate, however that retrieval for episodic self-referential memories with embarrassing 
emotional content was evident in both traumatic and avoidant identities. These results are in 




amnesia being reported (e.g., Huntjens et al., 2007; Huntjens et al., 2003; Huntjens et al., 
2012).  
Thus, information is subjectively reported to be irretrievable but objectively retrieved. 
There are several possible explanations for these findings. First, patients were consciously 
simulating amnesia resulting in self-reports of amnesia but transfer of information between 
identities. No firm conclusions can be drawn about this possibility, as DID patients did not 
differ from nonamnesic controls nor from simulators. The Bayes factors, however indicated 
anecdotal evidence for the simulator aIAT scores differing from 0 (indicating amnesia). The 
DID aIAT results indicated anecdotal evidence against amnesia, rendering this possibility less 
likely. Second, the patient results are determined by metacognitive beliefs of being unable to 
retrieve past events experienced in another identity with the accompanying alternative self-
concept. The patient’s subjective perception of the self as fragmented may result in the 
motivation not to engage in search of the autobiographical memory base or not acknowledge 
retrieved material if this is deemed ego-dystonic to the current personality state (e.g., adult 
activities in a child personality state). These metacognitive beliefs may have resulted in self-
reports of inter-identity amnesia, although the capacity to engage in searching past experience 
was unaltered. Future work should investigate the content and role of metacognitive beliefs in 
memory retrieval and identity reconstruction in DID (Huntjens & Dorahy, 2018). Clinically, 
amnesia in DID may result from metacognitive rather than cognitive processes. Thus, a 
metacognitive focus in therapy may assist in overcoming subjective identity fragmentation 
and subjective compartmentalisation of information.  
This research was limited by quite small sample sizes, although effect sizes indicated 
medium to large effects. Generalisations from this laboratory study should be limited to those 
participants with DID who have been in therapy for some time, who are aware they have 




move between these identities on command from a researcher or their therapist, and who 
have the mental energy and cognitive faculties to complete a very complex task. This 
grouping of DID participants is unlikely to reflect those not seeking treatment or those in the 
early stages of therapy. Further caution should be exercised in overgeneralising from the 
analogy procedure and embarrassment-laden content used here to genuine and more intense 
and distressing experiences often reported in those with DID. Future studies should utilise 
autobiographical experience to assess the validity of the current findings.  
In summary, DID participants demonstrated transfer of episodic memories across 
identities that claimed to have no knowledge of events that occurred in the other identity. 
Health practitioners may seek to use these findings to understand further the connection 
between identities, such that amnesic identities may have access to the experiences of other 
identities, although at this stage it is unclear why patients subjectively report having no 
awareness of these experiences (i.e., amnesia) and do not always wilfully engage in retrieval 
of events experienced in other identities. The latter may reflect a general habitual strategy 
influenced by the motivation not to acknowledge or take ownership of events that threaten 
that identity’s subjective self-coherence. The discrepancy between the ability to retrieve 
experiences on the one hand and the inability to take ownership of what is retrieved, on the 






American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
 disorders (5th ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Boon, S., Steele, K., & Van der Hart, O. (2011). Coping with trauma related dissociation:
 Skills training for patients and therapists. New York, NY: Norton.  
Boysen, G. A., & VanBergen, A. (2014). Simulation of multiple personalities: A review of
 research comparing diagnosed and simulated dissociative identity disorder. Clinical
 Psychology Review, 34, 14 –28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2013.10.008 
Bryant, R. A. (1995). Autobiographical memory across personalities in dissociative identity 
disorder: A case report. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104, 625– 631.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.104.4.625 
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical
 memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107, 261–288.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.107.2.261 
De Clercq, A., Crombez, G., Buysse, A., & Roeyers, H. (2003). A simple and sensitive
 method to measure timing accuracy. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, &
 Computers, 35, 109 –115. http://dx.doi.org/10 .3758/BF03195502 
Dorahy, M. J., Brand, B. L., Şar, V., Krüger, C., Stavropoulos, P., Martínez-Taboas, A., ...
 Middleton, W. (2014). Dissociative identity disorder: An empirical overview.
 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 48, 402– 417.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0004867414527523 
Dorahy, M. J., McKendry, H., Scott, A., Yogeeswaran, K., Martens, A., & Hanna, D. (2017).
 Reactive dissociative experiences in response to acute increases in shame feelings.





Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the
 implicit association test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality 
 and Social Psychology, 85, 197–216. http://dx .doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.197 
Harper, R., (Producer), Palmer, M., (Producer), & Slinger, H. (Director). (2010). When the 
devil knocks [Motion Picture]. Canada: Bountiful Films. 
Huntjens, R. J. C., & Dorahy, M. J. (2018). The Dissociative Beliefs about Memory
 Questionnaire. Manuscript in preparation.  
Huntjens, R. J. C., Peters, M. L., Woertman, L., Van der Hart, O., & Postma, A. (2007).
 Memory transfer for emotionally valenced words between identities in dissociative
 identity disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 775–789.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2006.07.001 
Huntjens, R. J. C., Postma, A., Peters, M. L., Woertman, L., & Van der Hart, O. (2003).
 Interidentity amnesia for neutral, episodic information in dissociative identity
 disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112, 290 –297.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.112.2.290 
Huntjens, R. J. C., Verschuere, B., & McNally, R. J. (2012). Inter-identity autobiographical
 amnesia in patients with dissociative identity disorder. PLoS ONE, 7, 1-8.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040580 
Kluft, R. P. (2007). Multiple personality disorder. In G. Fink (Ed.), Stress consequences:
 Mental, neuropsychological and socioeconomic (pp. 60 – 66). San Diego, CA:
 Academic Press.  
Kong, L. L., Allen, J. J. B., & Glisky, E. L. (2008). Interidentity memory transfer in





Lee, M. D., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2013). Bayesian modelling for cognitive science: A
 practical course. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139087759 
Lewis, D. O., Yeager, C. A., Swica, Y., Pincus, J. H., & Lewis, M. (1997). Objective
 documentation of child abuse and dissociation in 12 murderers with dissociative
 identity disorder. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 154, 1703–1710.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/ajp.154.12.1703. 
Lynn, S. J., Lilienfeld, S. O., Merckelbach, H., Giesbrecht, T., & Van der Kloet, D. (2012).
 Dissociation and dissociative disorders: Challenging conventional wisdom. Current
 Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 48 –53.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721411429457 
Moss, J., (Producer), Nevins, S., (Producer) & Mierendorf, M. (Director). (1993). Multiple 
Personality Disorder: The Search for Deadly Memories [Motion Picture]. United 
States of America. 
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & Panksepp, J.
 (2006). Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies
 on the self. NeuroImage, 31, 440 – 457.
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002 
Ross, C. A., Heber, S., Norton, G. R., Anderson, D., Anderson, G., & Barchet, P. (1989). The  
Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule: A Structured Interview. Dissociation, 2, 
169-189. Retrieved from https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/1129 
Suchotzki, K., Verschuere, B., Van Bockstaele, B., Ben-Shakhar, G., & Crombez, G. (2017).
 Lying takes time: A meta-analysis on reaction time measures of deception.




Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in memory: A meta-
 analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 371–394. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
 2909.121.3.371 
Verschuere, B., Prati, V., & De Houwer, J. D. (2009). Cheating the lie detector: Faking in the






Meaning-Making of self-defining memories in Dissociative Identity Disorder 
 
Abstract 
 Individuals with dissociative identity disorder (DID) often report a fragmented sense 
of self. Essential for the development of an integrated sense of self is the process of meaning 
making, which supports the integration of autobiographical memories into a person’s self-
concept. In this experiment, a self-defining memory task was used to assess meaning-making 
in adult and child DID identities. Fourteen DID participants, 25 adult comparisons, 26 child 
comparisons, 23 child simulators and 19 clinical comparisons with a psychotic disorder were 
recruited. They were asked to select three self-defining autobiographical memories and 
complete a questionnaire assessing the emotional valence for each memory and reported  
meaning making for the self-defining memories. DID adult and child identities reported 
comparable memory valence. Yet, DID child identities indicated the use of less meaning-
making than DID adult identities, with both groups being comparable to their age matched 
comparisons. Comparable performance of the child simulators with the DID child identities 
hinders unequivocal interpretation of the results. Although these results appear to support less 
ability in meaning making in the DID child identities, the use of a more objective assessment 








Meaning-Making of self-defining memories in Dissociative Identity Disorder 
Autobiographical memories play a crucial role in the development of the sense of self, 
the perception of who we are as a person. Illustrative of this central link are so-called self-
defining memories, referring to important memories about one’s personal life that involve 
strong feelings, are very familiar and help to understand what kind of individual a person is. 
People who successfully integrate these self-defining memories into their life story 
experience their identity as continuous and coherent over time, despite the vast changes their 
sense of self is likely to have undergone throughout its development (Jørgensen et al., 2012; 
Lampinen, Odegard, & Leding, 2004). But not all people are characterised by a continuous, 
integrated sense of self. For example, the condition Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is 
characterised by a lack of integration of the self. More specifically, patients with DID report 
the experience of two or more personality states that each report their own individual sense of 
agency and way of perceiving the world (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 
prevalence of DID is reported as between 1% and 4% of the general population (Johnson, 
Cohen, Kasen, & Brook, 2006; Loewenstein, 1994; Şar, Tutkun, Alyanak, Bakim, & Baral, 
2000) and 1% and 12% of clinical populations (Boon & Draijer, 1993; Foote, Smolin, 
Kaplan, Legatt, & Lipschitz, 2006; Horen, Leichner, & Lawson, 1995; Kluft, 1999; Latz, 
Kramer, & Hughes, 1995; Ross, Anderson, Fleisher, & Norton, 1991; Şar, 2011; Saxe et al., 
1993). Research supports a link between development of the disorder and reported traumatic 
childhood events, particularly abuse perpetrated by a caregiver (Dalenberg et al., 2012; 
Dorahy et al., 2014; Loewenstein, 2018; Loewenstein, Frewen, & Lewis-Fernández, 2017; 
Nijenhuis, Van der Hart, & Steele, 2010). The posttraumatic model of DID states that as 
children experience ambivalent feelings of fear of their abuser and a need to seek comfort and 
safety from them, different identities develop as a way to cope with the abuse and the internal 




Previous literature in this field indicated that despite the reported separation in sense 
of self between identities, the content of self-defining memories retrieved by identities is 
comparable, at least with regard to traumatic content. Huntjens et al. (2016) found that 
despite discrepancies in the presentation of identities as either trauma-oriented or trauma-
avoidant, there were no differences in the self-reported levels of traumatic content in either 
identities’ self-defining memories. That is, the DID patients did not seem to be “shut off” 
from their trauma in their avoidant identity state.  
However, the process of meaning-making of self-defining memories for each identity 
was not assessed in previous studies. Meaning-making supports the integration of memories 
into a person’s sense of self, and especially for memories with a negative emotional valence, 
acts to reduce the negative emotional content (McLean & Thorne, 2003). Those who engage 
in meaning-making actively consider the significance of events for their personal growth, 
which allows them to gain insight into how these events have impacted who they are at 
present and how the events have altered their perception of other areas of their life (McLean, 
2005; Wood & Conway, 2006). This process also allows people to gain more personal 
meaning in their life and consider the life lessons which have been used to guide their 
behaviour in subsequent comparable settings (Blagov & Singer, 2004; McLean, 2005; 
McLean & Thorne, 2003). The literature indicates that the ability to engage in meaning-
making tends to develop in adolescence (McLean & Thorne, 2003; Thorne, McLean, & 
Lawrence, 2004), as a result of advancement in the ability to engage abstract thinking 
(McLean & Thorne, 2003). In the context of DID, this process may be impaired, and the 
disorder may be associated with a lack of meaning making. More specifically, impaired 
meaning making may both be a precursor for the development of different identities or a 
maintenance factor of identity fragmentation. That is, less inclination to use meaning making 




the life story and sense of self may result in identity fragmentation or may prevent the 
development of an integrated identity.  
The aim of the current study was to explore whether the process of meaning-making 
is intact across dissociative identities, and whether they differ in the emotional valence of 
self-defining memories. The current study, in extending the exploration of potential 
differences in self-defining memories, used both adult and child identities. DID is typically 
constructed of identities that report differences in age, with some researchers theorising that 
child identities do not grow older or develop adult characteristics (Putnam, 1997). The child 
states are considered to be the result of a “structural” breakdown in the natural progression 
towards integration of discrete behavioural states in childhood; the child identity becomes 
fixated in time and development and does not experience mental growth since the time of 
traumatization (Van der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele, 2006). If DID child identities stay at the 
age they are when they develop, they are likely to be unable to develop the ability to engage 
meaning-making. To further compare whether DID identities develop meaning-making, 
comparison samples were included in this study. Comparison groups of non-clinical adults 
and children were included to compare DID identities to groups experiencing a more typical 
development of their memory processes. A group of child simulators who as adults 
completed the study as children, were also included to compare DID child identities to a 
group who share their biological age but merely present as children. This group was added 
given that proponents of the so-called sociocognitive model of DID state that the disorder is 
developed when highly suggestible people are exposed to social influence from therapists and 
the media, rather than traumatic experiences in childhood (Giesbrecht, Lynn, Lilienfeld, & 
Merckelbach, 2008; Piper & Merskey, 2004a; Piper & Merskey, 2004b; Spanos, 1994). 
Finally, the present research included a clinical comparison group of participants with 




reporting childhood experiences of abuse and neglect, albeit, less severe than those with DID 
(Renard et al., 2017; Scott, Ross, Dorahy, Read, & Schäfer, 2019). In addition, patients of 
both diagnoses report hallucinatory experience (Longden, Moskowitz, Dorahy, & Perona-
Garcelán, 2019). Previous work has yielded mixed results about the abilities of people with 
psychosis to engage meaning-making. Although Berna et al. (2016) presented evidence of 
individuals with attenuated psychotic symptoms reporting meaning-making for their self-
defining memories, Raffard et al. (2010) indicated a poorer ability for patients with 
schizophrenia to do so compared to the general population (Raffard et al., 2010).  
Based on the posttraumatic model and previous research, the current study tested the 
following three hypotheses: (1) DID child identities will be likely to report increased negative 
valence for self-defining memories and will be less likely to report the use of  meaning 
making than DID adult identities; (2) DID child identities will exhibit similar levels of 
meaning-making as child comparisons; (3) DID adult identities and psychosis clinical 




 DID sample. Fourteen DID participants were recruited from a dedicated hospital-
based programme in Australia and referrals via clinicians. The target sample size was 20, 
with this number selected as an attempt to exceed the samples of pre-existing studies 
researching self-defining memories in DID (Huntjens et al., 2016, n = 11). Clinicians 
referring to the hospital and those known to work with DID patients were sent details of the 
study and invitation letters to pass on to DID patients whom they felt were stable enough to 
receive the information. Nurses also gave the invitation letter to DID patients involved with 




confirmation of this DID diagnosis via the main researcher administering the DID section of 
the Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule (DDIS; Ross et al., 1989); (3) the ability to 
engage two identities, one that identified as an adult and one identifying as a child (aged 
between 6 and 12); and (4) the ability to switch between these two identities on request. 
Along with a diagnosis of DID, participants reported co-morbid diagnoses of posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) (n = 12), an anxiety disorder (n = 11), a mood disorder (n = 10), a 
personality disorder (n = 4), ADHD (n = 3), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (n =3), an 
eating disorder (n = 2), autism (n = 1), and a somatic symptoms disorder (n = 1). Participants 
were excluded if they, (1) were too psychiatrically unwell to concentrate on the tasks, (2) 
were unable to switch between identities or (3) retain one identity in executive control. 
Participants were told that the study would examine how sense of self is constructed in 
people with DID. Participants received a $20 shopping voucher for their participation. 
Adult comparisons. Twenty-six non-clinical comparison participants took part in the 
study. These participants were undergraduate psychology students recruited via; (1) a 
participant research pool (n = 4) and (2) advertisements placed around a psychology 
department (n = 21); and members of the general public of Christchurch and Brisbane 
recruited by snowball sampling (n = 1) to match the mean age of DID participants. 
Participants were excluded if they indicated a diagnosis of DID, psychosis or PTSD. Of the 
26 comparison participants, one was removed due to a pre-existing diagnosis of PTSD. 
Comparison participants reported no memory or attentional deficits as asked by the 
researcher. Control participants were told the aim of the study was to measure sense of self in 
different groups of people. They were not aware that the study was researching DID. 
Participants received a $10 shopping voucher for their participation. 
Child comparisons. Twenty-six child comparison participants aged between six and 




primary schools in Christchurch, New Zealand. Child comparison participants reported no 
memory or attentional deficits as assessed by single item measures targeting these domains 
(see Appendix D-8). Child comparison participants and their guardians were not aware that 
the study was researching DID. Participants received $10 in shopping vouchers for 
participating in the research. 
 Child simulators. Twenty-three child simulator participants took part in the study. 
These were undergraduate psychology students recruited via; (1) a participant research pool 
(n = 4); and (2) advertisements placed around a psychology department (n = 19); and 
members of the general population of Christchurch, recruited via snowball sampling so as to 
match the mean age of DID adult identities. Child simulators reported no memory or 
attentional deficits as assessed by single item measures targeting these domains (see 
Appendix D-8). Child simulators were not aware the study was investigating DID. 
Participants received $10 in shopping vouchers for participating in the research. 
 Psychosis clinical comparisons. Nineteen psychosis comparisons took part in the 
study. The target sample size was 20 to match the DID patient sample number. These 
participants were outpatients at three dedicated hospital and community-based treatment 
programmes for psychosis. The inclusion criterion was, (1) a pre-existing diagnosis of 
psychosis, with (2) confirmation of the disorder verified via a shortened version of the Mini 
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) administered by one of the researchers. 
Clinicians were asked to consider patients on their caseload who may meet the study criteria 
and to pass on information letters about the experiment. Along with a diagnosis of psychosis, 
participants reported co-morbid diagnoses of a mood disorder (n = 11), PTSD (n = 3), an 
anxiety disorder (n = 4), autism (n = 1), substance use disorder (n = 1) and OCD (n = 1). 




Participants were told the study would assess how sense of self is constructed in people 
experiencing psychosis and were given a $20 shopping voucher for their participation.  
 Table 1 displays the demographic details for each sample. The groups differed 
significantly for age, F(5, 114) = 69.45, p = .000, ηp2 = .75, with post-hoc Gabriel’s tests 
indicating that DID adult identities presenting as significantly older than DID child identities 
(p < .001), child comparisons (p < .001) and psychosis clinical comparisons (p < .001). There 
was also a trend for them to be significantly older than the adult child simulators (p = .095). 
DID adult identities did not differ significantly from adult comparisons (p = .724). DID child 
identities did not differ significantly from child comparisons (p = 1.000) but were 
significantly younger than adult comparisons (p < .001), child simulators (p < .001) and 
psychosis clinical comparisons (p <. 001). Adult comparisons were significantly older than 
child comparisons (p < .001) and psychosis clinical comparisons (p = .029). They did not 
differ significantly from child simulators (p = .973). Child comparisons were significantly 
younger than child simulators (p < .001) and psychosis clinical comparisons (p < .001). Child 
simulators did not differ significantly in age to psychosis comparisons (p = .540). There were 
variations in gender for psychosis participants compared to DID, and adult and child 
comparisons, with more males being present in the psychosis sample than the other samples. 
Due to the low cell count for males across DID and non-clinical comparison groups, 
inferential statistics were not conducted. Comparative analysis was also not utilised for 
ethnicity and education due to low counts. 
Dissociative experiences as measured by the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) 
for DID participants, adult comparisons and psychosis clinical comparisons differed 
significantly across groups. DID participants (M = 61.05, SE = 14.77) scored significantly 
higher than psychosis clinical comparisons (M = 14.30, SE = 10.86; p < .001) and adult 




Psychosis clinical comparisons and non-clinical comparisons did not present a significant 
difference (p = .372). Child comparisons and child simulators differed on dissociative 
experiences as measured by the Child Dissociative Checklist (CDC), F(1, 42) = 7.15, p = 
.011, ηp2 = .15, with child simulators showing more dissociation (M = 6.65, SE = 6.54) than 
child comparisons (M = 2.48, SE = 3.03). 
All DID participants (n = 14) had their diagnosis confirmed by the DDIS. All 
psychosis participants (n = 19) had their diagnosis confirmed by the MINI and all adult 
comparisons, child comparisons and child simulators were confirmed not to have psychosis. 
Psychosis experiences differed across groups, F(3, 72) = 38.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .61. DID 
participants (M = 3.64, SE = 1.65) and psychosis clinical comparisons (M = 4.63, SE = 2.03) 
scored significantly higher than adult comparisons (M = .00, SE = .00; p < .001; p < .001, 
respectively) and child comparisons (M = 1.14, SE = 1.74; p < .001; p < .001), but did not 
differ from each other (p = .162). Adult comparisons showed a trend to report significantly 
less psychosis experiences than child comparisons (p = .098).   
Table 1 
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Note. For the dissociative identity disorder (DID) group, five participants chose two 
ethnicities and one chose four ethnicities. For the child comparisons, two participants chose 
two ethnicities. For the psychosis clinical comparisons, one participant chose two ethnicities. 
For the adult comparisons, one participant reported no qualifications. For the clinical 
comparisons, four participants reported no qualifications. 
Materials 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Carlson & Putnam, 1993). The DES is a self-
report measure assessing general dissociative experiences and symptoms over 28 items 
(Carlson & Putnam, 1993) (see Appendix D-2). Participants indicate the percentage of time 
they experience each dissociative item when not under the influence of alcohol and drugs 
using an eleven point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 100 (always). A mean is calculated, 
with scores ranging from 0 to 100. The DES is appropriate for assessing pathological and 
non-pathological dissociative experiences across the participant groups used in this 
experiment The DES has excellent psychometric properties in clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Bernstein Carlson et al., 1993; Brand, Classen, McNary & Zaveri, 2009). Table 
2 shows the alphas for each sample in this study. 
CDC (Putnam, Helmers, & Trickett, 1993). The CDC is a self-report measure 
assessing the presence of general dissociative experiences and symptoms in children (Putnam 
et al., 1993). Parents or guardians of the child in question indicate the extent to which 
children have exhibited 20 different dissociative behaviours over the last 12 months. The 
Other 11  
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scale is scored: 0 (not true), 1 (somewhat or sometimes true) and 2 (very true). An overall 
total is recorded, with scores of 12 and higher indicating that the child may be experiencing 
pathological dissociation. Child comparisons and child simulator participants received the 
CDC to compare their reported levels of pathological dissociation to the DID participants. 
The child simulators reported their own CDC scores rather than a parent or guardian, as is 
customary. The CDC has good psychometric properties (Putnam et al., 1993). Table 2 shows 
the alphas for both samples in this study. 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1988). Participants were required to complete an item from the MCQ for each of their 
selected self-defining memories (outlined in procedure). Participants were asked about 
valence (negative or positive emotional connotation) of the selected memories measured on a 
1 to 7 scale, where 1 indicated the memory holds a negative connotation and 7 indicated a 
positive connotation.  
Scale to Assess Meaning Making (SMM; Wood & Conway, 2006). The SMM is a 
self-report measure assessing the extent to which participants report engaging in the process 
of meaning making for self-defining memories. The questionnaire determines whether people 
have experienced personal growth, insight and learned more about the meaning of their life in 
response to having experienced each event. A mean is calculated across six items with 
responses ranging between 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The SMM has good 
psychometric properties and has been used to assess both clinical and non-clinical 
populations. Cronbach’s alpha has been reported to be between .75 to .86 (Berna et al., 2016; 
Wood & Conway, 2006). Table 2 shows the reliability using inter-item correlations, 
recommended when a scale is constructed of few items (e.g., Pallant, 2013). A mean of the 




of the scale was satisfactory (i.e., see Briggs & Cheek, 1986, who recommend an optimal 
range for the inter-item correlations of .2 to .4).  
Demographic Questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire included questions 
about participant age, gender, ethnicity and education level (see Appendix D-8). 
Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule (DDIS; Ross et al., 1989). The DDIS is a 
structured interview used to diagnose dissociative disorders. The DID section of the measure 
was used to make a clinical interview diagnosis of DID in the DID sample by the primary 
researcher (see Appendix D-1). Respondents were verbally asked questions about whether 
they feel they have distinct identities, whether these identities take control of their behaviour, 
whether they are sometimes unable to recall important personal information and whether 
these experiences are caused by substance abuse. The DDIS is a psychometrically sound 
measure for assessing the presence of dissociative disorders (Ross et al., 1989). Previous 
research has presented a kappa value of 0.68, indicating substantial agreement between 
clinicians for DDIS scores (Ross et al., 1989).  
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998). The 
MINI is a structured interview used to diagnose psychotic disorders. The psychosis section of 
the measure was used to confirm a clinical interview diagnosis of psychosis in the clinical 
comparisons and to exclude those psychosis symptoms in the non-clinical comparisons (none 
were positive; see Appendix D-10). The MINI is a psychometrically sound measure for 
assessing the presence of current and lifetime psychosis. For the child comparison group, it 
was adapted into language appropriate for their age range. For indications of current 
psychosis symptoms, previous research has acquired kappa coefficient values ranging 
between 0.88 and 1.00 for inter-rater reliability and 0.90 for test-retest reliability (Lecrubier 




Self-Defining Memory Task (Berna et al., 2011; Singer & Halbach Moffitt, 1992). 
The Self-Defining Memory Task involved participants choosing three autobiographical 
memories from their past that (a) were at least one year old, (b) were remembered clearly, (c) 
felt currently important, (d) helped the person understand who they are as an individual (e) 
involved some strong feelings, (f) had been thought of many times and (g) were familiar like 
a picture that has been studied or a song learnt by heart. Participants gave each memory with 
a title, recorded their age when the events happened and estimated how long ago the event 
occurred.  
Table 2 
Cronbach’s alphas for the DES and CDC, and inter-item correlations for the SMM by Group 
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 The study required written informed consent from all participants. This study was 
approved by both University and Hospital Research Committees. Participants were presented 
the questionnaire battery in an interview format, where the researcher read the questions 
aloud, and participants verbally responded.  
 Administration Procedure. The study was part of a larger experiment exploring 
sense of self and episodic autobiographical memory in DID. Measures unconnected to the 
present study included a card-sort task assessing sense of self and a narrative life story task. 
First, all participants signed a written informed consent form (Appendix B-7). Then the 
participants completed a questionnaire battery of the DES or CDC, MINI and demographic 
questionnaire (order randomised). DID participants were also administered the DDIS prior to 
the questionnaire battery. The measures unconnected to this study were presented after the 
questionnaire battery and were concluded before the self-defining memory task. The MCQ 




Valence mean scores are reported in Table 37. To assess for differences between DID 
identities, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used, with Identity (DID 
adult identity, DID child identity) and Order of self-defining memory (first memory reported, 
second memory reported, third memory reported) as within-subjects factors. There was no 
significant main effect for Identity, F(1, 10) = .00, p = .950, ηp2 = .00. This analysis also did 
not indicate a significant main effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 20) = 1.48, p = 
                                                          
7 Due to some participants not indicating valence for self-defining memories, the data was not 




.251, ηp2 = .13. The Order of self-defining memory x Identity interaction was not significant, 
reflecting no difference in valence between groups across memories, F(2, 20) = .38, p = .690, 
ηp2 = .04.  
 To assess for differences between DID child identities, child comparisons and adult 
child simulators (i.e., adults simulating a child), a repeated measures ANOVA was used with 
Group (DID child identity, child comparison, adult simulator) as a between-subjects factor 
and Order of self-defining memory (first memory reported, second memory reported, third 
memory reported) as a within subject factor. There was a significant main effect for Group, 
F(2, 48) = 3.80, p = .029, ηp2 = .14, with Gabriel’s post-hoc tests indicating that the DID 
child identities presented a trend towards significantly more negatively valenced memories 
than child comparisons (p = .090). DID child identities did not differ in valence compared to 
child simulators (p = .998). Child comparisons presented memories with a more positive 
valence significantly more than child simulators (p = .045). The analysis did not indicate a 
significant main effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 96) = .31, p = .732, ηp2 = .01.   
The Order of self-defining memory x Group interaction was not significant, indicating that 
the differential pattern across groups did not vary across the three memories, F(4, 96) = .26, p 
= .901, ηp2 = .01.  
 To assess for differences between DID adult identities, adult comparisons and 
psychosis clinical comparisons, a repeated measures ANOVA was used with Group (DID 
adult identity, adult comparisons, psychosis clinical comparison) as a between-subjects factor 
and Order of self-defining memory (first memory reported, second memory reported, third 
memory reported) as a within-subjects factor . There was no significant main effect for 
Group, F(2, 49) = .92, p = .404, ηp2 = .04. The analysis did not indicate a significant main 
effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 98) = 1.00, p = .372, ηp2 = .02. The Order of 




valence between groups across the three different memories, F(2, 98) = 1.20, p = .317, ηp2 = 
.05.  
 To assess for differences between adult comparisons and child comparisons, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was used with Group (adult comparisons, child comparisons) as 
a between-subjects factor and Order of self-defining memory (first memory reported, second 
memory reported, third memory reported) as a within-subjects factor. There was no 
significant main effect for Group, F(1, 40) = 1.29, p = .262, ηp2 = .03. The analysis also did 
not indicate a significant main effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 80) = .91, p = 
.407, ηp2 = .02. The Order of self-defining memory x Group interaction was not significant, 
reflecting no differences in valence between groups across memories, F(2, 80) = .62, p = 
.543, ηp2 = .02. 
Table 3 
Means (with SD) for Valence assigned to each Self-Defining Memory 
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Note. Valence was rated on a single item 1 – 7 scale, with 1 indicating negative emotional valence and 
7 indicating a positive emotional valence 
Meaning Making 
 Meaning making mean scores are reported in Table 4. To assess for differences 
between DID identities, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used, with 
Identity (DID adult identity, DID child identity) and Order of self-defining memory8  (first 
memory reported, second memory reported, third memory reported) as within-subjects 
factors. There was a significant main effect for Identity, F(1, 10) = 6.69, p = .027, ηp2 = .40, 
with DID adult identities indicating more meaning making than DID child identities. The 
analysis did not indicate a significant main effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 20) 
= .09, p = .917, ηp2 = .01. There was an absence of a significant Order of self-defining 
memory x Identity interaction, reflecting no difference in meaning making between groups 
across the three memories, F(2, 20) = .46, p = .514, ηp2 = .04.  
 To assess for differences between DID child identities, child comparisons and child 
simulators, a repeated measures ANOVA was used with Group (DID child identity, child 
comparison, child simulator) as a between-subjects factor and Order of self-defining memory 
(first memory reported, second memory reported, third memory reported) as a within subject 
factor . There was not a significant main effect for Group, F(2, 54) = .184, p = .832, ηp2 = .01, 
suggesting that DID child identities reported  engaging similar levels of reported meaning-
making as children without DID and child simulators. The analysis also did not indicate a 
significant main effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 108) = .83, p = .437, ηp2 = 
.02. The Order of self-defining memory x Group interaction was not significant, reflecting no 
                                                          
8 Although we were not interested in the effect of order of memory retrieved, this variable 




differences in meaning making between groups across memories, F(2, 54) = .18, p = .837, ηp2 
= .01, reflecting no differences in meaning making between groups across the three 
memories. 
 To assess for differences between DID adult identities, adult comparisons and 
psychosis clinical comparisons, a repeated measures ANOVA was used with Group (DID 
adult identity, adult comparisons, psychosis clinical comparisons) as a between-subjects 
factor and Order of self-defining memory (first memory reported, second memory reported, 
third memory reported) as a within-subjects factor. There was not a significant main effect 
for Group, F(2, 51) = .59, p = .56, ηp2 = .02, indicating that DID adult identities reported 
engaging the same degree of meaning making around self defining memories as adults 
without DID and those with a psychotic disorder. The analysis also did not indicate a 
significant main effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 102) = .52, p = .598, ηp2 = 
.01. The Order of self-defining memory x Group interaction was not significant, reflecting no 
differences in meaning making between groups across memories, F(4, 102) = .28, p = .892, 
ηp2 = .01.   
 To assess for differences between adult comparisons and child comparisons, a 
repeated measures ANOVA was used with Group (adult comparisons, child comparisons) as 
a between-subjects factor and Order of self-defining memory (first memory reported, second 
memory reported, third memory reported) as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant 
main effect for Group, F(1, 46) = 18.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, with adult comparisons reporting 
more meaning making than child comparisons. The analysis did not indicate a significant 
main effect for Order of self-defining memory, F(2, 92) = 1.51, p = .226, ηp2 = .032. The 
Order of self-defining memory x Group interaction was not significant, indicating that the 
differential pattern across groups did not vary across the three memories, F(2, 92) = .641, p = 





Means (with SD) for Meaning Making assigned to each Self-Defining Memory 
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Note. Meaning-making was rated on a six item 0 – 6 scale, with 0 indicating no presence of meaning-
making and 6 indicating high levels of meaning-making. 
Discussion 
 The present study assessed the use of meaning-making in relation to self-defining 
memories by DID identities. DID adult identities reported more meaning-making compared 
to DID child identities. DID child identities did not present any differences compared to child 
comparisons. Similarly, DID adult identities were also indistinguishable from the adult 
comparisons, as were the psychosis clinical comparisons. DID identities thus appear to be 
able to be distinguished based on reported age for meaning-making and are comparable to 




identities as well as psychosis patients did not differ significantly from that of the healthy 
adult comparison group.  
According to subjective reports of those with DID, distinct identities have their own 
sense of agency and way of perceiving the world (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, identities showed a more advanced reported engagement 
of meaning-making when they identified as being an adult compared to a child. This finding 
provides support for theories stating that child identities do not advance the more mature 
cognitive processes typical in normal development (Putnam, 1997) as DID child identities 
report abilities that are more limited than those seen in a person of their biological age. 
Supporting this is the finding that adult comparisons presented with significantly more 
meaning-making than child comparisons, a finding in line with previous studies (Mclean & 
Thorne, 2003; Thorne et al., 2004). However, it should also be acknowledged that in DID, the 
reports of differential meaning-making may be moderated and determined by the perceived 
age of each identity by patients rather than reflect a differential ability in meaning making. 
The comparability of DID adult identities to adult comparisons did not support the hypothesis 
and was surprising in that a central definition of DID is a discontinuity in sense of self. These 
results indicate a similar reported ability to use cognitive processes involved with integration 
of autobiographical memories into sense of self by both groups. Meaning-making is 
implicated in the integration of autobiographical memories into the self-concept, which 
supports development of a continuous sense of self (Blagov & Singer, 2004). That these two 
groups were indistinguishable indicates the reported ability to gain insight and personal 
growth from experiences is preserved in DID adult identities, with the results of this for sense 
of self an avenue for further exploration.  
 Consistent with the second hypothesis, the comparability of DID child identities to 




the processes that support integration of autobiographical memory into a well-developed 
sense of self. However, the comparability of DID child identities to child simulators makes it 
difficult to interpret the results in this way. As simulation of a reduction in meaning-making 
was able to occur, it cannot be distinguished whether DID child identity performance is 
indicative of a true (akin to child comparisons) or feigned impairment.  
 Although inconsistent with the hypothesis, the results presented in this study support 
previous research (Huntjens et al., 2016) which has failed to find a distinction between the 
emotional valence of autobiographical memory across DID identities.  
In line with Berna et al. (2016), participants with psychosis showed no impairment in 
their reported engagement of meaning-making for self-defining memories. Their performance 
was equivalent to adult comparisons, indicating that the reported ability to gain insight and 
growth from the consideration of self-defining memories is comparable between various 
clinical groups and the general population, despite psychological differences. These results 
directly contrast previous research associated with psychosis and meaning making, which 
have used researcher transcribed narratives to grade the presence of meaning making (Berna 
et al., 2011). The present study only measured participant’s subjective reports of their 
experiences, meaning future studies should assess participant’s reported meaning-making 
ability using measures that are more objective. Previous research has consistently indicated a 
discrepancy in subjective and objective measurements of the abilities of DID identities, for 
example, although amnesia is often reported between identities (Marsh et al., in prep a; 
Marsh et al., in prep b), use of more objective measures indicate the presence of inter-identity 
memory retrieval (Marsh et al., 2018). In addition to use of objective measures of meaning-
making, use of longitudinal studies would provide evidence of whether meaning-making acts 




 A limitation of the study was the small sample sizes for DID participants and 
psychosis clinical comparisons. Although the DID sample presented here exceeded the 
sample size of comparable studies (e.g., Huntjens et al., 2016), future studies should aim to 
include larger samples to replicate the current findings in a more powerful design.   
The present study assessed the reported ability for DID identities to engage meaning-
making for self-defining memories. DID participants indicated a subjective belief of identity 
fragmentation, supported by discrepancies in the meaning-making reported between adult and 
child identities. However, the use of a self-report instrument and the resembling scores of 
simulators rendered an unambiguous interpretation of the results difficult, calling for future 
research including more objective measures of meaning making and related cognitive 
processes in DID.  
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 At the heart of dissociative identity disorder (DID) are issues related to a fragmented 
sense of identity and the compartmentalisation of memory, including episodic 
autobiographical experiences. For example, the first DSM-5 criterion for DID describes a 
disruption of identity characterised by the presence of two or more distinct personality states. 
The disruption in identity involves marked discontinuity in sense of self and sense of agency 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). The second DSM-5 criterion describes 
recurrent gaps in the recall of everyday events, traumatic events and important personal 
information (APA, 2013). It is common for patients with DID to report inter-identity 
amnesia, that is, a lack of access to memories of events that have been experienced by other 
identities (Allen & Movius, 2000; Dorahy, 2001; Dorahy & Huntjens, 2007; Loewenstein, 
Frewen, & Lewis-Fernández, 2017). The implications of this subjectively reported memory 
compartmentalisation in DID on the phenomenological experience of sense of self in 
different identity states is not well understood. As memories of episodic, autobiographical 
events are centrally associated with the development of sense of self, the intention of this 
thesis was to investigate the relationship between this type of memory and its 
compartmentalisation in DID, as well as the cognitive processes that support integration of 
autobiographical memories into a person’s self-concept. Chapters two, three and four focused 
on inter-identity amnesia for episodic autobiographical experiences, while chapter five 
studied the process of meaning making for autobiographical memories. Based on the 
posttraumatic model of DID (Dalenberg et al., 2012), amnesia for episodic autobiographical 
memory was expected. Due to the subjectively reported inability for memory to transfer 
between identities of Emotional Parts of the personality (EP) that recall trauma and identities 
of Apparently Normal Parts (ANP) that deny having access to these memories (van der Hart, 
Nijenhuis & Steele, 2006), amnesia for events experienced in another type of identity was 




child DID identities. Due to indications that child identities do not present with the usual 
developmental trajectory seen in a person growing from childhood to adulthood (Putnam, 
1997), their reported use of cognitive processes developed later in adolescence was expected 
to be impaired.  
Inter-Identity Transfer in DID 
Although previous research has explored inter-identity amnesia, there has been a lack 
of studies assessing the transfer of self-referential material, with these types of memories 
greatly associated with the development of sense of self. Chapter two used an explicit 
retrieval task to assess transfer of episodic self-referential memory. Chapter three used the 
same task but measured transfer of episodic autobiographical memory. DID participants 
exhibited amnesia for information encoded in another identity. They scored significantly 
lower on recognition sensitivity and showed a more conservative response bias for stimuli 
encoded in another identity compared to stimuli encoded in the same identity. The 
performance of DID participants was comparable to members of the general population who 
were exposed to only one set of stimuli (amnesic comparisons). Moreover, DID participants 
reported a qualitatively different way of retrieving experiences of the other identity, with 
these events less likely to be retrieved with autonoetic consciousness, whereas no identity 
differences were found for retrieval with noetic consciousness. Simulation of amnesia proved 
possible on the tasks used in this study, with simulators presenting the profile of amnesia seen 
in DID participants. Simulators also presented with the same reduction in autonoetic 
consciousness for other identity material. Due to the parallels between results for DID and 
simulator groups, it is not possible to determine whether DID participants presented a true 
inability to access information experienced in another identity, or were simulating inter-
identity amnesia. More indirect forms of testing retrieval for autobiographical experiences in 




or not. Chapter four used such an objective, indirect test to determine the extent of inter-
identity amnesia for episodic memory with a self-referential component. DID participant 
performance on the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) indicated inter-identity 
transfer of episodic self-referential memory. The performance of DID participants was 
comparable to nonamnesic comparisons (i.e., members of the general population who were 
exposed to the stimuli presented in both identities). Although they were also comparable to 
the simulator group, simulators indicated a trend towards inter-identity amnesia not presented 
by the DID participants.  
In summary, the findings from these three studies indicate subjective reports of inter-
identity amnesia for episodic self-referential and autobiographical memory, but transfer of 
episodic self-referential memory across amnesic identities when using a more indirect 
objective measure of memory retrieval. These results are in line with previous research 
assessing semantic, episodic and semantic autobiographical memory (Huntjens, Postma, 
Hanmaker, Woertman, & van der Hart, 2002; Huntjens, Postma, Peters, Woertman, & Van 
der Hart, 2003; Huntjens, Verschuere, & McNally, 2012).  
Meta-Memory Impairment in DID 
The findings that amnesia was easily simulated on the tasks presented in chapters two 
and three offers some credibility to the view that the DID participants performance may have 
been produced by demand characteristics or simulation of inter-identity amnesia. An 
alternative possible explanation has been proposed by Huntjens et al. (2006) and Huntjens, 
Peters, Woertman, Van der Hart, & Postma (2007). These researchers argued that a meta-
memory problem may explain the subjective reports of inter-identity amnesia. Amnesic 
identities are said to believe at a metacognitive level that they are unable to retrieve 
information of events experienced by another identity, and as a result DID participants may 




another identity state) or attribute retrieved memories to the other identity state (Huntjens et 
al., 2007). The theory of a meta-memory impairment suggests that people with DID may not 
realise the full extent of their memory abilities and the belief in compartmentalisation of 
identities held by those with DID may generate the results of inter-identity amnesia instead of 
conscious simulation. 
Agreeing with this view are subtle differences between the patterns of responding of 
DID participants versus simulators. In chapters two and three, DID participants scored higher 
on sensitivity and showed a more liberal response bias for stimuli presented to their amnesic 
identities compared to simulators. These differences between these two groups indicate it is 
unlikely that feigning of amnesia is a sufficient explanation for the DID patient behaviour. In 
chapter four, although the two groups showed a profile of inter-identity transfer, simulators 
showed a trend towards inter-identity amnesia not presented by the DID participants. In the 
context of the meta-memory explanation of the current findings, it is also worth mentioning 
that there  were also subtle differences between the patterns of responding of DID 
participants and amnesic comparisons. In chapters two and three, DID participants again 
scored higher on sensitivity and showed a more liberal response bias for stimuli presented to 
their amnesic identities compared to amnesic comparisons.  When taken together, the 
research from the first three studies provides no evidence of a full amnesic barrier in DID, as 
leakage of information, especially in recognition tasks and the aIAT was evident.  
Implications for DID Etiology 
Due to the nature of DID, researchers have historically speculated that the negative 
emotional valence of stimuli may render it less able to transfer across identities, due to an 
avoidance of some identities to deal with these experiences. The posttraumatic model 
conceptualises the development of DID occurring due to a need for children to avoid 




et al., 2014; Kluft, 1999). Theoretical formulations suggest that inter-identity amnesia may be 
more prevalent between emotional parts (EP) of the personality, who are fixated on the re-
experiencing of abusive and traumatic events, and Apparently Normal Parts (ANP) of the 
personality, who are avoidant of the memories of these experiences and report amnesia (Van 
der Hart, Nijenhuis, Steele, & Brown, 2004). In the first three studies presented in this thesis, 
identities were used that differed in their reported retrieval of traumatic past events. A 
combination of emotional and neutral stimuli were used, with the findings supporting the 
results of previous studies which indicate that emotional valence does not impact transfer 
(Huntjens et al., 2005; Huntjens et al., 2007). Participants do not appear to compartmentalise 
information of a more neutral nor of a more emotional nature, which may be expected based 
on a strict following of the etiology of DID as proposed by the posttraumatic model. Yet, the 
current studies did not assess episodic autobiographical traumatic experiences, which would 
be the types of experience most prone to compartmentalisation according to the posttraumatic 
model. Nonetheless, while the present results do not discount that traumatic experiences in 
childhood lead to DID development, identities may not be as ‘distinct’ as once thought. A 
further conclusion regarding the validity of the proposed posttraumatic and sociocognitive 
model in the context of DID is not possible. In essence, these models are models explaining 
etiology, and the sociocognitive model can only be falsified by demonstrating that 
dissociative fragmentation is primarily a direct reaction to childhood adversity (noting that an 
array of other contributing factors will be present, including sociocognitive factors that are 
influential in all psychiatric presentations) and does not emerge primarily as a consequence of 







Meaning-Making in DID 
As participants appear to have  some ability to access shared autobiographical 
memories, chapter five assessed whether the cognitive processes associated with the 
integration of autobiographical memories in one’s life story (i.e., meaning making) were 
impaired in DID. As people with DID describe experiencing a fragmented sense of self, the 
reported use of the cognitive processes that support identity integration was explored. DID 
adult and child identities were compared on their reported use of meaning-making for self-
defining memories. Although DID adult and child identities reported memories that were 
similar in emotional valence, child identities reported poorer meaning-making than adult 
identities, comparable to child comparisons and child simulators. These results were, 
however, again difficult to interpret given the comparable results of simulators who 
completed the questionnaire pretending to be a child. Future research should use more 
objective measures of meaning making and related cognitive processes to assess the extent to 
which people with DID have developed the tools to be able to integrate their past into their 
sense of self.  
Limitations 
It is important to recognise that due to small sample sizes, conclusions based on the 
current results should be drawn with caution. Current discussion in the scientific field 
indicates that although results characterised by low statistical power are less likely to detect a 
true effect, studies with small samples presenting statistically significant results may also be 
less reliable. In these cases, there may be an overestimation of effect sizes and a lack of 
ability for future studies to reproduce the results (Button et al., 2013). At present, much 
research uses small sample sizes without consideration of these concerns and they should be 
considered in future research in DID. Although it is difficult to recruit large sample sizes of 




stable, have the capacity to move between different identities on command and report 
amnesia between these identities, the sample sizes of the present studies were comparable and 
in some cases exceeded previous studies. With regard to population generalisability, it may 
be worthwhile testing patients who are at the beginning of therapy as they may show more 
amnesia, but on the other hand the patients we included in the present studies did report 
amnesia subjectively. In addition, patients at the beginning of therapy would be less likely to 
have the ability to switch between identities on request.  
Clinical Applications 
Amnesia is a core DSM-5 diagnostic criterion for DID; however, the strong clinical 
impression of amnesia depends exclusively on self-report (as do most symptoms in 
psychiatric disorders). Research at present indicates that outside of self-report, transfer of 
memory between amnesic identities is possible. Clinicians may have much to gain by 
focusing therapy around the idea of a meta-cognitive impairment as an explanation of 
reported inter-identity amnesia instead of a structural compartmentalisation of information. In 
future theoretical as well as empirical work, it would be interesting to explore the possibility 
of devising therapy based on the idea that amnesia in DID is more of a meta-cognitive 
impairment. Such an approach would understand the person’s attempt to separate their 
identities as a coping strategy. By working in a way that separates their identities, participants 
perpetuate and maintain their disorder (Fisher & Wells, 2009). Although people may have a 
belief in their amnesia, and the distinctness of their identities, the findings presented in 
chapter four show that these separations may not be as distinct as they are perceived by those 
with DID.  
Implications for DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria 
The results presented in this thesis also raise questions as to the amnesia criteria in the 




possible, it may be helpful for the criteria to be updated in a way that takes these findings into 
consideration. Use of more empirically based diagnostic criteria may provide a more accurate 
way for clinicians to distinguish those patients presenting with DID from those presenting 
with a different diagnosis. Two avenues for future research should be explored. One is further 
objective assessment of episodic, autobiographical memory transfer in amnesic identities via 
use of trauma-related stimuli. As identities that report amnesia often report differences in 
their ability to access traumatic events, potential differences in the content of these memories 
across amnesic identities should be explored. Research indicates that memories are more 
easily encoded when they can be linked to already existing autobiographical knowledge 
bases. Previous research has indicated that identities in people with DID often report self-
defining memories with similar amounts of traumatic content (Huntjens et al., 2016). 
However, other similarities and differences in the content of these memories has not been 
systematically explored. Future research should focus on whether stimuli of a traumatic, self-
referential nature also show transfer across amnesic identities. A second avenue is to navigate 
other cognitive processes, which may be impaired in DID. One of the roles of 
autobiographical memory is to integrate past experiences into our sense of self. When well-
integrated, people are better able to attain their goals, solve difficult problem-situations, and 
feel a sense of growth over time (Berna et al., 2011; Berzonsky et al., 2013; Sheldon, Kasser, 
Smith, & Share, 2002). This thesis explored the process of meaning-making of past life 
experiences, however the process of reflecting over autobiographical memories is 
multifaceted. Research into identity processing style, related to how people process identity-
relevant information, is likely to provide further insight about the ability for identities to 
integrate information that does not support their self-concept (Berzonsky, 1989; Berzonsky et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, exploration of the situational use of memory reflection, that is 




situations as the general population, may provide insight into whether there are differences in 
the reason that a person with DID chooses to reflect on their autobiographical memories 
(Bluck & Alea, 2011). The extent of integration of identity should also be assessed by 
determining the extent of identity fragmentation and identity continuity over time. Research 
using a task akin to the card-sort task (Showers, 1992) is likely to identify whether 
organisation of self-concepts (e.g., viewing the self as positive or negative across areas in 
one’s life) is comparable across identities. An understanding of the differences and 
similarities in the use of these processes to develop a well-integrated identity may provide 
insight into why compartmentalisation of autobiographical memories may be perceived to 
occur in those with DID (as seen in chapters two and three).  
It would also be worthwhile to assess more clinical comparison groups in future 
research. People with DID report receiving initial diagnoses of borderline personality 
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia to conceptualise their clinical 
presentation (Ellason, Ross, & Fuchs, 1996). Assessment of differences and transdiagnostic 
similarities between DID identities and the disorders for which they often receive a 
differential diagnoses for may present great benefit. At the moment, one of the main criteria 
in DID is a memory impairment, which differentiates it from other disorders that could be 
open for differential diagnosis. Research at present, however, indicates that many features of, 
for example, psychosis are present in DID, for example, internal locus of voice hearing 
(Ellason & Ross, 1997; Kluft, 1984; Longden, Madill, & Waterman, 2012). Additionally, 
these groups often experience maltreatment that impacts their likelihood to develop the 
disorder. The differences with DID exist with regards to reported separated identities and 
amnesia, with this thesis presenting research that both of those may be a subjective 
impairment of DID indicative of a more meta-cognitive impairment. This also raises the 




provide some benefit to those with DID, or may do so if undergoing adaptations given that 
the most distinct differential diagnosis criteria are unsupported by empirical studies. 
Conclusion 
This thesis provides additional evidence of an intact ability to access memories 
perceived to be inaccessible. Despite beliefs in an inability to retrieve certain memories due 
to an imperceptible memory barrier, DID identities present ability to access these memories  
if an objective task is used. Although there is evidence of a discrepancy in the reported use of 
meaning making across DID identities, more objective tests are required to explore whether 
this finding is also limited to the subjective realm. The perception reported by those with DID 
of compartmentalisation of their identities is not supported by the evidence of memory 
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 The literature review explored the current state of research of amnesia in DID. The 
DSM-5 criteria of DID include the presence of two or more distinct identities and an inability 
to remember everyday events and important personal information. Some identities in DID 
also report a lack of access to memories of traumatic events that have occurred, while other 
identities will report full access to the details of these memories. At present, DID research has 
assessed the extent of inter-identity amnesia for procedural, semantic, episodic and semantic 
autobiographical memory. Findings have indicated that despite the subjective reports of 
amnesia supported by results gained using measures of explicit memory retrieval, more 
objective tests tend to indicate a pattern of inter-identity transfer. As of yet, little research has 
explored episodic autobiographical memory in DID. Episodic autobiographical memory is 
associated with events that include self-referential characteristics and can be used to construct 
a person’s sense of self. As DID is a disorder characterised by separated identities that claim 
to have access to isolated memories, this memory system warrants further investigation. 
 Chapter two explored the extent of inter-identity amnesia of episodic, self-referential 
memories in dissociative identity disorder (DID). People with DID often report amnesia for 
events that have occurred in another identity. However, previous research has indicated that 
this may be more of a perceived than actual impairment, with research assessing other forms 
of memory (semantic, episodic, semantic autobiographical) indicating an ability for transfer 
to occur. The field has yet to explore the extent of this amnesia with regard to episodic, self-
relevant information. Participants were required to imagine themselves in and remember 
details of situations described in vignettes. Two amnesic identities were selected to receive 
one vignette each. Measures of free recall and recognition were used to assess explicit 
memory retrieval of the vignettes administered to both identities. Nineteen DID participants, 
16 DID simulators, and 41 comparison participants were recruited. The results support the 
subjective reports of amnesia, with the recognition test indicating a profile of inter-identity 
amnesia and recall test indicating a trend for inter-identity amnesia. DID participants were 
comparable to DID simulators, and comparison participants who did not receive any stimuli 
administered to the second identity. As a result of the similarity in DID and DID simulator 
performance as well as the discrepancy of the current findings with previous literature, 
further testing utilising actual episodic, autobiographic memories should be carried out. 
 Chapter three assessed inter-identity amnesia of episodic, autobiographical memories 




have occurred in another identity, however, previous research indicates mixed support for 
whether this is the case. Although previous research has found evidence of inter-identity 
transfer of semantic, episodic and semantic autobiographical memory, procedural and 
episodic self-referential memory has presented inter-identity amnesia. As research is yet to 
investigate episodic autobiographical memory transfer, this was explored in the present study. 
Participants were required to engage with and remember the details of behavioural tasks. Two 
amnesic identities were selected to each receive a set of the behavioural tasks. Measures of 
free recall and recognition were used to assess explicit memory retrieval of the behavioural 
tasks administered to both identities. Nineteen DID participants, 16 DID simulators and 41 
comparison participants were recruited. The results support the subjective reports of amnesia 
and empirically tested findings of inter-identity amnesia for procedural and episodic self-
referential memory. DID participants were comparable to DID simulators, and comparison 
participants who did not receive any stimuli administered to the second identity. Due to the 
similarity of performance profile between DID participants and DID simulators, future 
research should utilise more objective measures of inter-identity memory to further explore 
these findings. 
 Chapter four assessed inter-identity amnesia of episodic, autobiographical memories 
in dissociative identity disorder (DID). Although people with DID often report amnesia for 
events that have occurred in another identity, previous empirical research has indicated mixed 
support for these findings. The present study assessed inter-identity transfer of episodic, self-
referential memory on tests of implicit retrieval. Participants were required to imagine 
themselves in and remember details of situations described in vignettes. Two amnesic 
identities were selected to receive one vignette each. An autobiographical Implicit 
Association Test (aIAT) was used to assess memory transfer. Nineteen DID participants, 16 
DID simulators, and 41 comparison participants were recruited. Results indicated a profile of 
inter-identity transfer. The results did not support the subjective reports of amnesia and 
instead support the thesis of inter-identity amnesia being more of a perceived than actual 
deficit. The performance of DID participants was significantly different from DID simulators, 
indicating that DID participants are not simulating inter-identity amnesia. 
Chapter five assessed reported meaning-making for self-defining memories in 
dissociative identity disorder (DID). As people with DID often report a fragmented sense of 
self, meaning-making, a cognitive process that supports the integration of autobiographical 
memories into a person’s self-concept, was explored. Participants were required to select 




Fourteen DID participants, 25 adult comparisons, 26 child comparisons, 23 child simulators 
and 19 psychosis clinical comparisons were recruited. Results indicated that DID adult 
identities reported significantly more meaning-making than DID child identities, with both 
identity groups presenting comparable results to their age matched control groups. Due to the 
similarity in performance profile between DID child identities and child simulators, future 
research should use more objective measures to explore the extent to which DID adult and 
child identities differ on reported meaning-making. As this study measured participant’s 
subjective reports of meaning-making, use of more objective measures may also determine 
whether groups can be differentiated on the actual process.  
 The general discussion revisits the areas covered in this thesis. Studies one, two and 
three provide evidence of episodic self-referential and autobiographical memories staying 
compartmentalised in amnesic identities in dissociative identity disorder (DID) on tests of 
free recall and recognition but presenting transfer on more objective measures of retrieval 
(autobiographical Implicit Association Task). Chapter five explored whether identities differ 
in their reported ability to gain insight and draw meaningful lessons from experienced events, 
with the differences presented by DID adult and child identities requiring further exploration. 
As one of the principal uses of episodic autobiographical memory is to construct and update a 
person’s sense of self over time, subjective impairment in some identities meaning-making 
ability has the potential to maintain a fragmented sense of self. Overall, these findings 
support the idea of a meta-memory impairment in DID as opposed to a true memory 
impairment. Changing the focus of memory therapy to explore this meta-cognitive 
impairment may better help clients gain insight into their memory impairment. Current 
clinical practice exclusively uses self-report to determine the presence of the DSM-5 
diagnostic criterion of amnesia, however, the present thesis indicates use of more objective 
measurements of amnesia may be beneficial. In addition, it may be worth revisiting the DID 
DSM-5 criteria to reflect the meta-memory presentation supported by empirical research, 









Patiënten met een dissociatieve identiteitsstoornis (DIS) hebben het gevoel dat hun 
identiteit is opgesplitst in twee of meer delen of persoonlijkheidstoestanden die geregeld de 
controle over hun gedrag overnemen. De diverse persoonlijkheidstoestanden gaan daarnaast 
gepaard met verschillen in onder andere perceptie, zelfgevoel, affect en cognitie. Ook worden 
deze patiënten gekenmerkt door het onvermogen om alledaagse gebeurtenissen en belangrijke 
persoonlijke informatie uit het verleden te onthouden. Specifiek wordt er geheugenverlies 
(amnesie) voor gebeurtenissen gerapporteerd die ze in een andere persoonlijkheidstoestand 
hebben meegemaakt. Belangrijk is ook dat patiënten in sommige identiteiten het onvermogen 
rapporteren om zich traumatische gebeurtenissen uit het verleden te herinneren, terwijl andere 
identiteiten vertellen volledige toegang tot de details van deze herinneringen te hebben. Deze 
veronderstelde compartmentalisatie van herinneringen is ook in overeenstemming met het 
belangrijkste theoretische model van DIS, het posttraumatisch model.  
In eerder onderzoek, waarbij gekeken is naar amnesie met betrekking tot 
verschillende vormen van geheugen in DIS, werd echter vaak bewijs gevonden voor 
overdracht van herinneringen tussen identiteiten in plaats van de door patiënten genoemde 
amnesie, met name wanneer er in het onderzoek gebruik werd gemaakt van objectieve taken 
om de amnesie vast te stellen, in tegenstelling tot instrumenten die gebruik maken van 
zelfrapportage. Deze resultaten zijn zowel gevonden voor procedurele, semantische, 
episodische en semantisch autobiografische herinneringen. Echter, tot nu toe is er geen 
onderzoek geweest naar amnesie specifiek voor episodische zelf-referentiële en 
autobiografische herinneringen bij patiënten met DIS. Juist voor deze herinneringen ligt inter-
identiteit amnesie voor de hand, gezien de centrale rol van deze herinneringen bij het 
construeren en reconstrueren van de identiteit. 
Na een algemene inleiding op het fenomeen inter-identiteit amnesia vanuit de 
klinische context en een uitgebreide beschrijving van eerder empirisch onderzoek in 
hoofdstuk één van dit proefschrift, is in hoofdstuk twee gekeken naar de mate van inter-
identiteit amnesie voor episodische, zelf-referentiële herinneringen in patiënten met DIS. Aan 
het onderzoek namen in totaal 76 mensen deel (19 patiënten met DIS, 16 acteurs die DIS 
simuleerden, 20 gezonde controles en 21 gezonde controles die het stimulusmateriaal niet te 
zien kregen en dus als amnestische controlegroep fungeerden). De deelnemers moesten zich 
voorstellen dat ze figureerden in situaties die verteld werden in de vorm van vignetten. Ze 




expliciete retrieval van herinneringen werden free recall en recognitie van beide vignetten 
gemeten in één identiteit. Subjectief rapporteerden alle DIS patiënten amnesie voor het vignet 
dat gezien was in de andere identiteit. De resultaten lieten een trend zien voor amnesie op de 
free recall taak en een significant effect voor amnesie op de recognitietaak. Op deze 
expliciete geheugentaken scoorden patiënten slechter in vergelijking met gezonde controles 
en hun scores waren vergelijkbaar met de scores van de amnestische controlegroep. Echter, 
hun scores waren ook vergelijkbaar met de scores van de simulanten waardoor een 
eenduidige conclusie moeilijk te trekken is.  
In hoofdstuk drie is gekeken naar amnesie voor episodische autobiografische 
herinneringen in dezelfde groepen deelnemers. De deelnemers voerden diverse neutrale 
gedragstaken uit (zoals het opzoeken van een boek). Elk van de twee deelnemende 
identiteiten deed andere taken.  Wederom werd daarna het geheugen van een van deze 
identiteiten getoetst voor de taken die in beide identiteiten waren gedaan met behulp van een 
free recall taak en een recognitietaak. Wederom scoorden de patiënten vergelijkbaar met de 
amnestische controlegroep en kwamen hun taakscores dus overeen met hun subjectieve 
rapportage van amnesie. Echter, ook op deze taak scoorden de mensen die DIS simuleerden 
vergelijkbaar, waardoor een definitieve conclusie wederom lastig te trekken is. Deze 
resultaten vragen dus ook om het toepassen van meer objectieve taken om amnesie te meten, 
dat wil zeggen taken waarop simulatie moeilijk of onmogelijk is.  
Deze aanpak is gekozen in hoofdstuk vier waarin amnesie is bepaald voor 
autobiografische herinneringen, wederom in dezelfde deelnemende groepen. De procedure 
was vergelijkbaar met de studie die in hoofdstuk twee werd beschreven, maar nu werd het 
geheugen getest met een autobiografische Impliciete Associatie Test (IAT). De resultaten 
duidden, in tegenstelling tot de gerapporteerde amnesie en de bevindingen uit de vorige 
hoofdstukken, op een overdracht van herinneringen tussen identiteiten. Daarnaast verschilde 
de taakprestatie van DIS patiënten van die van DIS simulanten, er werd dus geen bewijs 
gevonden voor simulatie van amnesie bij mensen met DIS.  
In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift stond betekenisgeving van 
autobiografische herinneringen centraal, een cognitief proces dat de integratie van 
autobiografische herinneringen in het zelfconcept van een persoon ondersteunt. De hypothese 
was dat patiënten minder gebruik maken van dit proces omdat ze vaak een gefragmenteerd 
zelfgevoel rapporteren. We vroegen deelnemers drie zelfbepalende herinneringen op te 
schrijven en hierna voor elke herinnering de mate van betekenisgeving (door het invullen van 




belangrijk is voor mij”). In totaal deden mensen mee, 14 mensen met DIS, 25 gezonde 
mensen, 26 kinderen, 23 acteurs die deden alsof ze een kind waren, en een klinische 
vergelijkingsgroep van 19 patiënten met psychotische ervaringen. Bij elke DIS patiënt werd 
een volwassen identiteit met een kind-identiteit vergeleken, om na te gaan of ze in hun kind-
identiteit minder gebruik maakten van betekenisgeving (wat de identiteitsfragmentatie in 
stand zou kunnen houden). Uit de resultaten bleek dat DIS patiënten inderdaad rapporteerden 
minder gebruik te maken van betekenisgeving in hun kind-identiteit in vergelijking met hun 
volwassen identiteit, waarbij ze in hun kind-identiteit vergelijkbaar scoorden met gezonde 
kinderen en in hun volwassen identiteit als gezonde volwassenen. Patiënten met DIS 
rapporteren dus inderdaad, in ieder geval in sommige persoonlijkheidstoestanden, minder 
gebruik te maken van hun vermogen om lering te trekken uit ervaringen uit het verleden en 
dit houdt mogelijk hun gevoel van identiteitsfragmentatie in stand. Echter, ook de acteurs die 
deden alsof ze een kind waren, scoorden vergelijkbaar met de gezonde kinderen en met 
patiënten met DIS in hun kind-identiteit, waardoor een definitieve conclusie moeilijk te 
trekken is. Om daadwerkelijk vermogen tot betekenisgeving te meten in plaats van 
zelfrapportage zou er beter een objectieve taak gebruikt kunnen worden in toekomstig 
onderzoek.  
Hoofdstuk zes bevat een algemene discussie van de bevindingen van dit proefschrift. 
De grootste limitatie van het onderzoek beschreven in het huidige proefschrift omvat de 
relatief kleine steekproeven van proefpersonen. Toekomstig onderzoek zou dus gebruik 
moeten maken van grotere steekproeven. Daarnaast maakt het huidige proefschrift duidelijk 
dat het gebruik van meer objectieve metingen van functioneren bij mensen met DIS 
noodzakelijk is. Met een dergelijke taak kan men in toekomstig onderzoek verder in kaart 
brengen of gebrekkige betekenisgeving aan autobiografische herinneringen een 
daadwerkelijke tekortkoming is bij DIS en/of andere processen die gerelateerd zijn aan 
identiteit(re)constructie. Dit punt is ook van belang voor de klinische praktijk. Tenslotte zou 
het ontwikkelen van een therapievorm die de metacognitieve opvattingen van de client als 
uitgangspunt neemt, in plaats van uit te gaan van geheugen compartmentalisatie, patiënten 
kunnen helpen om inzicht te krijgen in hun stoornis.  
De voornaamste bevinding van overdracht van informatie tussen identiteiten bij 
mensen met DIS in dit proefschrift is niet in overeenstemming met het posttraumatisch 
model. De bevindingen zijn wel in overeenstemming met een verklaring in termen van een 
meta-geheugenstoornis in DIS in tegenstelling tot een stoornis in het daadwerkelijk opslaan 





























Appendix A-1: Recruitment letter for DID participants for Chapters two, three and four 
 
 
Information letter to clients regarding the study 
"The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation” 
 
We are writing to ask for your participation in research aimed at furthering the understanding 
of dissociative identity disorder (DID). While your insight into these issues may not provide a 
direct benefit to you, the knowledge to be gained from this study will be used to better the 
future treatment of people with DID. Below is a summary of the research. 
 
Aim of the study 
The main issue that this study addresses is how memories transfer from one identity to 
another. People with DID often report their identities not possessing the same memories for 
past experiences. For example, some identities may have more vivid memories for negative 
experiences in the person’s life. Other identities may not remember or may avoid thinking of, 
negative and distressing experiences. These identities may focus more on non-distressing 
memories or experiences in their daily life, they may experience increased numbness and 
may not fully recognize what has happened in the past. On the other hand, if they are aware 
of distressing experiences, it can feel as if they were not actually experienced by themselves. 
 
To date little research has looked at how people with DID process information in different 
identities. This study investigates this. Specifically, it assesses the nature of identities that do 




Before you decide whether to participate in this study, the research process will be explained. 
The study will take place at either Belmont Private Hospital in Brisbane or the University of 
Canterbury in Christchurch. The study will be run a female researcher, Rosemary Marsh, who 
is working on a PhD with Prof Warwick Middleton and Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy. You will 
complete some tasks associated with how your memory works, like hearing a story and 
repeating it back, hearing a word (e.g., bread) and thinking about what memory comes to 
mind, or seeing words on screen (e.g., happy, sad) and determine if they fit with how you see 
yourself. Some of these tasks will be done on a computer, but you will not need any 
familiarity with computers. In addition to these tasks you will be asked to fill in various 
questionnaires. We will now explain how to choose which identities are best to use in the 
study.  
 
What is expected of you? 
We request that you choose two identities to take part in this study. Please feel free to speak 
with your doctor about this. In choosing two identities, we’d ask you to make your choice 
with the following consideration in mind: 
One identity you choose should have memories of experiencing distressing events from your 
past. The other identity should remember or feel disconnected from past distressing events, as 
if they happened to another person or identity. 
Both identities should not be aware of the experiences and memories that the other has. That 
is, they don’t share experiences or have the same memories, so when one identity experiences 
an event (e.g., driving to the supermarket), the other identity is not aware of it (i.e., not aware 




Each identity chosen should be able to come forward on request. 
Each identity chosen should be able to engage in simple computer tasks. 
Each identity chosen should be able to read. 
 
Finally, we request that other identities who are not participating in the task should not 
influence or communicate with the identities involved in the tasks. That way we will be able 
to understand more about how the identities in the task learn and remember information. 
 
If you decide to take part, you can have a support person or your Doctor present during the 
study in order to guide the transition between identities. The session will take approximately 
90 minutes. 
 
Treatment of data 
Any information you provide us in this study will be kept confidential, meaning we cannot 
share your answers with your doctor or nurses. Only the researchers whose names are 
included in this letter will have access to your data. All information will be kept anonymous 
by ensuring your name is not on anything that contains information you provide in the study. 
All information will be put together with other people in the study. The results of the study 
may be published in a scientific journal, but no identifying information will be given. If you 
wish to obtain the overall results of this study, please contact Rosemary Marsh via the email 
address provided at the end of this letter. 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can withdraw from the study at 
any time without having to provide a reason. This decision will have no influence on your 
treatment. 
 
Participation in this study will have no health risk. The Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury has passed this study as safe for human participation. 
 
For your participation, you will receive a $10 shopping voucher and travel expenses will be 
reimbursed. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 




You are free to ask any further questions to Prof Warwick Middleton, Rosie Marsh (the 




Rosemary Marsh (PhD candidate, University of Canterbury) 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury) 
 
Researchers contact details are as follows: 
 
Rosemary Marsh 
            Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy 




rosiemarsh1@gmail.com             martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof Warwick Middleton 
            Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmed@tpg.com.au 
Lenaire Seager 
            Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
            lenaire.seager@healthcare.com.au 
Prof Simon Kemp 
            Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
            simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz 
Chandele Butler 
            Phone: +64 27 812 2163 




I consent to be contacted by a member of the Research team about the research project: 
 
Signed (participant):                                                          Date:                                          
 






Appendix A-2: Recruitment letter of Chapters two, three and four for DID clinicians 
 
Information letter to clinicians regarding the study 




We are conducting a study that examines the transfer of information across dissociative 
identities in dissociative identity disorder (DID). 
 
The main aim will be to address how old memories as well as new memories that have just 
been formed transfer from one identity to another. To do this we are seeking to recruit 
individuals who have a diagnosis of DID, and run tem through a set of tasks that examine 
learning and memory in two different dissociative identities. We are asking that each of these 
identities not be aware of what the other’s experience (i.e., interidentity amnesia), and that 
one identity has some memory of distressing experiences from the past, while the other 
identity is less aware of painful past experiences experiencing, or feels they have happened to 
other people or identities. We will not be asking people about any past events that have or 
may not have experienced, but simply want to assess two identities that have different 
psychological characteristics to see if they both process information similarly. 
 
To date there has been little research looking at how people with DID process information in 
different identities, especially information about themselves. 
 
If you agree, we’d be most grateful if you could give the attached invitation letter to any DID 
patient who may be interested in being involved. This letter contains all the details about the 
study. The session will take approximately 90 minutes. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 







            Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
rosie.marsh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy 
Clinical Psychologist 
            Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
            martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof Warwick Middleton 
Psychiatrist 
            Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmed@tpg.com.au 
 
Lenaire Seager 
Nurse Manager - TDU 
            Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
            lenaire.seager@healthcare.com.au 
Prof Simon Kemp 
Research Psychologist 
            Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
            simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz 
Chandele Butler 
Honours Student 
            Phone: +64 27 812 2163 





Appendix A-3: Recruitment letter of Chapters two, three and four for simulator participants 
 
Information letter to clients regarding the study 
"The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation” 
 
We are writing to ask for your participation in research aimed at furthering the understanding 
of dissociative identity disorder (DID), a severe psychiatric condition once known as multiple 
personality disorder. We are seeking people who have acting experience or an interest in 
acting to simulate or role-play dissociative identity disorder while engaging in a series of 
tasks designed to look at how memory works. Below is a summary of the research.  
 
Aim of the study 
DID is characterized by the existence within the individuals of two or more identities or 
personalities that have different memories, feelings, behaviours and interaction styles. The 
main issue that this study addresses is how memories transfer from one identity to another. 
People with DID often report their identities not possessing the same memories for past 
experiences. For example, some identities may have more vivid memories for negative 
experiences in the person’s life. Other identities may not remember or may avoid thinking of 
negative and distressing experiences. These identities may focus more on non-distressing 
memories or experiences in their daily life, they may experience increased numbness and 
may not fully recognize what has happened in the past. On the other hand, if they are aware 
of distressing experiences, it can feel as if they were not actually experienced by themselves. 
 
To date little research has looked at how people with DID process information in different 
identities. This study investigates this. Specifically it assesses the nature of identities that do 
remember distressing experiences and identities that have less knowledge of distressing 
experiences. In order to compare the result from a group of people with DID, we are 
recruiting a group of people to role-play DID in order to see if there is a difference in 
memory functioning in the DID group versus the role-play group. You will be asked to create 
and role-play two different identities or personalities that exist inside you. We ask that one of 
the identities believes it has experienced and can remember painful or traumatic experiences 
from earlier in life, and the other identity has little or no awareness of such experiences. We’d 




Before you decide whether to participate in this study, the research process will be explained. 
The study will take place at either the University of Canterbury or Belmont Private Hospital 
in Brisbane. If you are interested in being involved, you will complete a short survey by 
clicking on the link below. Then either Dr Greta Bond (Theatre & Film Studies), Chandele 
Butler (Dept of Psychology) or Martin Dorahy (Dept of Psychology) will contact you to 
arrange a time to get information on DID and watch a film on the condition. This will be 
done with other people taking part in the study. We will then ask you to practice being DID 
for approximately a week and then get information on the characteristics of the identities you 
practiced. Finally, you will role-play these identities while running through some task that 
look at memory functioning conducted in a lab in the Psychology Department with a female 
researcher (Rosemary Marsh), In the tasks you will hear a story and repeat it back, or hear a 
word (e.g., bread) and think about what memory comes to mind, or see words on a screen  
(e.g., happy, sad) and determine if they fit with how you see yourself. You will also be asked 




you are role-playing. Session one will take approximately 30 minutes and session two will 
take approximately 90 minutes. 
 
Treatment of data 
If you choose to take part any information you provide us will be kept confidential. Only the 
researchers whose names are included in this letter will have access to your data. All 
information will be kept anonymous by ensuring your name in not on anything that contains 
information you provide in the study. All the information will be put together with other 
people in the study. The results of the study may be published in a scientific journal, but no 
identifying information will be given.  
Participation in this study will have no health risk. The Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury has passed this study as safe for human participation. 
 
For your assistance with this study you will received a $50 shopping voucher. The research 
who conducts the memory task will not be aware of which participants have DID and which 
are role-playing. She will rate each person doing the study on how authentic they appeared to 




You are free to ask any further questions to Dr Greta Bond (Theatre & Film Studies), 
Chandele Butler (Dept of Psychology) or Dr Martin Dorahy (Dept of Psychology; 3643416 
or martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz.  
 









            Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
rosiemarsh1@gmail.com 
 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy 
            Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
            martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof Warwick Middleton 
            Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmed@tpg.com.au 
 
 
Prof Simon Kemp 
            Phone: +64 3 364 2968 











You are invited to take part in a study which looks at how cognitive factors influence 
memory. Specifically, we are interested in whether old and recent memories are influenced 
by a person’s level of cognitive functioning. 
 
We require participants who are students at the University of Canterbury aged between 30 
and 65. The study will involve completion of a combination of questionnaires and tasks, with 
the tasks requiring you to retrieve memories of events created during the study. These 
memories will be kept in the strictest confidence. The experiment will take between one and 
two hours and you will be given a $10 shopping voucher for your participation.  
 
If you are interested in participating, please email Rosie at rosie.marsh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 




Rosemary Marsh (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury) 
 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury) 
 





Appendix A-5: Recruitment letter for DID participants for Chapter five 
 
Information letter to clients regarding the study 
"The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation” 
 
We are writing to ask for your participation in research aimed at furthering the understanding 
of dissociative identity disorder (DID). While your insight into these issues may not provide a 
direct benefit to you, the knowledge to be gained from this study will be used to better the 
future treatment of people with DID. Below is a summary of the research. 
 
Aim of the study 
The main issue that this study addresses is the differences in how sense of self is constructed 
in different identities. People with DID often report the importance of previous events 
differently depending on the identity. For example, some identities may have more vivid 
memories for experiences in a person’s life, while other identities may not remember these 
events or may not recall them as being so important.  
To date little research has looked at how people with DID differ in their reporting of these 
memories and how this affects the construction of sense of self. Our study investigates this.  
 
Procedure 
Before you decide whether to participate in this study, the research process will be explained. 
The study will take place at either Belmont Private Hospital in Brisbane or the office of 
Warwick Middleton. The study will be run a female researcher, Rosie Marsh, who is 
completing a PhD alongside Prof. Warwick Middleton and Prof. Martin Dorahy. You will 
complete some tasks associated with how you describe yourself, like choosing words that 
describe yourself in certain situations and answering questions about self-selected important 
events from your past. In addition to these tasks you will be asked to fill in various 
questionnaires. We will now explain how to choose which identities are best to use in the 
study.  
 
What is expected of you? 
We request that you choose two identities to take part in this study. Please feel free to speak 
with your doctor about this. In choosing two identities, we’d ask you to make your choice 
with the following consideration in mind: 
Each identity chosen should be able to come forward on request. 
Each identity chosen should be able to engage in simple computer tasks. 
Each identity chosen should be able to read. 
One identity should be an adult that is aware of many events that occur. 
One identity should be young, approximately aged between the ages of 8 and 12. 
 
Finally, we request that other identities who are not participating in the task should not 
influence or communicate with the identities involved in the tasks. That way we will be able 
to understand more about how the identities in the task learn and remember information. 
 
If you decide to take part, you are welcome to have a support person or your Doctor present 
during the study in order to guide the transition between identities. The session will take 
about two hours. 
 




Any information you provide us in this study will be kept confidential, meaning we cannot 
share your answers with your doctor or nurses. Only the researchers whose names are 
included in this letter will have access to your data. All information will be kept anonymous 
by ensuring your name is not on anything that contains information you provide in the study. 
All information will be put together with other people in the study. The results of the study 
may be published in a scientific journal, but no identifying information will be given. If you 
wish to obtain the overall results of this study, please contact Rosie Marsh via the email 
address provided at the end of this letter. 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can withdraw from the study at 
any time without having to provide a reason. This decision will have no influence on your 
treatment. 
 
Participation in this study will have no health risk. The Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury has passed this study as safe for human participation. 
 
For your participation, you will receive a $20 shopping voucher. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 





Rosie Marsh (PhD candidate, University of Canterbury) 
Prof. Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury) 
 
Researchers contact details are as follows: 
 
Rosie Marsh 
            Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
rosie.marsh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy 
            Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
            martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
Prof Warwick Middleton 
            Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmid@tpg.com.au 
 
Lenaire Seager 
            Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
            lenaire.seager@healthecare.com.au 
Prof Simon Kemp 
            Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
            simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz 
Brooke Johnson 
             Phone: +64 27 504 9899 




I consent to be contacted by a member of the Research team about the research project: 
 
Signed (participant):                                                          Date:                                          
 








You are invited to take part in a study which looks at how people describe themselves. 
Specifically, we are interested in whether the reporting of life memories occurs in different 
groups of people. 
 
We require participants who are students at the University of Canterbury aged between 30 
and 65. The study will involve completion of a combination of questionnaires and tasks, with 
the tasks requiring you to retrieve memories of events that have occurred in your life and to 
describe how you see yourself. All information will be kept in the strictest confidence. The 
experiment will take between one and two hours and you will be given a $10 shopping 
voucher for your participation.  
 
We are looking to recruit university students, so those on the STAR program are excluded 
from the study.  
 
If you are interested in participating, please email Rosie at rosie.marsh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 




Rosie Marsh (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury)  
 
Brooke Johnson (Masters Student, University of Canterbury) 
 
Prof. Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury) 
 











Your child is invited to take part in a study which looks at how people describe themselves. 
Specifically, we are interested in how the reporting of life memories occurs in different 
groups of people. 
 
We require participants who are aged between 8 and 12. The study will involve completion 
of a combination of tasks requiring participants to retrieve memories of events that have 
occurred in their life. These memories will be kept in the strictest confidence. The experiment 
will take between one and two hours and you will be given a $10 shopping voucher for 
participating.  
 
If you are interested in allowing your child to participate, please email Rosie at 




Rosie Marsh (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury) 
 
Brooke Johnson (Masters Student, University of Canterbury) 
 
Prof. Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury) 
 










































Appendix B-1: Information sheet for DID and Simulator participants for Chapters two, three 
and four 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
 
My name is Rosemary Marsh and I am a PhD Candidate in the Department of Psychology at 
the University of Canterbury. You are invited to take part the research project “The 
Relationship between Memory Functioning and Cognitive Factors”. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the extent to which memory is influenced by different 
types of tasks. In today’s session, we will progress through a series of tasks that look at this. 
You will be required to fill out five questionnaires which will look at things like how much 
you daydream, whether you think of distressing things that may have happened to you, and 
whether you feel you have a good knowledge of who you are. You will also read through a 
series of stories to look at how you take in information. Some stories will have no emotional 
information in them; other stories will contain some emotional information. We are interested 
in eye movements associated with doing the tasks, so for some of them we will look at your 
eye movement. This will be done with a small camera that will be outside your line of vision 
so should distract you. We will do some task while you are in one identity, and other tasks 
while you are in another identity. So, I will ask you to switch between identities occasionally. 
I’d ask you now to consider which two identities are interested in taking part in the study. In 
giving this consideration, I’d ask you pick one that has no or only limited knowledge of any 
difficulty experiences you have had in the past, and the other that has knowledge of difficulty 
experiences in your life. 
 
Tasks will be either done on a computer, in which case you’ll respond pressing a button, or 
will be done by me asking you questions. For example, I might read out a word to you (e.g., 
sunshine) and ask you to tell a memory in your life that this word makes you recall. I will 
record your responses so we can add them to responses given by others and then analyse 
them. 
 
Below is the schedule and time estimate for each part of today’s session. 
 
Questionnaires 30 minutes 
 
Tasks and activities                  60 minutes 
 
For taking part in the project, you will receive a $20.00 shopping voucher. The study will 
take between 60-90 minutes to complete. If you want to stop at any time for a break or 
withdraw from the study, please let me know. There will be no negative penalty to you if you 
withdraw and you will still receive the participation voucher. Please note however, that 
information cannot be withdrawn from the project once it has been entered into the computer, 
as all information will be anonymised.  
 
The results of this study may be published, but any information you provide us will be kept 
confidential. Your identity will not be made public without your prior consent. To ensure 
confidentiality no names will be used on the questionnaires or in the final report. Any and all 
information that has identifying features (such as the consent form) will be kept by Martin 
Dorahy, in his locked office. Only Rosemary Marsh, Martin Dorahy and Chandele Butler will 




After the conclusion of the experiment Martin Dorahy will keep a copy of the data for ten 
years, after which it will be destroyed. A thesis is a public document and will be available 
through the UC Library. 
 
This project is being carried out as a requirement for an Honours Research Project by 
Chandele Butler and a PhD by Rosemary Marsh, under the supervision of Martin Dorahy, 
Warwick Middleton and Simon Kemp who can be contacted at the email addresses below. 
Rosemary, Chandele or Martin will be happy to address any concerns you have about 
participation in the project. 
 
Contact details as follows: 
 
Rosemary Marsh 
            Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
rosiemarsh1@gmail.com 
Chandele Butler 
            Phone: +64 27 812 2163 
            clb104@uclive.ac.nz 
 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy 
            Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof Warwick Middleton 
            Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmed@tpg.com.au 
 
Lenaire Seager 
            Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
lenaire.seager@healthcare.com.au 
Prof Simon Kemp 
            Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
            simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 
Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)  
 











Appendix B-2: Information sheet for control participants for Chapters two, three and four 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
 
My name is Rosemary Marsh and I am a PhD Candidate in the Department of Psychology at 
the University of Canterbury. You are invited to take part the research project “The 
Relationship between Memory Functioning and Cognitive Factors”. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the extent to which memory is influenced by different 
types of tasks. In today’s session, we will progress through a series of tasks that look at this. 
You will be required to fill out five questionnaires which will look at things like how much 
you daydream, whether you think of distressing things that may have happened to you, and 
whether you feel you have a good knowledge of who you are. You will also read through a 
series of stories to look at how you take in information. Some stories will have no emotional 
information in them; other stories will contain some emotional information. We are interested 
in eye movements associated with doing the tasks, so for some of them we will look at your 
eye movement. This will be done with a small camera that will be outside your line of vision 
so should distract you. Some tasks that we will do look similar to each other, while other 
tasks will be quite different. 
 
Tasks will be either done on a computer, in which case you’ll respond pressing a button, or 
will be done by me asking you questions. For example, I might read out a word to you (e.g., 
sunshine) and ask you to tell a memory in your life that this word makes you recall. I will 
record your responses so we can add them to responses given my other and analyse them. 
 
Below is the schedule and time estimate for each part of today’s session. 
 
Questionnaires 30 minutes 
 
Tasks and activities                  60 minutes 
 
For taking part in the project, you will receive a $10.00 shopping voucher. The study will 
take between 60-90 minutes to complete. If you want to stop at any time for a break or 
withdraw from the study, please let me know. There will be no negative penalty to you if you 
withdraw and you will still receive the participation voucher. Please note however, that 
information cannot be withdrawn from the project once it has been entered into the computer, 
as all information will be anonymised.  
 
The results of this study may be published, but any information you provide to us will be kept 
confidential. Your identity will not be made public without your prior consent. To ensure 
confidentiality no names will be used on the questionnaires or in the final report. Any and all 
information that has identifying features (such as the consent form) will be kept by Martin 
Dorahy, in his locked office. Only Rosemary Marsh, Martin Dorahy and Chandele Butler will 
have access to the data, which will be securely stored electronically by password protection. 
After the conclusion of the experiment Martin Dorahy will keep a copy of the data for ten 
years, after which it will be destroyed. A thesis is a public document and will be available 
through the UC Library. 
 
This project is being carried out as a requirement for an Honours Research Project by 




Warwick Middleton and Simon Kemp who can be contacted at the email addresses below. 
Rosemary, Chandele or Martin will be happy to address any concerns you have about 
participation in the project. 
 
Contact details as follows: 
 
Rosemary Marsh 
            Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
rosiemarsh1@gmail.com 
Chandele Butler 
            Phone: +64 27 812 2163 
            clb104@uclive.ac.nz 
 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy 
            Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof Warwick Middleton 
            Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmed@tpg.com.au 
 
Lenaire Seager 
            Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
lenaire.seager@healthcare.com.au 
Prof Simon Kemp 
            Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
            simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 
Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)  
 














Appendix B-3: Information sheet for DID participants for Chapter five 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
 
My name is Rosie Marsh and I am a PhD Candidate in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. You are invited to take part the 
research project “The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation”. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the extent to which memories and sense of self are 
constructed in people with Dissociative identity disorder (DID) and psychosis. In the session, 
we will progress through a series of tasks that look at this. You will be required to fill out a 
series of questionnaires which will look at whether you feel you have a good knowledge of 
who you are. You will also be asked to identify words that describe how you would describe 
yourself in different day-to-day situations. You will also be asked to recall some memories 
from your past. Some tasks that we will do look similar to each other, while other tasks will 
be quite different. 
 
Questionnaires and tasks will be either done on a computer, in which case you’ll respond 
pressing a button, or will be done by me asking you questions. I will record your responses so 
we can add them to responses given by others and analyse them. 
 
Below is the schedule and time estimate for each part of today’s session. 
 
 Questionnaires 30 minutes 
 
 Tasks and activities      90 minutes 
 
For taking part in the project, you will receive a $20.00 shopping voucher. The study will 
take around 120 minutes to complete. If you want to stop at any time for a break or to 
withdraw from the study, please let me know. There will be no negative penalty to you if you 
withdraw and you will still receive the participation voucher. Please note however, that 
information cannot be withdrawn from the project once it has been entered into the computer, 
as all information will be anonymised.  
 
The results of this study may be published, but you can be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered. Your identity will not be made public without your prior 
consent. To ensure confidentiality no names will be used on the questionnaires or in the final 
report. Any and all information that has identifying features (such as the consent form) will 
be kept by Martin Dorahy, in his locked office. Only Rosie Marsh, Martin Dorahy and 
Brooke Johnson will have access to the data, which will be securely stored electronically by 
password protection. After the conclusion of the experiment Martin Dorahy will keep a copy 
of the data for ten years, after which it will be destroyed. A thesis is a public document and 
will be available through the UC Library. 
 
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a Masters thesis by Brooke Johnson and 
a PhD by Rosie Marsh, under the supervision of Martin Dorahy, Warwick Middleton and 
Simon Kemp who can be contacted at the email addresses below. Rosemary, Brooke or 
Martin will be happy to address any concerns you have about participation in the project. 
 





 Rosie Marsh 
             Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
rosiemarsh1@gmail.com 
 Brooke Johnson 
             Phone: +64 27 504 9899 
             
brooke.johnson@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 Prof Martin Dorahy 
             Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
 Prof Warwick Middleton 
             Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmid@tpg.com.au 
 
 Lenaire Seager 
             Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
lenaire.seager@healthecare.com.au 
 Prof Simon Kemp 
             Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
             simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 
Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)  
 
 Human Ethics Committee: 







Appendix B-4: Information sheet for adult control participants for Chapter five 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
 
My name is Rosie Marsh and I am a PhD Candidate in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Canterbury. You are invited to take part the research project “The Relationship 
between Memory Functioning and Dissociation”. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the extent to which memories and sense of self are 
constructed in people with Dissociative identity disorder (DID), psychosis and non-clinical 
controls. In the session, we will progress through a series of tasks that look at this. You will 
be required to fill out a series of questionnaires which will look at whether you feel you have 
a good knowledge of who you are. You will also be asked to identify words that describe how 
you would describe yourself in different day-to-day situations. You will also be asked to 
recall some memories from your past. Some tasks that we will do look similar to each other, 
while other tasks will be quite different. 
 
Tasks will be either done on a computer, or will be done by me asking you questions. I will 
record your responses so we can add them to responses given by others and analyse them. 
 
Below is the schedule and time estimate for each part of today’s session. 
 
Questionnaires 30 minutes 
 
Tasks and activities                  60 minutes 
 
For taking part in the project, you will receive a $10.00 shopping voucher. The study will 
take between 60-90 minutes to complete. If you want to stop at any time for a break or to 
withdraw from the study, please let me know. There will be no negative penalty to you if you 
withdraw and you will still receive the participation voucher. Please note however, that 
information cannot be withdrawn from the project once it has been entered into the computer, 
as all information will be anonymised.  
 
The results of this study may be published, but you can be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered. Your identity will not be made public without your prior 
consent. To ensure confidentiality no names will be used on the questionnaires or in the final 
report. Any and all information that has identifying features (such as the consent form) will 
be kept by Martin Dorahy, in his locked office. Only Rosie Marsh, Martin Dorahy and 
Brooke Johnson will have access to the data, which will be securely stored electronically by 
password protection. After the conclusion of the experiment Martin Dorahy will keep a copy 
of the data for ten years, after which it will be destroyed. A thesis is a public document and 
will be available through the UC Library. 
 
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a Master’s thesis by Brooke Johnson 
and a PhD by Rosie Marsh, under the supervision of Martin Dorahy, Warwick Middleton and 
Simon Kemp who can be contacted at the email addresses below. Rosemary, Brooke or 
Martin will be happy to address any concerns you have about participation in the project. 
 






            Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
rosie.marsh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Brooke Johnson 
            Phone: +64 27 504 9899 
            
brooke.johnson@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Prof Martin Dorahy 
            Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof Warwick Middleton 
            Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
            warmid@tpg.com.au 
 
Lenaire Seager 
            Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
lenaire.seager@healthecare.com.au 
Prof Simon Kemp 
            Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
            simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 
Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)  
 
Human Ethics Committee: 







Appendix B-5: Information sheet for child controls for Chapter five 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
 
My name is Rosie and I am doing Psychology at the University of Canterbury. You are 
invited to take part a project about memory. 
 
We want to see whether people’s memories are linked to how they feel about themselves. We 
are interested in the differences between children and adults. In the session, we will do some 
tasks that look at this. You will do some questionnaires which look at whether you feel you 
know who you are. You will also be asked to tell me some memories you have about events 
that occurred in the past.  
 
Time for today’s tasks: 
 
Questionnaires 30 minutes 
 
Tasks and activities                  15 minutes 
 
You will get a $10.00 shopping voucher for taking part. If you want to stop at any time for a 
break or to finish early, please let me know. This is absolutely fine and you will still receive 
the participation voucher if you finish early. It can be difficult to delete your information 
once it is in the computer so let us know early if you don’t want us to use anything.  
 
The results of this study may be published, but no one will know your answers are yours 
except for Rosie. Your name made public without asking you first. The assent form which 
has your name on it will be kept by Martin Dorahy, in his locked office. Only Rosie Marsh, 
Brooke Johnson and Martin Dorahy will have access to the things you say and it will be kept 
safe on a computer that has a password. When the study finishes, Martin Dorahy will keep 
the data for ten years, after which it will be destroyed. The overall findings will be available 
in print through the UC Library. 
 
This project is being carried out for university studies by Brooke Johnson and Rosie Marsh, 
under the supervision of Martin Dorahy, Warwick Middleton and Simon Kemp who can be 
contacted at the email addresses below. Rosie, Brooke or Martin are happy to address any 
questions you have about taking part in the project. 
 
Contact details as follows: 
 
Rosie Marsh 
      Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
      rosie.marsh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Brooke Johnson 
      Phone: +64 22 078 2070 
      brooke.johnson@pg.canterbury.ac.nz     
 
Prof. Martin Dorahy 
      Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
      martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof. Warwick Middleton 
      Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
      warmed@tpg.com.au 
 
Lenaire Seager 
      Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
      lenaire.seager@healthcare.com.au 
Prof. Simon Kemp 
      Phone: +64 3 364 2968 






This project has been approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. If 
you have any complaints about the tasks, please write to Secretary, Human Ethics 









Appendix B-6: Information sheet for parents of child controls for Chapter five 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
 
My name is Rosie Marsh and I am a PhD Candidate in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Canterbury. Your child is invited to take part the research project “The 
Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation” as a control participant (i.e. 
they have never received a diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder (DID) or had 
experiences with psychosis). 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the extent to which memories and sense of self are 
constructed in people with dissociative identity disorder (DID), psychosis and non-clinical 
controls. We will progress through a series of tasks that look at this. Your child will be 
required to complete a series of questionnaires which will look at whether they feel they have 
a good knowledge of who they are. They will also be asked to recall some memories from 
their past. Children are welcome to have a support person present during the session. 
 
Below is the schedule and time estimate for each part of the session. 
 
Questionnaires 30 minutes 
 
Tasks and activities       15 minutes 
 
For taking part in the project, your child will receive a $10.00 shopping voucher. The study 
will take 40 minutes to complete. If you or your child wants to stop at any time for a break or 
to withdraw from the study, they are able to let me know. There will be no negative penalty 
to either of you if you withdraw and your child will still receive the participation voucher. 
Please note however, that information cannot be withdrawn from the project once it has been 
entered into the computer, as all information will be anonymised.  
 
The results of this study may be published, but you can be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered. Your child’s identity will not be made public without your 
prior consent. To ensure confidentiality no names will be used on the questionnaires or in the 
final report. Any and all information that has identifying features (such as the consent form) 
will be kept by Martin Dorahy, in his locked office. Only Rosie Marsh, Brooke Johnson and 
Martin Dorahy will have access to the data which will be securely stored electronically by 
password protection. After the conclusion of the experiment Martin Dorahy will keep a copy 
of the data for ten years, after which it will be destroyed. A thesis is a public document and 
will be available through the UC Library. 
 
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a Master’s thesis by Brooke Johnson 
and a PhD by Rosie Marsh, under the supervision of Martin Dorahy, Warwick Middleton and 
Simon Kemp who can be contacted at the email addresses below. Rosie, Brooke or Martin 
will be happy to address any concerns you have about participation in the project. 
 
Contact details as follows: 
 
Rosie Marsh 
      Phone: +64 27 951 5850 
      rosie.marsh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Brooke Johnson 
      Phone: +64 22 078 2070 





Prof. Martin Dorahy 
      Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
      martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Prof. Warwick Middleton 
      Phone: +61 7 3831 4466 
      warmed@tpg.com.au 
 
Lenaire Seager 
      Phone: +61 7 3398 0111 
      lenaire.seager@healthcare.com.au 
Prof. Simon Kemp 
      Phone: +64 3 364 2968 
      simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz       
 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to Secretary, Human Ethics 











Names of researchers: 
 
Martin Dorahy (Clinical Psychologist/Assoc. Prof, University of Canterbury);  
Rosemary Marsh (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury);  
Rafaele Huntjens (Assoc. Prof, University of Groningen);  
Chandele Butler (Honours Student, University of Canterbury);  
Simon Kemp (Professor, University of Canterbury),  
Warwick Middleton (Professor, Belmont Private Hospital);  




I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions. 
 
I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research.  
I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without 
penalty. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any 
information I have provided should this remain practically achievable. 
 
I understand that should I complete the project my individual data will be merged 
with data from other participants. 
 
I understand that my memories will be recorded.  
I understand that any information or opinions I have provided will be kept 
confidential to the researcher Rosemary Marsh, and that any published or reported 
results will not identify the participants. I understand that a thesis is a public 
document and will be available through the UC Library. 
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure 
facilities and in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after five 
years. 
 
I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be managed.  
I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study by 
contacting the researcher at the conclusion of the project. 
 
I understand that I can contact Rosemary Marsh (rosiemarsh1@gmail.com) or 
Martin Dorahy (martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz) for further information. If I have 
any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)  
 
By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project.  
 
 
_______________________________ _____________________________ ________ 







Appendix B-8: Debrief sheet for DID and simulator participants for Chapters two, three and 
four 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
Debriefing Form 
 
This study is interested in the memory functioning of people with dissociative identity 
disorder and those without a mental disorder. In order to understand this relationship, we 
asked for information about your levels of dissociation and post-traumatic stress using the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale - II (a measure of dissociation), the Dissociative Beliefs about 
Memory Measure (a measure of a person’s belief about the role of memory in their life), the 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptom Scale (a measure of PTSD) and the 20-item 
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (a measure of physical dissociation).  
 
We also sought information related to the difference between memories that people are aware 
of and those that they are not aware of (explicit and implicit memories, respectively). People 
with dissociation sometimes report being unable to remember certain memories in one 
identity, whereas they are easily remembered in another identity. Due to this, we used a series 
of tasks to see if memories created during the study and those recalled from the past were 
explicitly and implicitly recalled. We were also interested in how the emotional content of 
memories influences recall. We used the narratives from the first task to assess this by 
incorporating shameful events into a few of the stories.  
 
We were also interested in the effect of dissociation and trauma on your sense of self (your 
beliefs about yourself and who you are). We altered the self-referential information available 
during events. In task two, some identities were required to talk about how much they 
identified with certain famous people. Some identities were required to write their name on a 
drawing of theirs. This increased how much of their self-concept was engaged in the event. 
 
If you feel the need to talk to anyone about the effect this study has had on you, you are 
welcome to talk further to Rosemary Marsh or Martin Dorahy, via the contact details 
provided below. Your medical practitioners will also be free to talk about any thoughts you 
have regarding this study. 
 
Contact details for the researchers are as follows: 
 
Rosemary Marsh Martin Dorahy 
Phone: +64 27 951 5850 Phone:    +64 3 364 3416 
rosiemarsh1@gmail.com  martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 





Rosemary Marsh (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury) 
 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury) 
 





Appendix B-9: Debrief sheet for control participants for Chapters two, three and four 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
Debriefing Form 
 
This study is interested in the memory functioning of people with dissociative identity 
disorder and those without a mental disorder. In order to understand this relationship, we 
asked for information about your levels of dissociation and post-traumatic stress using the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale - II (a measure of dissociation), the Dissociative Beliefs about 
Memory Measure (a measure of a person’s belief about the role of memory in their life), the 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptom Scale (a measure of PTSD) and the 20-item 
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (a measure of physical dissociation). 
 
We also sought information related to the difference between memories that people are aware 
of and those that they are not aware of (explicit and implicit memories, respectively). People 
with dissociation sometimes report being unable to remember certain memories in one 
identity, whereas they are easily remembered in another identity. Due to this, we used a series 
of tasks to see if memories created during the study and those recalled from the past were 
explicitly and implicitly recalled. We were also interested in how the emotional content of 
memories influences recall. We used the narratives from the first task to assess this by 
incorporating shameful events into a few of the stories. 
 
We were also interested in the effect of dissociation and trauma on your sense of self (your 
beliefs about yourself and who you are). We altered the self-referential information available 
during events. In task two, some people were required to talk about how much they identified 
with certain famous people. Some people were required to write their name on a drawing of 
theirs. This increased how much of their self-concept was engaged in the event. 
 
If you feel the need to talk to anyone about the effect this study has had on you, you are 
welcome to talk further to Rosemary Marsh or Martin Dorahy, via the contact details 
provided below. 
 
Contact details for the researchers are as follows: 
 
Rosemary Marsh Martin Dorahy 
Phone: +64 27 951 5850 Phone:    +64 3 364 3416 
rosiemarsh1@gmail.com martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 





Rosemary Marsh (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury) 
 
Assoc. Prof Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury) 
 




Appendix B-10: Debrief sheet for Chapter five 
 
The Relationship between Memory Functioning and Dissociation 
Debriefing Form 
 
This study was interested in the memory functioning and sense of self construction of people 
with dissociative identity disorder (DID), psychosis, and those without a mental disorder. In 
order to understand this relationship we asked for information about your levels of 
dissociation and self-concept using the Dissociative Experiences Scale - II (DES-II) (a 
measure of dissociation), the Self Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS) (a measure of the clarity of 
self concept), the Scale to assess Meaning Making, Identity Style Inventory – 5 (ISI-5) 
(processing of information associated with a person’s identity), Thinking About Life 
Experiences Scale (TALE) (assessment of autobiographical memories) and Diachronic 
Disunity Scale (DDS).  
 
We also sought information related to the difference between younger and older identities in 
DID and their comparability to similar ages in psychosis and control groups. Specifically, we 
were interested in whether there were structural variations in the way that memories and self 
were reported. We are also interested in learning whether the ways identities in DID describe 
themselves are similar or different both within the identity and between different identities. In 
addition, we are interested in the clarity of a person’s self-concept and the relationship there 
is to autobiographical memories.  
 
If you feel the need to talk to anyone about the effect this study has had on you, you are 
welcome to talk further to Rosie Marsh, Brooke Johnson or Martin Dorahy, via the contact 
details provided below. Your medical practitioners will also be free to talk about any 
thoughts you have regarding this study. Additional outside support can be gained from 
Lifeline Aotearoa in the form of an anonymous and confidential telephone counselling 
service (0800 543 354). 
 
Contact details for the researchers are as follows: 
 
Rosie Marsh 




Phone: +64 3 364 3416 
martin.dorahy@canterbury.ac.nz 
Brooke Johnson 




Thank you for your participation.  
 
Regards,  
Rosie Marsh (PhD Candidate, University of Canterbury), Brooke Johnson (Masters student, 
University of Canterbury), Prof. Martin Dorahy (University of Canterbury), Prof. Warwick 





























Appendix C-1: Simulator experience disclosure sheet for Chapters two, three and four 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Please fill in the following: 
 




Age (in years): ____________________ 
 
Primary discipline of study (e.g. Psychology, drama): _____________________ 
 
Education background (What is the highest qualification you have gained? E.g. NCEA, 
undergraduate degree…):____________________________ 
 
How much acting experience have you had (in years)? ____________________ 
 
How would you describe your acting experience? 
 
a) Professional 
b) Amateur  
 








Have you been diagnosed with any psychological disorder? (pls. circle):           No     Yes 
 
If yes, was it related to trauma you have experienced in your life? (pls circle):  No     Yes 
 
Have you ever had any visual, memory and attention problems? (pls circle):     No     Yes 
 
Do you have a history of sexual abuse/assault?                                                    No     Yes 
 
Email address:  
 








E.g. never heard 







E.g. completed a 
course that covers 
DID  
E.g. heard of 
the disorder  












Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (known in the past as Multiple Personality Disorder-
MPD) is a complex psychological disorder now understood to be the result of complicated 
biological, psychological and social factors, including the experience of severe trauma in 
early childhood, like repeated physical, sexual, and/or emotional abuse.  
 
 
Q: How Do the Identities of DID Develop? 
 
When faced with an overwhelming situation from which there is no physical escape, a child 
may learn to "go away" in his or her head. Children typically use this ability as a defense 
against physical and emotional pain, or fear of that pain. By dissociating, thoughts, feelings, 
memories, and perceptions of the trauma can be separated off in the mind.  Until about the 
age of eight or nine years, children are developmentally primed for fantasy play, such as 
when they create and interact with imaginary “friends”. When under extreme stress, young 
children may call on this special ability to develop a “character” or “role” into which they can 
escape when feeling threatened. One therapist described this as nothing more than a little girl 
imagining herself on a swing in the sunshine instead of at the hands of her abuser. Repeated 
dissociation can result in a series of separate entities, or mental states, which may eventually 
take on identities of their own. These entities can become the internal "personality states" of 
DID. Changing between these states of consciousness is often described as "switching".  
 
 
Q: Do People Actually Have “Multiple Personalities”? 
 
Yes and no. One of the reasons for the decision to change the disorder's name from MPD to 
DID is that "multiple personalities" is a misleading term. A person with DID feels as if he or 
she has within them two or more identities, each with its own way of thinking and 
remembering about the person and their life. These identities or personalities have been 
called "alters," "parts," "states of consciousness," or "ego states." It is important to keep in 
mind that although these alternate states may feel or appear to be very different, they are all 
manifestations of a single person.  
 
 
Q: Is it Obvious when a Person Switches Personalities? 
 
Unlike popular portrayals of dissociative identities in books and movies, most people with 
DID work hard to hide their dissociation. There is also a lot of variation in switching between 
identities. For some the switch is very subtle and not that noticeable, for others there is a 
distinct change in the person’s body posture, demeanour, use of language and interaction 
style. Switching often occurs quite quickly, over a few seconds or a little longer. People with 
DID can often function so well, especially under controlled circumstances, that family 
members, co-workers, neighbours, and others with whom they interact daily may not know 
that they are chronically dissociative.  People with DID can hold highly responsible jobs, 






Q:  What Are the Symptoms of Dissociative Identity Disorder? 
 
The main symptom of DID is having, and switching between, different identity states that 
have their own memories, emotions, behaviours and experiences in life. These identity states 
also often differ in their knowledge base (e.g., one may know French and another may not) 
and idiosyncrasies (e.g., accent, body posture, interpersonal interaction style; for example, 
one person might be shy, and another more playful or confident). Another core symptom of 
DID is the inability to remember important event in the person’s life, this is called amnesia. 
Often people with DID are unaware of what is happening while another idebtity is in control 
of their body and mind therefore they cannot remember what happened when that identity 
interacted with the world. This often means that identities are not aware of each other, like 
two different people operating in the same body with no knowledge of each other and no 
memories for what has haappened when the other is in control. People with DID can also 
experience out-of-body-episodes (e.g., feeling detached from themselves), time loss, and 
trance states. Often they also experience anxiety, depression and report hearing voices, that 
are thought to be the other identity or identities speak. 
 
 
Q: Is DID a Major Mental Health Problem? 
 
Current research shows that DID may affect 1% of the general population and as many as 5-
20% of people in psychiatric hospitals. These statistics put DID in the same category as 
schizophrenia, as one of the major mental health problems today.  
 
 
Q: Can Dissociative Disorders Be Cured?   
 
Yes. DID can respond well to individual psychotherapy, or "talk therapy,". Other therapies 
that might also be helpful include medications, hypnotherapy, and art or movement therapy. 
The course of treatment is long-term, intensive, and painful, as it generally involves 
remembering and reclaiming the dissociated traumatic experiences. Ultimately, the “alters” or 
“parts” can merge into a single whole “personality,” reclaiming the awareness, identity, and 






Appendix C-3: Identity description sheet for Chapters two, three and four 
 
Character Description Sheet 
 
Fill out the following questions to develop an identity or character 
What situation would draw this identity or character out in your life? 
 
What is the purpose/function of this identity/character in your life? 


























































































Although the created identities are aspects of the same individual they do NOT know each 
other. It is as if they are to separate people/characters. 
 
Please portray identities as you see fit, but try to behave as though you and your other 





Try not to remember anything that your other identity/character has experienced. Perform all 






Appendix C-4: Practice Logbook for Chapters two, three and four 
 






 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
0-10        
11-20        
21-30        
31-40        
41-50        
51-60        
61-70        
71-80        
81-90        














1. Invent and learn all the details of the second identity – not restricting yourself to the 
guidelines given. 
a. How is the character oriented towards other people?  For example: 
i. Is he/she respectful towards people in authority or disrespectful; 
ii. Is he/she sociable, offering information easily to others, or private and 
introverted? 
iii. How does he/she respond to conflict?  
 
b. What is his/her relationship like with the people in his/her life? For example 
(where appropriate):  
i. Parents; 
ii. Siblings;  
iii. Children;  
iv. Friends;  
v. Co-workers;  
vi. Employers;  
vii. Neighbours 
 
c. Think about important events in his/her life. Create memories for the identity. For 
example:  
i. Their most distressing or traumatic memory. 
ii. Times she/he remembers being happiest/saddest/most content/most 
afraid/most embarrassed. 
 
Note: While this material may not be explicitly used, there is no such thing as knowing your 




2. How does the second identity character move?   
a. How does he/she stand; sit; move his/her hands; cross his/her legs? 
b. Does he/she gaze directly at other people, or tend to look away? 
c. Does he/she lean into or away from other people when talking? 
d. Does he/she have any tics or physical habits, for example, playing with hair; 
fiddling with fingers; cracking knuckles; biting fingernails? 
e. What sort of clothes does he/she prefer to wear? 
Note: rehearse this physical identity by trying it on.  Go about your everyday tasks “in 








                  i.         to be loved 
ii.        to be praised and accepted  
iii.       to be ignored and left alone 
iv. not to be hurt  
v. to be desired 
vi. to be in control 
vii. to be looked after 
 
             b. What strategies does s/he use to achieve this? For example:  
                  i.        by flattery 
                  ii.        by trying to please  
iii. by sitting very still  
iv. by flirting 
v. by aggression  
vi. by submission  
vii. by presenting him/herself as : competent; incompetent; meek; respectful; 
disrespectful; in control; out of control? 
 
Note:  Ideally the secondary identity character never speaks or acts without you (the actor) 
knowing exactly what it is the character wishes to achieve by this behaviour (even if that is 




4. Rehearse moving between your own identity and the second identity character.   
a. Pay attention to the way the physical characteristics of this character differs 
from your usual behaviour.   
b. Change back and forth; try attempting the same tasks as each different 
character.   
c. Watch yourself “transitioning” in front of a mirror.   
d. It may help to take some time to observe strangers in a café or library – see 
how different people hold themselves differently, have different tics or 
gestures, speak differently.  Try and see what you can imagine about them 
from these observed physical actions: your task, ideally, is to make your 
second identity character as fully realised and believable to an outsider as a 






Appendix C-6: DID Knowledge Test for Chapters two, three and four 
 
Dissociative Identity Disorder Knowledge Test 
 
Please answer the following questions with True or False  
 
1. Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) was previously known as Multiple Personality 
Disorder (MPD). (True) 
 
2. DID is understood to be the result of complicated biological, psychological and social 
factors. (True)  
 
3. Only physical abuse in early childhood results in DID. (False) 
 
4. Children develop a “character” or “role” as a defence against pain, or fear of pain to escape 
when feeling threatened. (True) 
 
5. Trauma can be separated off in the mind by dissociating thoughts, feelings and memories. 
(True) 
 
6. Individuals with DID often refer to themselves as “I” instead of “we”. (False) 
 
7. Repeated dissociation can result in a series of separate entities, or mental states, which 
may eventually take on identities of their own. (True) 
 
8. Changing between states of consciousness is often described as "converting" rather than 
“switching”. (False) 
 
9. Identities or personalities have been called "alters," "parts," "states of consciousness," or 
"ego states”. (True) 
 
10. In DID, different identities are all manifestations of a single person. (True)  
 
11. Switching between identities is the same for all individual with DID involving a distinct 
change in the person’s body posture, demeanour, use of language and interaction style.  
(False) 
 
12. Different identity states that have their own memories, emotions, behaviours, experiences 
in life and knowledge base. (True) 
 
13. A core symptom of DID is the inability to remember important event in the person’s life, 
this is called amnesia. (True) 
 
14. It would be unusual for people with DID to experience out-of-body-episodes, time loss, 
and/or trance states. (False) 
 







Appendix C-7: Simulator checklist: Knowledge of Character for Chapters two, three and four 
 
Identification code:   
 





Hair Colour  
Eye Colour  
Occupation  




Personality Style  
Personal History  
Interaction with other people  
Family Life  
Marital Status  
Children  
Situations that bring out the identity  
Function/Purpose  








































3. Did you feel motivated to successfully mimic DID in this study? 
 
  Not at all     Somewhat              Quite a lot      Completely 
 
4.  Do you believe the researcher thought you had DID? 
 
   Not at all      Somewhat               Quite a lot                       Completely 
 
5. Did the information and coaching provided allow you to successfully simulate DID? 
 
  Not at all       Somewhat             Quite a lot       Completely 
 




7. Do you feel you spent enough time practicing simulating DID?                                    Yes      No 
 
8. Did you come across any obstacles that prevented you from simulating DID to the best of your 
ability? (e.g. illness, not enough direction, university commitments, work, etc..)             Yes      No  
 
9. Was the training period of 1 week sufficient time to effectively learn and practice simulating 
DID?                                                                                                                                    Yes      No 
 














Very poor Average Excellent Good Poor 



































1. Have you ever felt like there were two or more distinct identities each which have 
their own pattern of perceiving, thinking and relating to the self and others? 
YES    NO    UNSURE 
 
2. Do at least two of the identities or personalities recurrently take control of your 
behaviour? 
 YES    NO    UNSURE 
 
3. Have you experienced inability to recall important personal information that is too 
extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness? 
 YES    NO    UNSURE 
 
4. Is this problem with different identities or personalities due to substance abuse e.g. 
alcohol blackouts or a genuine medical condition? 










These questions describe experiences that you may have in your daily life.  Your answer 
should show how often these experiences happen to you when you ARE NOT under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.  CIRCLE a number from 0% to 100% to show what percentage 
of the time this happens to you.  If it happens 45% of the time, circle both 40% and 50%. 
 
1. Some people have the experience of driving or riding in a car or bus or subway and 
suddenly realising that they don’t remember what has happened during all or part of the trip. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly 
realise that  they did not hear part or all of what was said. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea 
how they got there. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
4. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that they 
don’t  remember putting on. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belongings that 
they do not remember buying. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
6. Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people that they do not 
know who call them by another name or insist that they have met them before. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
7. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are standing 
next to themselves or watching themselves do something and they actually see themselves as 
if they were looking at another person. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
8. Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognise friends or family 
members. 
 





9. Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their lives 
(for  example, a wedding or graduation). 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
 
10. Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not think 
that they have lied. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
11. Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognising 
themselves. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
12. Some people have the experience of feeling that other people, objects and the world 
around them are not real. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
13. Some people have the experience of feeling that their body does not seem to belong to 
them. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
14. Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so vividly 
that they feel as if they were reliving that event. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
15. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they remember 
happening really did happen or whether they just dreamed them. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
16. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but finding it strange 
and unfamiliar. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
17. Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie they become so 
absorbed in the story that they are unaware of other events happening around them. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
18. Some people find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it feels 
as though it were really happening to them. 
 




19. Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
20. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of nothing, 
and are not aware of the passage of time. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
21. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to 
themselves. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
22. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared with 
another  situation that they feel almost as if they were two different people. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
23. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things with 
amazing ease  and spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for example, sports, 
work, social situations, etc.). 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
24. Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done 
something or have just thought about doing this (for example, not knowing whether they have 
just mailed a letter or have just thought about mailing it). 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
25. Some people find evidence that they have done things that they do not remember 
doing. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
26. Some people sometimes find writings, drawings, or notes among their belongings that 
they must have done but cannot remember doing. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
27. Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head that tell them to 
do things or comment on things that they are doing. 
 
(NEVER)     0%     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100     (ALWAYS) 
 
28. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so that 
people and objects appear far away or unclear. 
 










Below is a list of problems that people sometimes have after experiencing a traumatic 
event. Please rate on a scale of 0-3 how much or how often these following things have 
occurred to you in the last two weeks: 
 
0. Not at all  
1. Once per week or less/ a little bit/ one in a while  
2. 2 to 4 times per week/ somewhat/ half the time  
3. 3 to 5 or more times per week/ very much/ almost always  
 
1. Having upsetting thought or images about the traumatic event that come 
into your head when you did not want them to  
 
0 1 2 3 
2. Having bad dreams or nightmares about the traumatic event  
 
0 1 2 3 
3. Reliving the traumatic event (acting as if it were happening again)  
 
0 1 2 3 
4. Feeling emotionally upset when you are reminded of the traumatic event  
 
0 1 2 3 
5. Experiencing physical reactions when reminded of the traumatic event 
(sweating, increased heart rate)  
 
0 1 2 3 
6. Trying not to think or talk about the traumatic event  
 
0 1 2 3 
7. Trying to avoid activities or people that remind you of the traumatic 
event  
 
0 1 2 3 
8. Not being able to remember an important part of the traumatic event  
 
0 1 2 3 
9. Having much less interest or participating much less often in important 
activities  
 
0 1 2 3 
10. Feeling distant or cut off from the people around you  
 
0 1 2 3 
11. Feeling emotionally numb (unable to cry or have loving feelings)  
 
0 1 2 3 
12. Feeling as if your future hopes or plans will not come true  
 
0 1 2 3 
13. Having trouble falling or staying asleep  
 
0 1 2 3 
14. Feeling irritable or having fits of anger  
 
0 1 2 3 
15. Having trouble concentrating  
 




16. Being overly alert  
 
0 1 2 3 
17. Being jumpy or easily startled 
 














Which ethnic groups do you identify with? 
- New Zealand European 
- Maori 
- Australian 
- Aboriginal Australian 
- Samoan 





- Other such as Dutch, Japanese, Tokelauan. Please state: 
   
What is the highest qualification you have gained? 
- NCEA Level 1/School certificate 
- NCEA Level 2 
- NCEA Level 3/higher school certificate 
- Trade certificate 
- University Entrance 
- Foundation or Bridging Course 
- National Certificate or Diploma 
- Undergraduate degree 
- Honours degree 
- Masters degree 
- Doctoral degree 
- Other 
 















While listening to the audio, how much did you notice having each of the following feelings? 
(please rate to the nearest whole number, where 0 is not at all and 100 is completely). 
 
Shame 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 
         Completely 
 
Disgust 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 
         Completely 
 
Anxiety 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 
         Completely 
 
Embarrassment 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 
         Completely 
 
Guilt 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 
         Completely 
 
Happiness 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 
         Completely 
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         Completely 
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at all 
         Completely 
 
Guilt 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 
         Completely 
 
Happiness 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not 
at all 





Appendix D-7: Post-Experiment Questionnaire for Chapters two, three and four 
 






















- Body posture 
o Yes 
o No 
- Voice Characteristics 
o Yes 
o No 




To what degree did the participant appear to be feigning DID symptoms? 
- Not at all 
- Somewhat 
- Quite a lot 
- Completely 
 



















- In a relationship 
- Married 
 
Which ethnic groups do you identify with? 
- New Zealand European 
- Maori 
- Australian 
- Aboriginal Australian 
- Samoan 





- Other such as Dutch, Japanese, Tokelauan. Please state: 
   
What is the highest qualification you have gained? 
- NCEA Level 1/School certificate 
- NCEA Level 2 
- NCEA Level 3/higher school certificate 
- Trade certificate 
- University Entrance 
- Foundation or Bridging Course 
- National Certificate or Diploma 
- Undergraduate degree 
- Honours degree 
- Master’s degree 
- Doctoral degree 
- Other 
 




If yes, and you know which one/s please select those that apply: 
- Dissociative Identity Disorder 
- Other dissociative disorder 
- Schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder 
- Other psychotic disorder (e.g., delusional disorder) 




- Post-traumatic stress disorder 
- Somatic symptom disorder 
- Mood disorder (e.g., depression, bipolar) 
- Eating disorder (e.g., binge eating, anorexia, bulimia nervosa) 
- Autism spectrum disorder 
- Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
- Anxiety disorder (e.g. social anxiety) 
- Substance use disorder (e.g. alcohol, common drugs) 















Appendix D-9: Child Dissociative Checklist (CDC) 
 
Child Dissociative Checklist (CDC), Version 3 
Frank W. Putnam, MD 
 
Date: ______________  Age: ______  Sex: M F  Identification: _________ 
 
Below is a list of behaviors that describe children. For each item that describes 
your child NOW or WITHIN THE PAST 12 MONTHS, please circle 2 if the item is 
VERY TRUE of your child. Circle 1 if the item is SOMEWHAT or SOMETIMES TRUE 
of your child. If the item is NOT TRUE of your child, circle 0. 
 
0  1  2  1. Child does not remember of denies traumatic or painful experiences  
that are know to have occurred. 
 
0  1  2  2. Child goes into a daze or trance-like state at times or often appears 
“spaced-out.” Teachers may report that he or she “daydreams”
 frequently in school. 
 
0  1  2  3. Child shows rapid changes in personality. He or she may go from
    being shy to being outgoing, from feminine to masculine, from 
timid to aggressive. 
 
0  1  2  4. Child is unusually forgetful or confused about things that he or she 
should know, e.g. may forget the names of friends, teachers or 
other important people, loses possessions or gets easily lost. 
 
0  1  2  5. Child has a very poor sense of time. He or she loses track of time, 
may think that it is morning when it is actually afternoon, gets 
confused about what day it is, or becomes confused about when 
something has happened. 
 
0  1  2  6. Child shows marked day-to-day or even hour-to-hour variations in
    his or her skills, knowledge, food preferences, athletic abilities,
    e.g. changes in handwriting, memory for previously learned  
Information such as multiplication tables, spelling, use of tools
 or artistic ability. 
 
0  1  2  7. Child shows rapid regressions in age-level behavior, e.g. a  
Twelve year-old starts to use baby-talk sucks thumb or draws  
like a four-year old. 
 
0  1  2  8. Child has a diffi cult time learning from experience, e.g.  
explanations, normal discipline or punishment do not change 
his or her behavior. 
 







0  1  2  10. Child refers to himself or herself in the third person (e.g. as she 
or her) when talking about self, or at times insists on being  
called by a different name. He or she may also claim that things 
that he or she did actually happened to another person. 
 
0  1  2  11. Child has rapidly changing physical complaints such as headache 
or upset stomach. For example, he or she may complain of a 
headache one minute and seem to forget about it the next. 
 
0  1  2  12. Child is unusually sexually precocious and may attempt age  
inappropriate sexual behaviour with other children or adults. 
 
0  1  2  13. Child suffers from unexplained injuries or may even deliberately 
injure self at times. 
 
0  1  2  14. Child reports hearing voices that talk to him or her. The voices 
may be friendly or angry and may come form “imaginary 
companions” or sound like the voices of parents, friends or 
teachers. 
 
0  1  2  15. Child has a vivid imaginary companion or companions. Child may 
insist that the imaginary companion(s) is responsible for things 
that he or she has done. 
 
0  1  2  16. Child has intense outbursts of anger, often without app arent cause 
and may display unusual physical strength during these 
episodes. 
 
0  1  2  17. Child sleepwalks frequently. 
 
0  1  2  18. Child has unusual night-time experiences, e.g. may report seeing 
“ghosts” or that things happen at night that he or she can’t 
account for (e.g. broken toys, unexplained injuries). 
 
0  1  2  19. Child frequently talks to him or herself, may use a different voice 
or argue with self at times. 
 
0  1  2  20. Child has two or more distinct and separate personalities that take 




Appendix D-10: MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
 
Ask for an example of each question answered positively. Only code YES if the example clearly show 
a distortion of thought, or of perception, if they are not culturally appropriate 
 
Now I am going to ask about unusual experiences that some people have; 
 
L1 a Have you ever believed that people were spying on you, or that 
someone was plotting against you, or trying to hurt you? 
 
 Yes No 
 b IF YES, do you currently believe these things?  Yes No 
      
L2 a Have you ever believed that someone was reading your mind or 
could hear your thoughts, or that you could actually read someone’s 
mind or hear what another person was thinking? 
 Yes No 
 b IF YES, do you currently believe these things?  Yes No 
      
L3 a Have you ever believed that someone or some force outside of 
yourself put thoughts in your mind that were not your own, or made 
you act in a way that was not your usual self? Have you ever felt that 
you were possessed?  
IF YES, ask for examples and discount any that are not psychotic 
 
 Yes No 
 b IF YES, do you currently believe these things?  Yes No 
      
L4 a Have you ever believed that you were being sent special messages 
through the TV, radio, or newspaper, or that a person you did not 
personally know was particularly interested in you? 
 
 Yes No 
 b IF YES, do you currently believe these things?  Yes No 
      
L6 a Have you ever heard things other people could not hear, such as 
voices? 
 
 Yes No 
 aa IF YES, did you hear a voice commenting on your thoughts or 
behaviour, or did you hear two or more voices talking to each other? 
 
 Yes No 
 b IF YES to L6.a, did have you heard these things in the past month?   Yes No 
      
L7 a Have you ever had visions when you were awake or have you ever 
seen things other people could not see? 
Check to see if these are culturally inappropriate 
 Yes No 
 b IF YES, have you seen these things in the past month?   Yes No 
      




 How long have you been experiencing  -examples- for?       Duration____________.          
 
      
N1 a Do you lack motivation to do things, or are you uninterested in things 
you once enjoyed? 
 
 Yes No 
 b IF YES, do you find you spend most of the day doing nothing?  Yes No 
      
N2 a Do you experience few or no emotions at events, or do your emotions 
lack in intensity? 
 Yes No 
 
 
     
Observers Judgement (do not read) 
 
   
L8 Is the person currently exhibiting incoherence, disorganized speech, or 
marked loosening of associations 
 Yes No 
      
L9 Is the person currently exhibiting disorganized or catatonic behaviour?  Yes No 
      
L10 Are negative symptoms of Schizophrenia e.g. significant affective 
flattening, poverty of speech (alogia), or an inability to initiate or persist in 
goal-directed activities (avolition) prominent during the interview? 





















Appendix D-11: Scale to assess Meaning Making 
 
Scale to assess meaning making: 
 










































Appendix D-12: Memory Characteristic Questionnaire 
Memory Title: 
Age at event: 
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire: 
1. My memory for this event is  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Dim                                                                                                                        Sharp/clear  
 
2.  My memory for this event is 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Black and white                                                                                                                       Entirely Colour 
 
3. My memory for this event involves visual detail  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Little or none                                                                                                                                   A lot 
 
4. My memory for this event involves sound  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Little or none                                                                                                                                   A lot 
 
5. My memory for this event involves smell  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Little or none                                                                                                                                             A lot 
 
6. My memory for this event involves touch  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 





7. My memory for this event involves taste  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Little or none                                                                                                                                   A lot 
 
9. My memory for the event is  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Sketchy                                                                                                                                        Very detailed 
 
10. Order of events is  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
     Confusing                                                                                                                                 Comprehensible
              
13. My memory for the location where the event takes place is  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Vague                     Clear/distinct 
 
15. Relative spatial arrangement of objects in my memory for the event is  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Vague                     Clear/distinct 
 
16. Relative spatial arrangement of people in my memory for the event is  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Vague                                    Clear/distinct 
 
17. My memory for the time when the event takes place is  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Vague                     Clear/distinct 
24. In this event I was  




A spectator                                    A participant 
 
25. At the time, the event seemed like it would have serious implications 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not at all               Definitely 
 
27. I remember how I felt at the time when the event took place 
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not at all               Definitely 
 
28. Feelings at the time were  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Negative                   Positive 
 
29. Feelings were  
 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not intense                       Very intense 
 
30. As I am remembering now, my feelings are 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not intense                       Very intense 
 
31. I remember what I thought at the time 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not at all                   Clearly 
 
32. This memory reveals or says about me 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 





33. Overall, I remember this event 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Hardly               Very well 
 
35. I remember what I thought after the event 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not at all             Yes, clearly 
 
36. Do you have any doubts about the accuracy of your memory for this event?  
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
A great deal of doubt                  No doubt whatsoever 
 
37. Since it happened, I have thought about this event 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not at all           Many times 
 
38. Since it happened, I have talked about it 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Not at all           Many times 
 
39. About when did this event happen? Circle one: 
 




















































Appendix E-2: Vignette transcripts for Chapter two 
 
 Home Vignette 
 
1 You are in your house 
 
2 You turn on your computer and look through websites 
 
3 You notice an advert for cheap clothing 
 
4 You notice yourself getting interested in its content 
 
5 You become more excited in the site as your interest increases 
 
6 Soon you are looking at the different specials 
 
7 You click a link to keep browsing 
 
8 Then, a respected friends of yours phones 
 
9 They hear your enthusiasm 
 
10 You tell them about the cheap clothes you’ve found 
 
11 You quickly click on the icon for more specials 
 
12 Your friend shares your excitement 
 
13 You get the impression they are also interested in the specials 
 
14 You feel good sharing the idea with your friend 
 
 Palk Vignette 
 
1 You are walking through a local park 
 
2 You notice a café and wonder whether to get a coffee 
 
3 You decide against it and continue along the path 
 
4 You approach a duck pond 
 
5 You sit on the bench beside the pond 
 
6 You feed the ducks 
 
7 You notice the wind start to pick up and put your jacket on 
 





9 You get off the park bench and continue walking through the park 
 
10 You see many people picnicking 
 
11 You decide you are hungry and head to the café 
 
12 You realise it has started raining lightly 
 
13 You get an umbrella from your bag 
 






Appendix E-3: Vignette transcripts for Chapter four 
 
 Bank Vignette 
 
1 You walk into your local bank 
 
2 You walk up to a free Teller 
 
3 You ask to withdraw $100 
 
4 You notice the Teller staring at your face 
 
5 The Teller begins to smirk 
 
6 They point and say you have nasal mucus on your cheek 
 
7 You quickly get a tissue to wipe your face clean 
 
8 As you do so, another Teller laughs mockingly at you 
 
9 You wipe the mucus off 
 
10 You feel vulnerable, inferior and exposed 
 
11 You wish you could dig yourself into a hole 
 
12 You take the $100 in a rush and head for the door 
 
13 You can sense the Tellers talking about you 
 
14 You leave the bank 
 
 Supermarket Vignette 
 
1 You go into your local supermarket 
 
2 You walk through the fruit and vegetable aisle 
 
3 You briefly stop to place apples in your trolley 
 
4 You suddenly remember needing to meet a friend at the restaurant next door 
 
5 You quickly turn the corner into the next aisle 
 
6 You feel your trolley bang into something 
 
7 You realise you have hit a small child 
 





9 She berates you for being so careless 
 
10 You see others in the aisle looking judgingly at you 
 
11 You apologise to the mother but others begin to criticise you 
 
12 You quickly try to get away from the situation 
 
13 You go to the self-checkout machine to buy the apples 
 






Appendix E-4: Instructions for behavioural task 
 
 Behavioural Tasks 1: 
In this task I am going to get you to do some activities that assess how the brain uses 
information in order to complete tasks. We will ask you some questions about the tasks later 
on. First, I would like you to take your mobile phone out, put it on silent and place it next to 
the pot plant. Second, I would like you to retrieve that book/brochure from the table, which is 
under some papers. Turn to page 12 and study the picture of the three shapes which is on the 
separate piece of paper. Now, following the instructions above the images, I would like you to 
draw the shapes on this blank piece of paper. Then colour the circle in blue, the triangle in 
red and the square in green using the crayons. Now, using your favourite coloured pen of this 
available set, write your first name under the circle and your birthday under the square. 
Now, what memory associated with your life comes to mind when you see the finished 
picture? When you have one, I would like you to spend fifteen seconds visualizing this 
memory. 
Behavioural Tasks 2: 
First, trace a picture of a dog using the blue pen. Second, fill those three cups with water to 
the level marked on the side of each cup. Then, line them up in order from the least amount of 
water to the most. Now, I would like you to create an origami model of a finger pointer. 
Follow these instructions to do so. Now, I would like you to view these photos of people and 
identify them while pointing with the origami finger. Do you know who these people are? 
Could you rank them from your most to least liked? Finally, I would like you to state which 




Appendix E-5: Drawing Shape Instructions 
 
Circle Drawing Instructions 
Starting from the top of the circle, where on a clock the point would be represented by the 
number 12, circle the pen around in a clockwise motion, eventually joining with the top of the 
shape. 
 
Triangle Drawing Instructions 
Starting from the top of the triangle, bring the pen down diagonally to the right bottom 
corner. Next, bring the pen along to the left corner. Finally, draw the pen up diagonally to the 
centre of the shape so it joins with the first drawn point. 
 
Square Drawing Instructions 
Starting from the top left corner of the square, draw a straight line across to the right corner. 
Next, bring the pen down and stop at the bottom right corner. Then bring the pen across to the 
bottom left corner. Last, join the remaining points with a line in order to create the final side 



















Appendix E-6: Instructions to Make Origami Finger Pointer 
 
1. With the top right corner, fold it over to the bottom left corner 
2. With the left top corner, fold it to the bottom left corner 
3. With the middle right corner, fold it so it meets the bottom left corner. 
4. Fold the top right corner to the bottom left corner 
5. With the right corner, fold it over fully, and then undo it so only a crease is left 
6. With the thicker part, roll it down so it folds in the middle 


























Appendix E-8: Recognition task stimuli for Chapter two 
 
 
1. Did you walk up to the duck pond? 
2. Did you walk up to the pet store? 
3. Did you leave a park? 
4. Did you exit a taxi? 
5. Did you notice the wind start to pick up? 
6. Did you notice the music playing in the bar? 
7. Did you put on a jacket? 
8. Did you eat a sandwich? 
9. Did you feel hungry? 
10. Did you feel ignored? 
11. Did you turn on the computer? 
12. Did you turn over the leaflet? 
13. Did you interact with the friend? 
14. Did you interact with the cousin? 
15. When you told your friend about the specials, did they become interested? 
16. When you told your friend about the specials, did they sound distressed? 
17. When you interacted with the person, were you in your house? 
18. When you interacted with the person, were you in your garden? 
19. Were the specials about clothes? 
20. Were the specials about make-up? 
21. Did you feel good? 
22. Did you feel moral? 




24. Did you feel broken ? 
25. Did you share the specials with your friend? 
26. Did you divide the money amongst your siblings? 
27. Did you get an umbrella from your bag? 
28. Did you take a photo with your camera? 
29. Did you look through websites? 
30. Did you gaze through the fence? 
31. Did you notice the café? 
32. Did you see the gym? 
33. Were people phoning? 
34. Were people visiting? 
35. Were people picnicking? 
36. Were people cycling? 
37. Did you click a link? 
38. Did you play a game? 
39. Did you walk through the park? 







Appendix E-9: Recognition task stimuli for Chapter three 
 
1. Did you paint over the lines? 
2. Did you colour in the shapes? 
3. Did you point to the pictures? 
4. Did you remove the photos? 
5. Did you put something by the pot plant? 
6. Did you put something under the keyboard? 
7. Did you put something in the cup? 
8. Did you put something over the chair? 
9. Were you asked to think of what memory came to mind when you saw your picture? 
10. Were you asked to think about your favourite toy from childhood? 
11. Were you asked to say which person was the most similar to you? 
12. Were you asked to say which people were in your favourite movies? 
13. Did you see a photo of a triangle? 
14. Did you see a photo of a diamond? 
15. Did you see a photo of Brad Pitt? 
16. Did you see a photo of George Clooney? 
17. Was the book under the papers? 
18. Was the book on top of the pen? 
19. Was the book on the floor? 
20. Was the book next to the door? 
21. Did you put your mobile on silent? 
22. Did you take your shoes off? 




24. Did you outline a star? 
25. Did you choose your favourite colour? 
26. Did you choose your favourite food? 
27. Did you rank the photos based on their likeability? 
28. Did you rank the photos based on their generosity? 
29. Did you create some drawings of shapes? 
30. Did you create some pictures of buildings? 
31. Did you create an origami model? 
32. Did you create a house made of cards? 
33. Did you colour in pictures? 
34. Did you cut through paper? 
35. Did you pour water? 
36. Did you play with play-dough? 
37. Did you write your name? 
38. Did you write your phone number? 
39. Did you write who was the most similar to you? 
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